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INTRODUCTION:  TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION 
STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND 
 
For as long as we can remember, legal education has been delivered 
in essentially the same fashion, in buckets.  Not literally, of course, but rather 
through an expert in a specific subject matter domain.1  The expert mines a 
bucket of substantive law, such as Contracts or Torts, relating it to students 
through a book of appellate cases.2  The students received this knowledge, 
studied it outside of class for its meaning, and then returned to class in a 
rather formalized linear structure to learn more about the nature and ethos of 
the bucket.3  With a presumptive identity of teaching and learning—that is, if 
the teacher was teaching, the students must be learning—things such as 
learning science, cultural awareness, power structures, specific objectives 
about developing a variety of lawyering skill-sets, and measuring those 
developments formatively, were at best peripheral to the learning process. 
The legal educational orthodoxy, however, is losing momentum—no 
longer an unquestioned beacon of educational superiority—and the rapidity 
and centrality of the potential changes have taken many people by surprise.  
The changes have been generated by forces located outside of the Academy, 
leading to the commoditization of legal education.4  As related in the article 
by Professors SpearIt and Smith Ledesma, students are voting with their 
pocketbooks5 and a shrinking number are applying to law school.6  Further, 
the type of law jobs available in a globalized, tech-savy legal market is 
evolving.  The economic forces are also influenced by the clients and the 
lawyers who operate within the system.  Clients are no longer blithely 
																																																								
1. Traditional subject matter domains included Torts, Contracts, Civil 
Procedure and Property Law. 
2. For one of the earliest casebooks, see, e.g., C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION 
OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871). 
3. The irony is that a law graduate in the early 1900s might very well feel 
right at home in the law school classroom of the early 2000s, especially when leafing through 
the books used to facilitate core courses. 
4. See Terrence Loose, What You Should Do Instead of Law School, YAHOO! 
EDUCATION, http://education.yahoo.net/articles/best_law_school_alternatives.htm (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2014). 
5. It was believed for many years that attending law school was a good idea 
for many people as a background for other endeavors, even if they did not want to practice 
law.* 
6. There has been at least a double-figure percent decrease in students taking 
the LSAT in each of the past three years, according to the Law School Admission Council.  
See LSATS Administered—Counts and Percent Increases by Admin and Year, LSAC, 
http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsats-administered (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
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accepting the fee structures of their lawyers, particularly institutional clients 
served by big firms; in-house lawyers are also responsible for managing fees, 
not just cases.  The day of assigning multiple senior and junior lawyers in a 
law firm or business to a job, and clients paying the resulting fees without 
question, seems to be over.  Consequently, the compact with the profession, 
through which law graduates are effectively given subsidized training by the 
lawyers that hire them, has been breached and may never return.  Instead, a 
very public cost/benefit debate is occurring—is legal education worth its 
price?7 
It is not just the legal profession that is changing, but law students as 
well.  Born-digital students seem to prefer more flexibility, mobility, and 
different learning approaches than the singular, Socratic-style, in-class 
linearity of generations past.  The idea of one size of learning fitting all is 
losing its appeal, especially for gamers and those living within a device-
obsessed culture. 
Despite all of the negativity swirling around legal education, there is, 
to some, a silver lining—this sea change brings opportunity.8  There is now a 
huge chance to reframe legal education so it is stronger and better situated in 
the global marketplace.  After all, it is hard to find a part of law that is so 
local it is not connected to or affected by a broader, if not global, stage. 
This new path for legal education likely involves a different 
understanding of a law school’s dual roles.  One role is teaching about a 
specialized knowledge domain, the law, often short-circuited into a way of 
thinking called thinking like a lawyer.9  This role provides law schools 
admission to the academy, the world of graduate education, through 
resemblance to other programs in length and rigor.  The other role is teaching 
students to become professional lawyers, operating with and applying the 
knowledge learned in the marketplace.  Any reconceptualization likely 
involves an education that is designed to transition students into law practice 
so that they not only pass the bar exam, but understand what it takes to 
succeed in their respective fields.  The education probably will involve using 
learning science and experiential education throughout the educational 
process, not just sporadically, but in domain-specific applications to 
maximize its value.  A new approach involves creating beneficial learning 
																																																								
7. E.g., Loose, supra note 4.  This commoditization is economic-oriented, 
mostly looking at the value of legal education compared to other graduate programs or no 
extra schooling at all.  See, e.g., id. 
8. This opportunity is to effect lasting and beneficial modifications that adapt 
to the needs of the constituencies in the long-term, not simply a short-term increase in paying 
applicants. 
9. This term has been over-used to justify what traditional law teachers do, 
without any specific data-driven outcomes analysis. 
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environments, those that are learner- and community-centered, and those that 
create engagement and not disinterest.  It is technology-driven and empathy-
motivated, paying attention to Yeats’ famous quote, “education is not the 
filling of a pail, but the lighting of a fire.” 
This edition of the Nova Law Review at Nova Southeastern 
University, Shepard Broad Law Center illustrates how the changing world of 
legal education provides an opportunity to revise and adapt our 
understandings and assumptions as we go forward.  The authors all use the 
theme of reframing—altering the pillars of legal education or even the law 
itself. 
Professors SpearIt and Stephanie Smith Ledesma, in Experiential 
Education As Critical Pedagogy:  Enhancing the Law School Experience, 
use critical pedagogy to examine the benefits of increasing the use of 
experience in legal education, particularly as a response to the downturn of 
law school applicants, law jobs, and publicity about the value of law school.  
The focus of the article is how changes in methodology serve not only to 
educate, but also to empower students.  The article thus expands boundaries 
and offers an uncommon window into the power relationships that lie within 
the legal education arena.  The authors view the empowerment of students 
through an experiential student-centered education not only as an intrinsic 
benefit, but one with various instrumental outcomes, especially if doctrinal 
faculty are engaged in the experiential process.  The most significant 
outcome for the authors is the opportunity for students to experience justice 
and not simply read about it in a book. 
Professors Curcio, Ward, and Dogra offer the very timely A Survey 
Instrument to Develop, Tailor, and Help Measure Law Student Cultural 
Diversity Education Learning Outcomes.  In light of the fact that the 
American Bar Association appears ready to adopt a learning outcomes model 
for its member schools, the authors suggest that competency in working 
across cultures, the importance of which is already understood in law 
practice in a multicultural world, should be adopted in a more systemic and 
systematic way in law schools.  The authors go far beyond just opining about 
the usefulness of such a pedagogy however, and provide a sample survey that 
could identify and measure culturally competent learning outcomes.  While 
law schools have been challenged by how to adapt curricula that blend 
together demands for a more modern and pragmatic education, the authors 
propose how their survey instrument and research can assist law schools in 
incorporating cultural sensitivity and specific learning outcomes within an 
existing curriculum, without starting from the beginning.  Thus, this article 
has something for the entire legal community, speaking to professors, 
students, practitioners, and accreditors, all at the same time. 
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Professor Elizabeth Shaver infuses the domain of legal research and 
writing with creativity and alternative pedagogy in LRW’s The Real World:  
Using Real Cases to Teach Persuasive Writing.  Professor Shaver uses the 
MTV reality show, The Real World, to illustrate how to reposition teaching 
and learning in legal research and writing.  In particular, she describes an 
exercise that utilizes actual briefs and judicial opinions to teach the different 
components of persuasive writing.  Included in these components are the 
development of a theme, organization of the arguments, and effective use of 
case law as authority.  Through the exercise, students become practitioners 
and importantly, learn how to spot and develop persuasive writing.  
Significantly, Professor Shaver thoughtfully organizes the order of learning 
for her students—knowledge of the rules and principles comes first, and then 
the application of that knowledge through judgment and evaluation about the 
components of persuasive advocacy follows.  In describing the 
comprehensive exercise, Professor Shaver provides a roadmap to her 
thinking about learning and persuasive writing in general. 
Ms. Feluren, in Moving the Focus Away From the IQ Score Towards 
the Subjective Assessment of Adaptive Functioning:  The Effect of the DSM-5 
on the Post-Atkins Categorical Exemption of Offenders With Intellectual 
Disability From the Death Penalty, writes about the impact of the new 
version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (“DSM”)—the DSM-5, the 
authoritative resource for diagnosis used by psychiatrists and 
psychologists—on the death penalty for persons who have an intellectual 
disability.  In Atkins v. Virginia,10 a seminal case about the Eighth 
Amendment’s limits on the death penalty for the mentally disabled, the 
Supreme Court drew a line against imposing the death penalty against a 
person who was significantly impaired mentally.11  Ms. Feluren analyzes the 
interface between the mental health system, as illustrated by the DSM-5, and 
the legal system, utilizing history and the textual changes to predict how the 
changes in the DSM-5 ought to be handled within the constitutional 
framework. 
Ms. Duquette writes about products liability and mass shootings in 
the United States in The Rx and the AR:  A Products Liability Approach to 
the Mass Shooting Problem.  Ms. Duquette presents a different perspective 
on how to deal with the issue of mass shootings—using controls over the 
distribution of prescription medications, instead of focusing on guns.  Ms. 
Duquette’s point is that many of the mass murderers were prescribed either 
antidepressant or antipsychotic medications and presumably were adversely 
																																																								
10. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
11. Id. at 321. 
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affected by them.  As such, the pharmaceutical industry should be part of the 
calculus in efforts to remedy this problem. 
These articles provide for wonderful reading on many levels, from 
thoughtful dispositions about topical and nuanced questions, to ways to ably 
respond to a rapidly transforming world, one where the entire nature of legal 
education and law could see more change in the next decade than it did in the 
previous century.  Law review articles are sometimes criticized for their lack 
of utility, but this is one criticism that cannot be leveled at this volume.  In 
fact, it is clear these articles will contribute to the national narrative about 
transforming legal education and law.  The new narrative created by these 
pieces helps to pave the way for decades of tradition to give way to a 
different and stronger foundation built to withstand emerging contexts—
leading to more suitable outcomes for a volatile and very challenging era for 
legal education and the rule of law. 
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Legal education reformers are increasingly focused on an 
outcome-oriented approach to legal education.  Law school 
accreditors are poised to adopt learning outcomes standards 
requiring each law school to identify the knowledge, attitudes, and 
skills its law graduates should possess.  Among the skills suggested 
for inclusion in law school learning outcomes is the ability to work 
effectively across cultures.  Despite the importance of cultural 
competence for effective legal practice, law schools have not yet 
developed a systematic method for helping students develop 
awareness of how cultural perspectives shape lawyer-client 
interactions, affect transactions, and influence the development of 
the law.  This article identifies ways law schools might 
conceptualize learning outcomes that will enhance law students’ 
abilities to effectively represent clients in today’s multicultural 
world and global legal environment.  It provides legal educators 
with a statistically valid and reliable survey instrument developed 
to help identify, and potentially measure, some of those learning 
outcomes.  It discusses the survey design and findings.  Finally, 
this article suggests several ways our survey instrument and 
research can help legal educators conceptualize ways to integrate 
the inclusion of cultural sensibility learning and learning 
outcomes into the law school curricula. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, law schools have been heavily berated for ill-
preparing students for real-world law practice.1  In response to widespread 
attacks on the legal education system, many U.S. law schools have begun 
rewriting their curricula.2  Legal education reformers have placed increasing 
                                                            
1. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949, 1951–53 (2012).  A. Benjamin Spencer has described this as 
“[the] perfect storm in legal education:  Law school graduates are under-employed, over-
indebted, and under-prepared for practice,” prompting an attack on legal education practices.  
Id. 
2. See U. DENVER STURM C. LAW, http://www.denverlawplan.com (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2014); Brian Leiter, Washington & Lee’s Radical Transformation of the 3rd 
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1
2014] INSTRUMENT TO DEVELOP AND TAILOR LAW STUDENT 179 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY EDUCATION LEARNING OUTCOMES 
emphasis on learning outcomes, sparking discussion about the value of an 
outcome-oriented approach to legal education as well as debate over which 
outcomes should be included in standard curricula.3  Law school accreditors 
are poised to adopt learning outcomes standards requiring each law school to 
identify the knowledge, attitudes, and skills law graduates should possess.4  
Among the skills proposed for inclusion in the mandatory outcomes was the 
ability to work effectively across a range of cultures.5 
Despite the fact that lawyers frequently deal with people from 
diverse backgrounds in the increasingly globalized practice of law, law 
schools have not yet developed a systematic method for helping students 
develop awareness of how cultural perspectives shape lawyer-client 
interactions, affect transactions, and influence the development of the law.6  
This aspect of education, often called cultural competence, has largely been 
relegated to the domain of clinical faculty or specialty courses.  Law school 
                                                                                                                                            
Year of Law School, BRIAN LIETER’S L. SCH. REP. (Mar. 24, 2008), http://
www.leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2008/03/washington-lees.html; Symposium Program, 
Ne. Univ. Sch. of Law, Experience the Future: Inaugural National Symposium on Experiential 
Education in Law (Oct. 26–28, 2012), http://www.northeastern.edu/law/pdfs/academics/exp-
future-papers/program-2012.pdf. 
3. See Janet W. Fisher, Putting Students at the Center of Legal Education:  
How an Emphasis on Outcome Measures in the ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools 
Might Transform the Educational Experience of Law Students, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 225, 225–26 
(2011); Beverly Petersen Jennison, Beyond Landgell:  Innovating in Legal Education, 62 
CATH. U. L. REV. 643 passim (2013).  For a comprehensive discussion of the shift to learning 
outcomes in legal education, see Mary A. Lynch, An Evaluation of Ten Concerns About Using 
Outcomes in Legal Education, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 976 (2012). 
4. The proposed accreditation standard incorporating learning outcomes, 
Standard 302, is currently in its final phase of adoption, having been published for “notice and 
comment” by the American Bar Association Council of the Section of Legal Education and 
Admission to the Bar.  The most recent version of proposed Standard 302 is available at 
Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. & 
Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education (Mar. 2014), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_
and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/march2014councilmeeting/2014
_02_compilation_of_proposed_changes_to_standards_clean.authcheckdam.pdf. 
5. See, e.g., Letter from Jackie Gardina, Co-President, Soc’y of Am. Law 
Teachers & Ngai Pindell Co-President, Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers, to Dean Jeffery E. Lewis, 
Chair, Am. Bar Ass’n Standards Review Comm. (Apr. 13, 2012), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/stan
dards_review_documents/20120416_comment_general_salt_s211_212.authcheckdam.pdf. 
6. Numerous legal educators have argued that cultural sensibility skills 
should be infused throughout the curriculum.  See ANTHONY O’DONNELL & RICHARD 
JOHNSTONE, DEVELOPING A CROSS-CULTURAL LAW CURRICULUM 13 (1997); Nelson P. Miller 
et al., Equality as Talisman:  Getting Beyond Bias to Cultural Competence as a Professional 
Skill, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 99, 111–13 (2008); Beverly I. Moran, Disappearing Act:  The 
Lack of Values Training in Legal Education–a Case for Cultural Competency, 38 S.U. L. REV. 
1, 24–26 (2010). 
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accreditors have thus far declined to include cultural competence as one of 
the mandatory outcomes, in contrast to the accrediting bodies for medical 
and other professional schools.7  Instead, the proposed accreditation standard 
allows individual law schools to decide whether cultural competence should 
be amongst the school’s designated learning outcomes.8  As schools respond 
to the demand for more experiential learning, and as they develop their list of 
learning outcomes, law schools should consider whether they should prepare 
students to become what we call a culturally sensible lawyer9—a lawyer who 
can work effectively across cultures. 
This article discusses the theoretical and practical aspects of 
developing a culturally sensible lawyer and a statistically reliable survey 
instrument we developed to help law schools assess some baseline cultural 
sensibility knowledge, attitudes, and skills learning outcomes.  Part I 
discusses why cultural sensibility should be a designated legal education 
learning outcome.  It begins with a brief discussion about the paradigm shift 
to learning outcome accreditation standards.  It then explains how the 
construct of cultural competence evolved into a construct of cultural 
sensibility.  Emphasizing an open-mindedness about one’s own and others’ 
cultures, cultural sensibility education works toward helping students avoid 
making assumptions about other cultures or legal systems, as well as 
avoiding behaviors based upon impressions of cultural domination or 
superiority.  This part then discusses why cultural sensibility is important for 
all lawyers, not just those engaged in international transactions or social 
justice issues.  Using the cultural sensibility framework, Part II discusses 
how law schools and law professors might conceptualize knowledge, skills, 
                                                            
7. See LIAISON COMM. ON MED. EDUC., FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF A 
MEDICAL SCHOOL: STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF MEDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS 
LEADING TO THE M.D. DEGREE 10 (2012), available at http://www.lcme.org/publications/
functions2012may.pdf (requiring medical schools to document objectives relating to the 
development of skills in cultural competence); see also THE NAT’L ARCHITECTURAL 
ACCREDITING BD., INC., 2009 CONDITIONS FOR ACCREDITATION 22 (2009), available at http://
www.naab.org/accreditation/2009_conditions (listing cultural diversity as one of its student 
performance criteria). 
8. See Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education 
(Mar. 2014), supra note 4. 
9. Some ideas in this article explicate thoughts originally expressed in earlier 
pieces.  See Andrea A. Curcio et al., Using Existing Frameworks to Develop Ways to Teach 
and Measure Law Students’ Cultural Competence, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION:  EDUCATION 
AND ETHICS IN PRACTICE 21, 21 (David A. Frenkel ed., 2013) [hereinafter Curcio et al., Using 
Existing Frameworks to Develop Ways to Teach and Measure Law Students’ Cultural 
Competence]; Andrea A. Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers:  A Study of 
Student Attitudes About the Role Culture Plays in the Lawyering Process, 16 U. W. SYDNEY L. 
REV. 100, 104 (2012) [hereinafter Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers]. 
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and attitude learning outcomes related to the development of a culturally 
sensible lawyer.  Part III explains theoretical models that explore the 
progression students experience as they develop their ability to work 
effectively across cultures.  These models challenge the notion that anyone 
can ever become fully culturally competent, positing that culture—and our 
experience of culture—is an evolving and dynamic process10 that occurs 
along a cultural sensibility learning continuum. 
In light of the cultural sensibility learning outcomes and learning 
continuum, Part IV discusses a statistically reliable survey instrument we 
developed to measure some aspects of students’ cultural sensibility 
knowledge, attitudes, and skills.  We explain the survey development and 
methodology and discuss the survey results.  In Part V, we discuss how the 
survey can be used to inform teaching, and develop learning outcomes.  Our 
survey results suggest that the focus of cultural sensibility teaching needs to 
be helping students understand that we all have multi-faceted cultural 
backgrounds and experiences that affect how we perceive and analyze legal 
problems and how we interact with clients and colleagues.  Our results 
suggest legal educators can use the survey to develop learning outcomes 
tailored to their students and that the survey can serve as one measure of 
achievement of some of those cultural sensibility learning outcomes. 
I. WHAT IS CULTURAL SENSIBILITY AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? 
A. Cultural Sensibility and the Law School Accreditation Context 
Historically, law school accreditors have focused on input 
measurements, requiring schools to provide substantial instruction with 
regard to certain kinds of knowledge, skills, and values.11  In addition to 
focusing on specific types of instruction, assessing law schools based on 
input measurements means emphasizing factors such as “faculty-student 
ratios [and] per pupil expenditures.”12  Law school accreditors’ input-
oriented focus significantly differs from the focus of accreditors in other 
                                                            
10. Lan Cao, The Ethnic Question in Law and Development, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 1044, 1069 (2004); Doris Estelle Long, Crossing the Innovation Divide, 81 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 507, 541 (2008). 
11. CATHERINE L. CARPENTER ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF EDUC. & 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT OF THE OUTCOME MEASURES COMMITTEE 19 (2008), 
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/legaled/committees/subcomm/Outcome%20Measures
%20Final%20Report.pdf; Susan Hanley Duncan, The New Accreditation Standards Are 
Coming to a Law School Near You—What You Need to Know About Learning Outcomes & 
Assessment, 16 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 605, 610 (2010). 
12. Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or Retrenchment:  Legal Education at a 
Crossroads, 44 IND. L. REV. 735, 764 (2011). 
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professions,13 and this approach has been widely criticized for failing to 
prepare students for legal practice.14  For instance, an influential 2007 report 
by the Clinical Legal Education Association critiqued the input-oriented 
approach, stating:  “In the history of legal education in the United States, 
there is no record of any concerted effort to consider what new lawyers 
should know or be able to do on their first day in practice or to design a 
program of instruction to achieve those goals.”15  Subsequently, the report 
noted, law school graduates were ill-prepared for practice, and law schools 
were guilty of doing a disservice to communities by failing to focus more on 
learning outcomes rather than educational inputs.16 
The traditional focus on learning inputs, however, has been rapidly 
changing in recent years as law school educators and accreditors have 
increasingly acknowledged the importance of an outcome-oriented approach 
to legal education.17  In 2007, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar appointed a Special 
Committee on Outcome Measures (“Outcomes Committee”), and in 2008, 
this Outcomes Committee released a report encouraging the section to “‘re-
examine the current ABA Accreditation Standards and reframe them, as 
needed, to reduce their reliance on input measures and instead adopt a greater 
and more overt reliance on outcome measures.’”18 
Since 2008, the ABA Standards Review Committee has been 
working to develop an accreditation standard that identifies mandatory 
learning outcomes.19  The latest version of proposed ABA accreditation 
standards includes Standard 302, which is entitled “Learning Outcomes” and 
                                                            
13. Id. at 763–64 & n.153. 
14. ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION 
AND A ROAD MAP 1–5 (1st ed. 2007); Spencer, supra note 1, at 2009. 
15. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 14, at 3.  For more discussion of the Best 
Practices Report and other background, see Carasik, supra note 12, at 743; Mary Crossley & 
Lu-in Wang, Essay, Learning by Doing:  An Experience with Outcomes Assessment, 41 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 269, 272 (2010); Fisher, supra note 3, at 225–30; Spencer, supra note 1, at 
2009–10. 
16. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 14, at 7–8; Spencer, supra note 1, at 
2009–10. 
17. See Crossley & Wang, supra note 15, at 269–73; Lynch, supra note 3 at 
981–84; Spencer, supra note 1, at 2016–17. 
18. Crossley & Wang, supra note 15, at 271–72. 
19. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 1.  The outcome measures have 
undergone numerous revisions and been the subject of substantial debate within the academy.  
Crossley & Wang, supra note 15, at 271–72.  For a thorough discussion of the debate within 
the academy, see generally, Lynch, supra note 3.  The various iterations of the proposed 
Learning Outcomes Standards, and the public comments on those iterations, are available at 
Notice and Comment, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/
notice_and_comment.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
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would require law schools to establish learning outcomes that demonstrate 
student competency in a number of areas.20 
Learning outcomes have been defined as “something [the] students 
can do now that they could not do previously . . . [a change in people] as a 
result of a learning experience.”21  Those advocating for an outcomes-based 
education argue that outcome-oriented assessment benefits students, law 
schools, and the community at large.  Students benefit from having clearly 
stated learning goals and faculty and law schools are able to determine the 
effectiveness of the institution’s curriculum.22  Further, they argue that law 
school accreditors protect consumers by encouraging educators to focus on 
institutional effectiveness and the training of competent lawyers.23  While 
there are legitimate concerns about the effect and implementation of learning 
outcomes,24 law school accreditors soon will join other professions and 
require schools to identify learning outcomes and demonstrate achievement 
of those outcomes.25 
As law schools make the paradigmatic shift toward focusing on what 
students have learned rather than on areas or types of instruction, legal 
educators will need to identify learning outcomes both on a course and 
curricular level.  Additionally, law school accreditors will be looking for 
ways to identify and analyze learning outcomes.  Cultural sensibility—more 
commonly known as cultural competency—is amongst the learning 
outcomes schools may choose to establish to satisfy the requirement that 
schools prepare law students for “competent and ethical participation as a 
                                                            
20. Standard 302 will require schools to establish learning outcomes that, 
at a minimum, include competency in the following:  (a) knowledge and 
understanding of substantive and procedural law; (b) Legal analysis and reasoning, 
legal research, problem-solving, and written and oral communication in the legal 
context; (c) Exercise of proper professional and ethical responsibilities to clients 
and the legal system; and (d) Other professional skills needed for competent and 
ethical participation as a member of the legal profession. 
Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. & 
Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education (Mar. 2014), supra note 4.  
Interpretation 302-1 encourages schools to consider fulfilling the mandate of Standard 302(d) 
by designating and measuring a wide range of additional skills, including cultural competency 
and self-evaluation.  Id. 
21. Paul Watson, The Role and Integration of Learning Outcomes Into the 
Educational Process, 3 ACTIVE LEARNING HIGHER EDUC. 205, 208 (2002). 
22. Lori A. Roberts, Assessing Ourselves:  Confirming Assumptions and 
Improving Student Learning by Efficiently and Fearlessly Assessing Student Learning 
Outcomes, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 457, 461, 466–67 (2011). 
23. Id. at 464; see also Steven I. Friedland, Outcomes and the Ownership 
Conception of Law School Courses, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 947, 959, 962 (2012). 
24. See infra text accompanying notes 105–08. 
25. See Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education 
(Mar. 2014), supra note 4. 
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member of the legal profession.”26  Recognizing the importance of preparing 
students to work in our multi-cultural world, this article provides law schools 
with a method to conceptualize, and begin to measure, some cultural 
sensibility learning outcomes. 
B. Evolution from Cultural Competence to Cultural Sensibility 
Culture is a social construct, steeped in the history, politics, and 
economics of a given community,27 and culture is not value-free.28  Culture 
encompasses a wide range of factors that influence individuals’ perspectives 
and behaviors.  The term culture itself has been the subject of great debate.29  
Although no singularly accepted definition of culture exists, some medical 
educators define culture as:  “[I]ntegrated patterns of human behavior that 
include the language, thoughts, [communications], actions, customs, beliefs, 
[values], and institutions of racial, ethnic, social, or religious groups.”30  By 
including the term social groups, this definition indicates that many aspects 
of culture exist, including but not limited to:  Socio-economic status, sexual 
orientation, disability, gender, physical characteristics, marital status, role in 
family, religion, and age.31  Of course, all members of a particular social 
group do not share all of the same experiences,32 and people have multiple 
                                                            
26. See Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education 
(Mar. 2014), supra note 4. 
27. O’DONNELL & JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 7–9. 
28. Nisha Dogra & Khalid Karim, Diversity Training for Psychiatrists, 11 
ADVANCES PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 159, 159 (2005); Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins:  
Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 195, 217–19 (2004). 
29. Raquel Aldana, Cross-Cultural Legal Competence as Transformation 
(n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad 
Law Center Library); Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law and Economics, the Culture of 
Deindividualization, the Paradox of Blackness, 70 IND. L.J. 709, 715 n.16 (1995); Mary Helen 
McNeal, Slow Down, People Breathing:  Lawyering, Culture and Place, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 
183, 204–05 (2011). 
30. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., CULTURAL COMPETENCE EDUCATION FOR 
MED. STUDENTS 1 (2005), available at https://www.aamc.org/download/54338/data/. 
31. See Susan Bryant, The Five Habits:  Building Cross-Cultural Competence 
in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 41 (2001); Adam B. Cohen, Many Forms of Culture, 64 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 194, 194–95 (2009). 
32. Bradley W. Bergey & Avi Kaplan, What Do Social Groups Have to Do 
with Culture?  The Crucial Role of Shared Experience, FRONTIERS PSYCHOL., Nov. 2010, at 1, 
1, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3153807/pdf/fpsyg-01-00199.pdf; Bryant, 
supra note 31, at 41.  See generally Alexis Anderson et al, Challenges of “Sameness”: Pitfalls 
and Benefits to Assumed Connections in Lawyering, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 339 (2012) 
(discussing the need to train students to be aware of the risks of sameness and assumptions of 
sameness when lawyers interact with clients). 
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cultural backgrounds that all converge to influence perceptions and 
behaviors.33  Thus, not only is the definition of culture elusive, one cannot 
assume that simply because someone has a particular cultural background 
they will act in a certain manner or hold certain beliefs. 
The way educators conceptualize frameworks for teaching students 
to work effectively across cultures reflects evolving understandings of 
cultural complexity.  Educators spanning numerous disciplines initially 
designated such work as cultural competence education.34  Although 
valuable insights exist from many disciplines, we focus on the cultural 
diversity teaching and assessment developments in the health care fields 
because of the parallels between medical and legal education with regard to 
developing students’ abilities to successfully work across cultures.35 
Decades ago, health care educators recognized the need for cultural 
competence education because studies indicated there were significant 
disparities in health outcomes related to patients’ race and ethnicity.36  Early 
health care educational endeavors proceeded on the premise that certain 
races and ethnicities had particular attitudes, beliefs, or experiences that 
impacted the delivery of health care services.37  This cultural competence 
model “emphasized a notion that clinicians and trainees need to develop 
expertise in particular cultures to be effective providers.”38  Based on this 
early conceptualization of cultural competence, students were expected to 
have a certain level of knowledge about particular cultures—e.g., knowledge 
about the culture’s history and origin and beliefs of people belonging to that 
                                                            
33. See Dogra & Karim, supra note 28, at 163; Ascanio Piomelli, Cross-
Cultural Lawyering by the Book:  The Latest Clinical Texts and a Sketch of a Future Agenda, 
4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 131, 133 (2006) [hereinafter Piomelli, Cross-Cultural 
Lawyering by the Book]. 
34. See, e.g., THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE 272–
403 (Darla K. Deardorff, ed., 2009) (discussing developing intercultural competence in 
numerous disciplines). 
35. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION 
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 80–81, 130–31 (1st ed. 2007) (discussing how legal educators 
can learn from our medical educator counterparts); Jennifer S. Bard, “Practicing Medicine 
and Studying Law”:  How Medical Schools Used to Have the Same Problems We Do and 
What We Can Learn from Their Efforts to Solve Them, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 135, 
150–55 (2011) (discussing similarities and differences between legal and medical education 
efforts to develop students’ practice skills). 
36. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Report Regarding the 2011 Pacific McGeorge 
Workshop on Promoting Intercultural Legal Competence (The “Tahoe II” Conference), 26 
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 63, 71 (2013). 
37. Niranjan S. Karnik & Nisha Dogra, The Cultural Sensibility Model:  A 
Process-Oriented Approach for Children and Adolescents, in 19 CHILD AND ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 719, 721 (Shashank V. Joshi & Andres J. 
Pumariega eds., 2010). 
38. Id. 
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culture both generally and as they related to the provision of health care.  
Students were also expected to develop skills based upon that knowledge, 
including the ability to communicate with sensitivity, to understand the 
patient’s perspective, and to develop culturally sensitive treatment plans.39  
Finally, students were expected to acquire attitudes that demonstrated an 
understanding of, and respect for, differences based upon cultural beliefs and 
practices.40  However, little attention was devoted to examination of how 
one’s own culture influences responses to these ideas. 
As medical educators used the cultural competence framework to 
develop teaching materials and assess student-learning outcomes, they 
discovered shortcomings inherent in that framework.  Although the impetus 
for development of cultural competence learning outcomes was to address 
health care disparities based upon race and ethnicity,41 some commentators 
criticized the narrow conceptualization of culture used when measuring 
health care students’ learning outcomes.42  Additionally, early educational 
models were criticized for proceeding on the assumption that one could 
develop expertise in a particular culture simply by learning about broad 
generalizations related to cultural beliefs and practices.43  Because culture is 
a complex, multi-faceted concept, and because all people have multiple 
cultural backgrounds and experiences that influence the lenses through which 
they see the world, it is impossible for anyone to become competent in 
another’s culture.44  It also became clear that given the number of different 
cultures that exist, the curriculum would become quickly overloaded with an 
emphasis on acquisition of specific cultural knowledge.45 
                                                            
39. Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes:  The Missing Element in 
Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 409–10 (1997) (discussing 
learning outcomes for mental health counselors); Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 724 
(discussing learning outcomes for medical students). 
40. Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 724. 
41. Aysegul Gozu et al., Review, Self-Administered Instruments to Measure 
Cultural Competence of Health Professionals:  A Systematic Review, 19 TEACHING & 
LEARNING MEDICINE 180, 181 (2007). 
42. See Arno K. Kumagai & Monica L. Lypson, Beyond Cultural 
Competence:  Critical Consciousness, Social Justice, and Multicultural Education, 84 ACAD. 
MED. 782 passim (2009); Zofia Kumas-Tan et al., Measures of Cultural Competence:  
Examining Hidden Assumptions, 82 ACAD. MED. 548 passim (2009). 
43. Angela C. Jenks, From “List of Traits” to “Open-Mindedness”:  
Emerging Issues in Cultural Competence Education, 35 CULTURE, MED., & PSYCHIATRY 209, 
215 (2011). 
44. Kumagai & Lypson, supra note 42, at 782–83; see also Kumas-Tan et al., 
supra note 42, at 552. 
45. Elois Ann Berlin & William C. Fowkes, Jr., A Teaching Framework for 
Cross-Cultural Heath Care:  Application in Family Practice, 139 W. J. MED. 934, 938 (1983) 
(noting that it was “unrealistic to [believe] that health care providers [could] gain [an] in-depth 
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To remedy the theoretical problems inherent in the cultural 
competency model, medical educators began talking about developing 
students’ cultural sensitivity or cultural humility.  These models defined 
culture more broadly and encompassed a much wider range of cultural 
factors, including race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, socio-
economic status, and other factors that influenced people’s worldviews.46  
Educators also examined developing students’ awareness of the role that 
culture plays in the delivery of health care services and using that awareness 
as a communication tool when treating patients.47  A culturally sensitive or 
culturally humble medical practitioner was taught to be aware that others 
may come from a different belief system or perspective and that they needed 
to respect that belief system and develop an appropriate treatment plan in 
light of the patient’s cultural background.48  Students also were taught to be 
self-reflective about their own biases and stereotypes and how those might 
affect the ways in which they interacted with and treated patients.49  They 
were encouraged to reflect upon their own preconceptions and to respect 
differences between their worldview and that of their patient to optimize 
patient care.50 
Clinical legal educators adopted this culturally sensitive approach, 
encouraging law students to be self-reflective about their own cultural 
experiences and how those experiences affected the students’ interpretation 
of client interactions and behaviors.51  Students were encouraged to be 
                                                                                                                                            
knowledge about . . . health-affecting beliefs and practices of every ethnic or cultural group 
they [were] likely to encounter”). 
46. Lisa Bliss et al., Client and Patient Relationships:  Understanding 
Cultural and Social Context, in POVERTY, HEALTH AND LAW: READINGS AND CASES FOR 
MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP 125, 147 (Elizabeth Tobin Tyler et al. eds., 2011); see also 
Melanie Tervalon & Jann Murray-García, Cultural Humility Versus Cultural Competence:  A 
Critical Distinction in Defining Physician Training Outcomes in Multicultural Education, 9 J. 
HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 117, 120 (1998). 
47. Tervalon & Murray-García, supra note 46, at 119–20; see also Bliss et al., 
supra note 46, at 148, 150. 
48. Bliss et al., supra note 46, at 146, 148. 
49. Id. at 148. 
50. Naser Z. Alsharif, Cultural Humility and Interprofessional Education and 
Practice:  A Winning Combination, AM. J. PHARMACEUTICAL EDUC., Sept. 10, 2012, at 1, 1. 
51. The seminal work in this area was done by Professors Susan Bryant and 
Jean Koh Peters.  E.g., Bryant, supra note 31.  Their 2001 article paved the way for clinical 
legal educators grappling with how best to teach law students to account for the role culture 
plays in the lawyering process.  Id.  Since then, many clinical educators have addressed how 
to help students understand the impact cultural experiences have on the lawyer-client 
relationship.  See, e.g., Bliss et al., supra note 46, at 148; Antoinette Sedillo López, Making 
and Breaking Habits:  Teaching (and Learning) Cultural Context, Self-Awareness, and 
Intercultural Communication Through Case Supervision in a Client-Service Legal Clinic, 28 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 43–44 (2008); Miller et al., supra note 6, at 111–12; Piomelli, 
27
: Nova Law Review 38, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
188 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
sensitive to cultural practices that differed from their own and to approach 
interactions with humility rather than hubris.52  However, this humility or 
sensitivity approach did not account for the fact that cultural experiences 
vary over our lifetimes and did not necessarily include encouraging students 
continuously to examine whether their own worldviews or beliefs might need 
to shift.  This approach also had the potential to encourage passive or blind 
acceptance of what the practitioner is told about other cultures.  Female 
genital mutilation—as an extreme example—might not be challenged for 
fear of being disrespectful of another’s culture.53  Similarly, this approach 
could lead to unexamined acceptance of cultural practices as a defense to 
charges of domestic violence.54  As educators continue to reflect upon—and 
improve—how to teach students to work effectively in today’s multicultural 
society, they develop new models.  For example, recently, doctors Karnik 
and Dogra proposed moving from a cultural sensitivity model to a cultural 
sensibility model.  They describe cultural sensibility as “an openness to 
emotional impressions, susceptibility, and sensitiveness” that allows one to 
reflect and change because of his or her interactions with people from 
different cultural backgrounds.55  This conceptual framework emphasizes 
that everyone has a cultural background that affects his or her perceptions, 
                                                                                                                                            
Cross-Cultural Lawyering by the Book, supra note 33, at 141; Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing 
and Counseling Across Cultures:  Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 384 (2002).  
Professors Bryant and Koh have brought their work with law students to the attention of 
practicing lawyers, who confront these same issues.  See Sue Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Five 
Habits for Cross-Cultural Lawyering—Introduction, ILL. LEGAL ADVOC., http://
www.illinoislegaladvocate.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.dsp_content&contentID=5985 
(last updated Oct. 2007). 
52. Margaret Martin Barry et al., Teaching Social Justice Lawyering:  
Systematically Including Community Legal Education in Law School Clinics, 18 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 401, 418 (2012); Sedillo López, supra note 51, at 45–48, 68; Liwen Mah, Comment, The 
Legal Profession Faces New Faces:  How Lawyers’ Professional Norms Should Change to 
Serve a Changing American Population, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1721, 1754 (2005). 
53. Some cultural relativists argue that one must respect the cultural practice 
of female genital mutilation while others argue that this practice violates basic human rights.  
For insights into this debate see Henriette Dahan Kalev, Cultural Rights or Human Rights, 
The Case of Female Genital Mutilation, 51 SEX ROLES 339, 347 (2004), available at http://
www.intact-network.net/intact/cp/files/1296997267_Cultural%20Rights%20or%20Human%
20Rights.pdf. 
54. For a very thoughtful analysis of the tensions between acceptance and 
challenging culturally based defenses in domestic violence cases, see Holly Maguigan, 
Cultural Evidence and Male Violence:  Are Feminist and Multiculturalist Reformers on a 
Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 passim (1995). 
55. Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 723 (laying out the cultural sensibility 
framework).  This work was based upon research originally outlined by Dr. Dogra in 2003.  
Nisha Dogra, Cultural Expertise or Cultural Sensibility?  A Comparison of Two Ideal Type 
Models to Teach Cultural Diversity, 5 INT’L J. OF MED. 223, 224–226 (2003). 
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beliefs, and actions.56  The cultural sensibility framework focuses on 
students’ understanding that culture is a complex compilation of numerous 
influences and emphasizes developing students’ understanding of how 
culture, in turn, influences interactions or knowledge.57  This approach 
considers whether students are able to use their understanding of culture to 
develop constructive and positive relationships or skills.58  Finally, the model 
looks at whether students are willing to be self-reflective about the role 
culture plays in interactions and use information they have learned to be 
open to re-examining, and potentially changing, their own perspectives, 
behaviors, and attitudes.59  At the heart of this framework is the notion that 
cultural experiences are not static.  Students and practitioners continue to 
develop; and their experiences continue to influence their worldviews.60 
This cultural sensibility framework, focused on the need to develop 
cultural self-awareness, compliments the work of many clinical legal 
educators,61 as well as views expressed by legal educator experts at the 2011 
Pacific McGeorge Workshop on Promoting Intercultural Legal 
Competence.62  This framework focuses on the need to teach students to 
recognize the influence their own cultural backgrounds and perspectives 
have on how they interpret legal rules and how they interact with others.63  
The goal of cultural sensibility education is to build self-awareness and to 
move students away from looking at those with different cultural experiences 
as the Other.64  Cultural sensibility education seeks to create an open-
mindedness that allows students to avoid making assumptions about other 
cultures or legal systems,65 teaching students to avoid behaviors based upon 
cultural domination or superiority,66 and encouraging them to be open to 
reconsidering, and potentially altering, their own way of viewing lawyer-
client interactions and legal problems. 
                                                            
56. Dogra & Karim, supra note 28, at 159–60. 
57. Id. at 163–64 tbl.1; Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 726–28 tbl.1. 
58. Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 726–28 tbl.1. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 31, at 40; Jacobs, supra note 39, at 405–06; 
Sedillo-Lopez, supra note 51, at 47–48; Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering:  Teaching 
Psychology to Develop Cultural Self-Awareness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 374–75 (2005). 
62. See generally Gevurtz, supra note 36. 
63. See Bryant, supra note 31, at 40; Weng, supra note 61, at 390, 396. 
64. See Weng, supra note 61, at 396–98 (discussing the need for students to 
become culturally self-aware and to recognize that a person’s culture shapes his or her 
attitudes, values and assumptions about the law and legal processes). 
65. Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 79–82. 
66. Id. at 82. 
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C. Why Cultural Sensibility is Important for Lawyers 
Cultural experiences underpin how we read and interpret legal 
principles and rules and how we apply those rules to facts.67  Cultural 
experiences also account for the way we understand and communicate 
information.68  Cultural perspectives permeate transnational transactions and 
cross-border disputes as well as domestic legal issues and interactions.  
Additionally, different countries and cultures have different views about 
attorneys’ functions in society and in particular situations.69 
Lawyers working in an international law context, be it in a large law 
firm’s business practice or on international human rights issues, should 
understand the role culture plays in their work.70  Likewise, understanding 
how to effectively work across cultures is important to lawyers who deal 
with cross-border disputes and transactions in many different legal 
specialties such as immigration law,71 environmental law,72 family law,73 
                                                            
67. Over a decade ago, Professor Marjorie Silver eloquently argued that law 
students should be taught that all lawyering is cross-cultural and that our cultural perspectives 
inform our legal and factual analysis.  See Marjorie Silver, Emotional Competence, Multi-
cultural Lawyering and Race, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 219 (2002).  Others have noted that culture 
permeates legal interpretation.  See, e.g., Kris Franklin, Pedagogy, “Theory Saved My Life”, 8 
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 599, 607 (2005) (noting “interpretation is both a basic human activity and 
wholly historically and culturally conditioned”); see Dan M. Kahan, Essay, “Ideology in” or 
“Cultural Cognition of” Judging:  What Difference Does It Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 
420 (2009). 
68. See Tae-Seop Lim, Language and Verbal Communication Across 
Cultures, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 69, 70, 73–
76 (William B. Gudykunst & Bella Mody eds., 2d ed. 2002); Peter A. Andersen et al., 
Nonverbal Communication Across Cultures, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 89, 90–91 (William B. Gudykunst & Bella Mody eds., 2d 
ed. 2002). 
69. Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 75. 
70. In the law firm context, see John Barkai, What’s a Cross-Cultural 
Mediator to Do? A Low-Context Solution for a High-Context Problem, 10 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 43, 44 (2008); Nancy S. Kim, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural 
Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 642, 655–60 (2010).  For application in the human 
rights context, see Kathleen Kelly Janus & Dee Smythe, Navigating Culture in the Field:  
Cultural Competency Training Lessons from the International Human Rights Clinic, 56 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 445, 446 (2011–2012). 
71. Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family 
and Marriage?:  Immigration Law’s Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273 passim 
(2003); Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 74. 
72. Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 74. 
73. Annie Bunting, Elijah and Ishmael:  Assessing Cultural Identity in 
Canadian Child Custody Decisions, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 471, 472–73 (2004); Gevurtz, supra 
note 36, at 74. 
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criminal law,74 and employment law,75 as well as in equity, property, and 
torts issues.76  However, the need to understand how cultural experiences 
affect the legal process is not limited to those engaging in international or 
cross-border transactions and disputes.  Most lawyers will encounter 
colleagues, judges, jurors, and clients whose cultural perspectives and 
experiences differ from their own.  Failure to understand the role culture 
plays can limit a lawyer’s ability to meet critical legal needs and provide 
access to justice as well as impede client representation generally.77 
Global competence, competently representing domestic clients, and 
access to justice issues all require lawyers to understand the role culture 
plays in the lawyering process.  Thus, scholars and educators working to 
develop students’ intercultural legal competence have identified two reasons 
for doing so:  (1) to enable law graduates to successfully represent clients in 
transactions and litigation situations that involve different countries, cultures 
or legal systems,78 and (2) to better serve those from underrepresented 
cultures and countries, providing greater access to justice.79 
Developing law students’ abilities to work effectively across cultures 
is important because lawyers’ failure to recognize and account for culturally 
different approaches to communication and problem solving may result in 
                                                            
74. See Scharlette Holdman & Christopher Seeds, Cultural Competency in 
Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 883, 883–84 (2008); see also Gevurtz, supra note 36, 
at 74. 
75. Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 74. 
76. O’DONNELL & JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 24, 66, 105 (suggesting ways 
to incorporate cultural sensibility teaching into a range of doctrinal courses); see also Gevurtz, 
supra note 36, at 74. 
77. For a discussion of the need for cultural sensibility to improve access to 
justice, see Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 74–75; see also Holdman & Seeds, supra note 74, at 
894, 896 (discussing how cultural competency is critical in capital cases involving clients 
from underserved and outsider communities); Ascanio Piomelli, Sensibilities for Social 
Justice Lawyers, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 177, 185–86 (2013) [hereinafter 
Piomelli, Sensibilities for Social Justice Lawyers] (discussing the need for social justice 
lawyers to pay attention to class, race and gender to recognize, and account for, cultural 
encapsulation).  For a discussion of the need for cultural sensibility skills in general client 
representation, see infra text accompanying notes 80–85. 
78. Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 71; Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, Teaching for 
Transnational Lawyering, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 519, 520 (2005) (noting cultural competence is 
“key to so many other methods of thinking and problem-solving that it should be taught as 
foundational to transnational lawyering”). 
79. Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 71; Nelson Miller & Victoria Kremski, Who Is 
the Customer and What Are We Selling?  Employer-Based Objectives for the Ethical 
Competence of Law School Graduates, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 223, 236–37 (2009); Piomelli, 
Sensibilities for Social Justice Lawyers, supra note 77, at 185–86; Rose Voyvodic, Lawyers 
Meet the Social Context:  Understanding Cultural Competence, 84 CANADIAN B. REV. 563, 
581–82 (2006). 
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misunderstandings,80 misapplication of the legal rules and principles to 
facts,81 failed international and cross-border transactions,82 the development 
and interpretation of laws and legal rules that fail to account for differing 
perspectives,83 and, in some cases, the continued marginalization of those 
who do not belong to the dominant culture.84  In all practice areas, cultural 
misunderstandings may impede lawyers’ abilities to effectively interview, 
investigate, counsel, negotiate, litigate, and resolve conflicts.85 
Helping law students understand the role culture plays in the 
lawyering process serves both lawyer and client.  As one health care educator 
noted, improved doctor-patient communications leads to more accurate 
diagnosis and treatment, increased patient satisfaction, and ultimately fewer 
malpractice claims.86  The same reasoning applies to lawyers.  Studies show 
that client satisfaction often relates as much to how lawyers communicate as 
to actual results achieved in a given case.87  Effective lawyers must be able to 
recognize, and appropriately respond to, their own and others’ cultural 
perceptions and beliefs because these often play a central role in lawyer-
client communications.88 
                                                            
80. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good 
Psychologists:  Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 437, 510–12 (2008); see also Bryant, supra note 31, at 42; see generally RICHARD 
BRISLIN, UNDERSTANDING CULTURE’S INFLUENCE ON BEHAVIOR (1993). 
81. Bryant & Peters, supra note 51 (noting that “[l]awyers in cross-cultural 
settings may have greater difficulty sorting out when they are making assumptions and when 
they are using facts”). 
82. Annette Demers, Cultural Competence and the Legal Profession:  An 
Annotated Bibliography of Materials Published Between 2000 and 2011, 39 INT’L J. LEGAL 
INFO 22, 22–23 (2011) (relaying story of failed international business transaction because of 
lawyer’s lack of awareness of cultural practices and expectations). 
83. O’DONNELL & JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 1. 
84. Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty 
Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 805, 837 (2008) (arguing that “the failure to train civil rights and 
poverty lawyers in practices of cross-cultural and difference-based identity analysis 
perpetuates stigma-induced marginalization in law and society”). 
85. Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 80, at 437, 442, 509–12. 
86. Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-Patient Communication: The 
Relationship with Malpractice Claims Among Primary Care Physicians and Surgeons, 277 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 553, 558 (1997). 
87. Clark D. Cunningham, Legal Education After Law School:  Lessons from 
Scotland and England, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 193, 203 (2005) (noting that studies found 
professional negligence claims often were not based upon case outcome but instead related to 
lawyer-client communication failures, including lawyers’ “failure to listen to the client, to ask 
appropriate questions, and to explain relevant aspects of the matter”). 
88. Bliss et al., supra note 46, at 141–43. 
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II. IDENTIFYING LEARNING OUTCOMES RELATED TO THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A CULTURALLY SENSIBLE LAWYER 
Educators committed to helping law students become culturally 
sensible professionals must consider how best to develop students’ abilities 
to work effectively across cultures.  Before designing a course or curriculum, 
it is useful to identify what students should learn in order to best design 
assignments, teaching methods, and assessments.89  One way to focus on 
student learning is to articulate learning outcomes.  Learning outcomes can 
help measure student progress.90  Learning outcomes can also provide 
valuable feedback about gaps in the course or curriculum and whether 
particular teaching modules or methods should be modified.91 
As mentioned above, learning outcomes are “something [the] 
students can do now that they could not do previously. . . . [A change in 
people] as a result of a learning experience.”92  The shift to learning 
outcomes is an educational paradigm shift in which the focus is upon what 
students have learned rather than on areas or types of instruction.93  The 
focus is on learner achievements rather than teacher intentions.94  Learning 
outcomes commonly consist of three aspects of student learning:  (1) the 
acquisition of knowledge (what instructors want students to know), (2) 
attitudes (the professional values or attitudes instructors want students to 
demonstrate), and (3) skills (what instructors want students to be able to 
do).95  These concepts constitute the knowledge–attitudes–skills framework 
used to develop student learning outcomes in other disciplines.  Although 
specific outcomes are often categorized separately, there is frequently some 
overlap and linkage.  As a group of medical school deans noted, “[i]nevitably 
there is overlap between the different domains with some outcomes being 
                                                            
89. MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ ET AL., TEACHING LAW BY DESIGN:  
ENGAGING STUDENTS FROM THE SYLLABUS TO THE FINAL EXAM 37 (2009); GRANT WIGGINS & 
JAY MCTIGHE, UNDERSTANDING BY DESIGN 13–14 (2d ed. 2005). 
90. Fisher, supra note 3, at 237. 
91. Id. at 236–37; see also Deborah Maranville et al., Lessons for Legal 
Education from the Engineering Profession’s Experience with Outcomes-Based Accreditation, 
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1017, 1032–33 (2012); Lynch, supra note 3, at 995–97. 
92. Watson, supra note 21, at 208. 
93. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 16–17; Friedland, supra note 23, at 
960. 
94. STEPHEN ADAM, LEARNING OUTCOMES CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
EUROPE:  UPDATE ON THE ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS OF LEARNING OUTCOMES ASSOCIATED 
WITH THE BOLOGNA PROCESS 14 (2008), available at http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/
hogeronderwijs/bologna/BolognaSeminars/documents/Edinburgh/Edinburgh_Feb08_Adams.p
df. 
95. Writing Learning Outcomes, AM. ASS’N. L. LIBR., http://www.aallnet.org/
Archived/Education-and-Events/cpe/outcomes.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
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common to more than one domain, but such duplication serves to illustrate 
the inextricable links and interdependence between the different elements 
comprising a competent and reflective practitioner.”96 
Learning outcomes may be designed by individual faculty members 
for a specific course and outcomes may be curricular in light of expectations 
of the knowledge–attitudes–skills graduates should demonstrate.97  Learning 
outcomes vary depending upon course or curricular content or individual 
faculty members’ learning objectives.  Both curricular and course learning 
outcomes are shaped by educators’ own world views and educational 
philosophies,98 and it is useful for educators to consider the reasons they 
choose particular approaches and the rationale for their preferences.99 
Because learning outcomes seek to provide information to students 
and teachers about student learning, they should be specific, measurable, 
achievable, relevant, and realistic.100  With that said, learning outcomes are 
difficult to draft because all learning is part of a continuum101 and the level 
and depth of learning depends upon context, teacher knowledge, and 
understanding as well as student knowledge and understanding.102  Very 
broad or general learning outcomes may provide learners little guidance and 
be difficult to measure.103  On the other hand, overly precise learning 
outcomes may too narrowly prescribe learning.104 
                                                            
96. J.G. Simpson et al., The Scottish Doctor—Learning Outcomes for the 
Medical Undergraduate in Scotland:  A Foundation for Competent and Reflective 
Practitioners, 24 MED. TCHR. 136, 137 (2002). 
97. RICHARD JOHNSTONE & SUMITRA VIGNAENDRA, AUSTRALIAN UNIVS. 
TEACHING COMM., LEARNING OUTCOMES AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT IN LAW 110–11 
(2003), available at http://www.cald.asn.au/docs/AUTC_2003_Johnstone-Vignaendra.pdf 
(discussing curricular based learning outcomes); Carolyn Grose, Outcomes-Based Education 
One Course at a Time:  My Experiment with Estates and Trusts, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336, 343–
44 (2012) (discussing course-based learning outcomes). 
98. Grose, supra note 97, at 340 (noting that in determining learning 
outcomes, educators identify their goals for the class, the desired outcomes and how those will 
be assessed, and the teaching methods best suited to the achievement of those outcomes). 
99. Id. at 345. 
100. Declan Kennedy et al., Writing and Using Learning Outcomes:  A 
Practical Guide, in EUA BOLOGNA HANDBOOK:  MAKING BOLOGNA WORK, 1, 18 available at 
http://sss.dcu.ie/afi/docs/bologna/writing_and_using_learning_outcomes.pdf; Jacob M. 
Carpenter, Unique Problems and Creative Solutions to Assessing Learning Outcomes in 
Transactional Drafting Courses:  Overcoming “The Form Book Problem,” 38 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 195, 203 (2012). 
101. Trevor Hussey & Patrick Smith, Learning Outcomes:  A Conceptual 
Analysis, 13 TEACHING HIGHER EDUC. 107, 109 (2008). 
102. Id. 
103. Ian Scott, The Learning Outcome in Higher Education:  Time to Think 
Again?, WORCESTER J. LEARNING & TEACHING, Jan. 2011, available at http://
www.worc.ac.uk/adpu/documents/WJLTIssue5PersonalperspectivesIScott.pdf. 
104. Id. 
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Some have correctly noted that not all aspects of what law professors 
teach can be reduced to an easily measurable learning outcome.105  
Additionally, there is a danger that quantification of learning outcomes may 
oversimplify the complexity of what students should learn.106  Although 
raising valid points, these critiques should not lead to a wholesale rejection 
of legal education learning outcomes.  The danger is not in identifying 
learning outcomes.  Rather, the dangers lay in reliance upon one instrument 
or one assessment method to quantify student learning,107 and in rigid 
adherence to a set of pre-determined learning outcomes rather than use of 
learning outcomes as part of an iterative process that guides, rather than 
dictates, student learning and curriculum development.108 
The process of identifying learning outcomes is relatively new to 
most law professors.  Therefore, to suggest cultural sensibility learning 
outcomes in the legal education context, we use work done by medical 
educators,109 clinical legal educators,110 and a group of legal education 
                                                            
105. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 3, at 986–90 (addressing concerns that a 
move to learning outcomes will result in a diminution of intellectual and conceptual classroom 
teaching and discussions). 
106. See Maranville et al., supra note 91, at 1035. 
107. See, e.g., Stefan H. Krieger & Serge A. Martinez, Performance Isn’t 
Everything:  The Importance of Conceptual Competence in Outcome Assessment of 
Experiential Learning, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 251 passim (2012) (arguing that outcomes 
assessment in experiential legal education should go beyond a checklist approach and 
encompass techniques designed to evaluate student reasoning as they engage with clients and 
cases). 
108. Angela Maher, Learning Outcomes in Higher Education:  Implications for 
Curriculum Design and Student Learning, J. HOSPITALITY, LEISURE, SPORT & TOURISM EDUC., 
Nov. 2004, at 46, 50. 
109. The theoretical constructs from medical educators were based upon the 
work of doctors Dogra, Karnik, and Karim.  See generally Dogra & Karim, supra note 28; 
Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37.  We also reviewed learning outcomes drafted by a blue 
ribbon commission of physicians and medical educators.  ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., TOOL 
FOR ASSESSING CULTURAL COMPETENCE TRAINING (TACCT) (2010), available at https:// 
www.aamc.org/download/54344/data/tacct_pdf.pdf [hereinafter ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., 
TOOL FOR ASSESSING CULTURAL COMPETENCE TRAINING (TACCT)].  We also reviewed survey 
instruments developed by numerous health care educators.  Michael D’Andrea et al., 
Evaluating the Impact of Multicultural Counseling Training, 70 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 143, 
145–48 (1991); Glenn Gamst et al., Cultural Competency Revised:  The California Brief 
Multicultural Competence Scale, 37 MEASUREMENT & EVALUATION COUNSELING & DEV. 163, 
163–66 (2004); Gozu et al., supra note 41 passim (reviewing numerous health care educator 
survey instruments); Sunil K. Khanna et al., Cultural Competency in Health Care:  Evaluating 
the Outcomes of a Cultural Competency Training Among Health Care Professionals, 101 J. 
NAT’L MED. ASS’N. 886, 887–89 (2009). 
110. Although many legal educators have worked on these issues, we found 
work done by the following clinical educators particularly informative as we designed the 
survey:  Bliss et al., supra note 46; Bryant, supra note 31; Miller et al., supra note 6; Sedillo 
López, supra note 51; Weng, supra note 61. 
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experts on cross-cultural learning.111  In designing these outcomes, we used 
the cultural sensibility model112 and the knowledge–attitudes–skills 
framework.113  We present these learning outcomes cognizant of the issues 
discussed above and with the understanding that although they might form a 
core curriculum of basic outcomes to help students understand the effect 
cultural perspectives have on the lawyering process, they are not an 
exhaustive or definitive list.114  Rather, they provide a starting place to 
envision developing a curriculum that prepares students to practice law in 
today’s multicultural society.  As with all learning outcomes, cultural 
sensibility learning outcomes will need to be revised and modified in 
response to student feedback and changing contexts.  We have categorized 
learning outcomes into the knowledge, skills, and attitudes domains.  
However, as mentioned above, there is often overlap within and between 
domains, and therefore learning outcomes that we have identified may 
appropriately fit within more than one domain.115 
A. Knowledge 
Many legal educators, especially clinical legal educators, recognize 
that competent lawyers must acknowledge the effect culture has upon the 
lawyer-client encounter and the ways in which lawyer ignorance of cultural 
perspectives can adversely impact clients.116  As discussed in Section I, 
amongst medical educators who pioneered the concept of developing 
culturally competent practitioners, competency originally was defined by 
knowledge about specific cultures as if there was a homogeneity amongst 
people who possessed a similar cultural background.117  Additionally, culture 
was commonly conflated with race and ethnicity.118  Such an approach 
                                                            
111. See generally Raquel Aldana & Leticia Saucedo, Learning in Mulukukú:  
A Journey of Transformation, in VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIVE LAW 
TEACHING 251 (Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers & Golden Gate Univ. Sch. of Law eds., 2011); 
Gevurtz, supra note 36. 
112. Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37 passim. 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 94–96. 
114. For an example of a comprehensive list of cultural sensibility medical 
school learning outcomes, see ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., TOOL FOR ASSESSING CULTURAL 
COMPETENCE TRAINING (TACCT), supra note 109. 
115. See supra text accompanying note 96. 
116. We do not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of all legal educators who 
have advocated for the integration of cultural sensibility education into law student clinical 
training.  Rather, we simply note that this issue is one that has long been considered by legal 
educators, and especially clinicians.  See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 31, at 35; Sedillo López, 
supra note 51, at 40; Weng, supra note 61, at 372–74. 
117. Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 721. 
118. Id. 
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encourages stereotyping and fails to acknowledge that individuals have 
multiple cultures and cultural experiences that shape their perceptions and 
attitudes.119  This conceptualization of culture can also lead to teaching about 
culture as if culture belongs to the Other rather than encouraging students’ 
understanding that we all have multiple cultural backgrounds that affect how 
we perceive and interact.120 
The issues inherent in this narrow approach have led legal educators 
to reject a knowledge-based approach in which students learn about 
particular cultures in favor of a more contextual approach in which learning 
outcomes focus on students’ knowledge and understanding of the cultural 
contexts in which information is presented and received.121  Additionally, 
some legal educators suggest that students should understand that cultural 
perspectives underlie legal decision-making in order to both effectively 
develop legal strategies under existing laws and to argue for changes to the 
law.122  Some argue that law students’ knowledge must extend to an 
understanding of the subconscious cognitive categories, schemas, and the 
susceptibility of schemas to unconscious biases and stereotyping in order to 
uncover deeply embedded assumptions and attitudes that affect 
interactions.123  Finally, some legal scholars postulate that students must 
understand the historical role cultural perspectives of the dominant culture 
                                                            
119. See TERRY CROSS ET AL., TOWARDS A CULTURALLY COMPETENT SYSTEM 
OF CARE: A MONOGRAPH ON EFFECTIVE SERVICES FOR MINORITY CHILDREN WHO ARE 
SEVERELY EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED 6 (1989); Mary E. Duffy, A Critique of Cultural 
Education in Nursing, 36 J. ADVANCED NURSING 487, 489 (2001); Cynthia A. Savage, Culture 
and Mediation: A Red Herring, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 269, 274 (1996). 
120. Piomelli, Cross-Cultural Lawyering by the Book, supra note 33, at 137–42 
(critiquing clinical textbook’s focus on examining the client’s culture while ignoring the 
student’s need to examine his or her own cultural experiences, beliefs and assumptions). 
121. See Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, 
Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1811–17 (1993) (arguing that understanding cultural contexts are critical 
to teaching lawyering for social change, and suggesting ways to raise personal identification 
issues in a wide range of classes); Alizabeth Newman, Bridging the Justice Gap:  Building 
Community by Responding to Individual Need, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 615, 664 (2011) (noting 
the need for community members to help lawyers understand the cultural contexts of clients’ 
statements and actions).  Clinical legal educators have adopted this contextualized approach as 
they teach students to interact with clients.  See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 3; Sedillo-López, 
supra note 51. 
122. See Kahan, supra note 67, at 419–21 (arguing that judges view cases 
through a cultural lens even when consciously trying to be objective); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et 
al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 
(2009) (finding that judges often have implicit biases that affect their judicial decision-
making). 
123. See Weng, supra note 61, at 373, 391–93; see also Jerry Kang, Trojan 
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1504 (2005); Miller et al., supra note 6, at 121–22. 
37
: Nova Law Review 38, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
198 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
have played and how these perspectives shaped the law in order to 
understand power differentials124 and how these perspectives influence 
relationships between individuals and the development of the law and legal 
systems.125 
We relay these last knowledge learning objectives with the caveat 
that, while it may be important to build students’ knowledge about historical 
perspectives, historical contexts vary among different communities and 
groups.126  Faculty should carefully consider how much emphasis should be 
placed upon the role the dominant culture has played in the development of 
the law and legal systems.  If students from the dominant culture feel that the 
curriculum is saying that their world views are wrong, as opposed to asking 
them to consider how their world views may color their thinking, the 
students may be less open to exploring the role culture plays in the lawyering 
process.127  A categorical view that certain views are acceptable and others 
are not may produce a defensive reaction and inhibit students’ willingness to 
engage in self-reflection and challenge their long-held beliefs.128  Thus, it is 
generally more effective to talk about unacceptable behaviors rather than 
unacceptable views. 
The following list utilizes the conceptualizations of various aspects 
of students’ cultural sensibility knowledge articulated above to identify some 
cultural sensibility knowledge learning outcomes one might have for a course 
or even a program of legal education—recognizing that many of these 
outcomes could also be categorized as attitude or skill outcomes. 
At the end of the course/law school you should be able to: 
 Define, in contemporary terms, race, ethnicity, and 
culture; 
                                                            
124. See O’DONNELL & JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 8; see also Anthony R. 
Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law:  From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (1995). 
125. See O’DONNELL & JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 8; Roberta Rosenthal 
Kwall, The Cultural Analysis Paradigm:  Women and Synagogue Ritual as a Case Study, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 609, 619 (2012). 
126. See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan, The New School Finance Litigation:  
Acknowledging That Race Discrimination in Public Education is More than Just a Tort, 96 
NW. U. L. REV. 99, 146–47 (2001–2002) (noting that race is a social construct based upon the 
historical and social context of a given community). 
127. See Aldana & Saucedo, supra note 111, at 255–56 (discussing the role 
reflective thinking plays in transformative educational experiences). 
128. See Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497, 
1563–65 (2010) (discussing psychologists’ findings that discussions of white privilege can 
have deleterious effects and ignite hostility in marginalized whites who may otherwise be 
allies in attempts to disrupt effect of that privilege). 
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 Identify your own cultural experiences and how those 
experiences may affect your perceptions of the law and 
legal systems; 
 Explain why cultural biases are not unique to one 
particular race or ethnicity or cultural background; 
 In a particular case or factual scenario, identify cultural 
experiences of the parties and the lawyers that may affect 
the legal and factual analysis; 
 Discuss the ways in which social determinants such as 
culture, education, income, housing, employment, access 
to transportation, and socio-economic status may affect 
access to justice; 
 Describe the influence of culture on the historical 
development of laws and legal systems; 
 Describe how stereotyping and biases may affect a 
lawyer’s interpretation of the facts and application of a 
legal rule to the facts; 
 Identify examples of culturally biased assumptions that 
lawyers and clients may bring into the lawyer-client 
relationship; 
 Explain your own cultural biases and how those may 
impact legal representation generally as well as in the 
context of a particular case or factual scenario; 
 Explain how subconscious schemas and categories make 
it difficult to identify when your reactions to other people 
are based upon culturally biased assumptions or 
stereotypes; 
 Recognize that bias and stereotyping (conscious and 
unconscious) affect your factual and legal analysis; 
 Describe challenges in cross-cultural communications. 
B. Attitudes 
Because our perspectives influence the decisions we make and how 
we view interactions,129 legal educators have discussed the need to develop 
students’ receptiveness to exploring the effect of socio-cultural beliefs and 
behaviors on the provision of legal services and the lawyer-client 
relationship.130  Clients may receive inadequate representation if law students 
and lawyers are not aware of their own potential bias and how their cultural 
                                                            
129. See John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation:  
What is a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 
85, 90–91 (1999). 
130. See generally Bryant, supra note 31; Miller et al., supra note 6; Sedillo 
López, supra note 51. 
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backgrounds affect their perceptions.  For example, Professor John B. 
Mitchell relates the story of a clinic case in which a recent émigré from an 
Asian country was accused of trying to sexually assault a man at a restroom 
urinal.131  The client’s story was that he thought he knew the alleged victim, 
and the client was simply trying to shake the man’s hand.132  For many 
Americans, the story would not be believable because of cultural attitudes 
about appropriate behavior at urinals.133  Understanding that in the client’s 
culture there was no self-consciousness about displaying what many 
Americans consider private body parts helped student lawyers develop the 
man’s defense.134  Understanding the effect of one’s socio-cultural belief 
systems is not just important in social justice lawyering.  It also important to 
lawyers engaged in representing business clients.  For example, in Western 
cultures, a signed contract represents a final business deal that the parties 
should honor and follow.  In other cultures, the fulfillment of a deal may be 
based upon trust between the parties rather than what is written in the 
contract.135  If lawyers do not understand that their attitudes toward a 
transaction stem from their own cultural practices and traditions, and that 
they should not view other cultural practices as wrong, the transaction may 
fail. 
A critical component of cultural sensibility education involves 
helping students understand how their own and others’ cultural practices and 
perceptions affect how they view clients and transactions.136  Students must 
understand that there is no single correct attitude or viewpoint, and faculty 
should not attempt to impose specific attitudes or values upon students.137  
Rather, faculty should seek to develop students’ curiosity, empathy, respect, 
and humility with regard to their own and others’ cultural beliefs and 
perspectives.138  These attitudes are important because they acknowledge that 
                                                            
131. Mitchell, supra note 129, at 104–05. 
132. Id. at 112. 
133. Id. at 116–17. 
134. Id. at 121. 
135. Catherine Sun, Negotiating Business Transactions in China, in BEST 
PRACTICES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN CHINA: LEADING LAWYERS ON 
STRUCTURING AND NEGOTIATING TRADE TRANSACTIONS, UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF 
DUE DILIGENCE, AND WORKING AS A LEGAL PROFESSIONAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
COMMUNITY 76 (Aspatore, 2009). 
136. See Miller et al., supra note 6, at 105–06; Sedillo López, supra note 51, at 
45–49. 
137. Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural 
Society, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 140, 160 (1995); F. Patrick Hubbard, Justice, Creativity, and Popular 
Culture:  The “Jurisprudence” of Mary Chapin Carpenter, 27 PAC. L.J. 1139, 1146–47 
(1996). 
138. Miller et al., supra note 6, at 113; Piomelli, Cross-Cultural Lawyering by 
the Book, supra note 33, at 153, 166; see also Weng, supra note 61, at 372. 
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our world view is not an absolute truth.  In cultural sensibility education, 
perhaps the most important attitudes to cultivate are openness to learning 
about how culture affects the lawyering process and open-mindedness about 
the assumptions students have about their own and others’ cultures.139  
Students should learn not to make judgments based upon their own cultural 
background and perceptions and should not assume that others share their 
perspective.140  They should also be open to discovering that their initial 
assumptions about another’s legal system or culture may be incorrect.141  
Faculty should also help students develop their self-awareness about their 
own system and culture, teaching students about how their own cultural 
backgrounds affect their perceptions and actions.142  Finally, students should 
be aware of differences in communication styles and value systems without 
attributing positive or negative connotations to those differences.143 
With these principles in mind, the following list identifies some 
cultural sensibility attitude learning outcomes one might have for a course or 
even a program of legal education (recognizing that many of these outcomes 
could also be categorized as knowledge or skill outcomes). 
At the end of the course/law school you should be able to: 
 Explain the challenges inherent in exploration of one’s 
own cultural biases and stereotypes; 
 Identify impediments that affect your openness to 
learning about your own cultural biases and stereotypes; 
 Explain why lawyers are as likely as clients to see the 
world through their own cultural lenses; 
 Reflect on how different values systems and 
communications styles may affect lawyers’ 
interpretations of client reactions and behaviors; 
 Reflect upon how your own varied cultural experiences 
affect your perceptions and interactions with clients, 
colleagues, and staff; 
 Evaluate why people are resistant to admitting that they 
make judgments based upon cultural biases and 
stereotypes; 
 Evaluate the role your own cultural experiences have had 
in shaping your views about the law and legal systems; 
                                                            
139. The attitude learning outcomes for a culturally sensible lawyer are built 
upon the work done by clinical legal educators.  For example, over a decade ago, Professor 
Bryant suggested that open-mindedness was a critical component of building students’ 
abilities to work effectively across cultures.  Bryant, supra note 31, at 41–42. 
140. Weng, supra note 61, at 385–86. 
141. See Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 84–85. 
142. Miller et al., supra note 6, at 105–06, 114; Silver, supra note 67, at 230. 
143. See Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 83–84. 
41
: Nova Law Review 38, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
202 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
 Recognize the need to suspend judgment when 
encountering unfamiliar conduct or views; 
 Demonstrate curiosity about the ways in which your 
cultural beliefs and practices influence your perceptions 
and interactions; 
 Demonstrate curiosity about clients’ cultural beliefs and 
practices. 
C. Skills 
Legal educators have identified the need for students to account for 
cultural perspectives, motivations, backgrounds, and understandings of the 
lawyer and the person with whom he or she interacts, and to apply these 
same understandings to their legal analysis.144  Students should be taught to 
assess whether their own assumptions and biases affect their understandings 
of information or the overall case,145 to identify red flags that indicate 
miscommunication may have occurred, and to develop strategies for 
correcting miscommunications caused by cultural misunderstandings.146  All 
of these skills enhance students’ abilities to effectively represent clients from 
a wide range of cultural backgrounds and perspectives.  Although some 
cultural sensibility skills are probably best developed via experiential 
learning, others can be developed in doctrinal courses through analysis of the 
cultural perspectives and beliefs underlying legal arguments, legal rules and 
judicial reasoning. 
The list below suggests some cultural sensibility skills learning 
outcomes one might have for a course or program of legal education 
(recognizing that many of these outcomes could also be categorized as 
knowledge or skill outcomes). 
At the end of this course/law school you should be able to: 
 Identify the cultural factors that may have affected the 
judge’s or jury’s decision-making process in a given case; 
 Identify the cultural factors that may have affected how 
the lawyer presented his or her client’s case; 
 Identify methods that may be utilized to ensure awareness 
of your own cultural traditions, perspectives, and beliefs; 
 Identify methods that may be utilized to ensure awareness 
of others’ cultural traditions, perspectives, and beliefs and 
how those may be the same or different than your own; 
                                                            
144. Bryant, supra note 31, at 40–41. 
145. Id. at 48–50; Sedillo López, supra note 51, at 46–48. 
146. Bryant, supra note 31, at 73, 76. 
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 Incorporate cultural considerations into your discussion of 
a hypothetical legal problem and the appropriate solution; 
 Provide examples of how your own cultural assumptions 
and biases affected your understanding of the factual and 
legal issues in a given case or transaction; 
 Identify situations in which your cultural biases or 
stereotypes impeded successful legal representation; 
 Ask appropriate questions to elicit client information 
about cultural beliefs or practices that may affect 
representation; 
 Communicate effectively using a wide range of strategies 
to engage with clients; 
 Respond appropriately to client feedback about key cross-
cultural issues; 
 Demonstrate strategies to assess, manage, and reduce bias 
in encounters with clients and witnesses; 
 Explain techniques and tools that can help identify red 
flags that there has been a cross-cultural 
miscommunication; 
 Use reflective practices when working on legal cases or 
transactions; 
 Use reflective practices when considering cultural 
contexts and cultural norms and whether particular 
cultural norms and practices create injustices which 
should be challenged. 
III. THE CULTURAL SENSIBILITY LEARNING CONTINUUM 
Identification of learning outcomes helps clarify what students 
should learn.  However, assessment of learning outcomes has to occur with 
the recognition that cultural sensibility develops on a continuum and that 
individual students within a given cohort may be in different places on that 
continuum.  Educators in other disciplines have developed various models to 
explain the progression students go through as they develop their abilities to 
work effectively across cultures.  One seminal early model was developed by 
Milton J. Bennett, M.D.147  Dr. Bennett’s model “provides a theory-based 
explanation for the varying degrees of individual and organizational 
effectiveness one observes in intercultural endeavours.”148  Bennett’s 
theoretical model describes the progression through various phases of what 
                                                            
147. Milton J. Bennett, A Developmental Approach to Training for 
Intercultural Sensitivity, 10 INT’L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 179, 179 (1986). 
148. Joe Greenholtz, Assessing Cross-Cultural Competence in Transnational 
Education:  The Intercultural Development Inventory, 25 HIGHER EDUC. EUR. 411, 412 
(2000); see also Bennett, supra note 147, at 180. 
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he calls intercultural sensitivity.149  He suggests that learners move from 
being ethnocentric, using their own culture as the yardstick by which other 
cultures are measured, to becoming ethnorelative, realizing that their own 
culture is “one of many equally valid worldviews.”150 
Bennett labels the first level of this development as Denial of 
Difference.151  In this phase, students do not understand or accept cultural 
differences.  People in this category either do not notice differences or 
construct broad, undifferentiated categories of cultural difference, such as 
Asian.152  Students at this stage must learn to recognize the existence of 
cultural differences.153  Bennett identifies the second level as Defense 
Against Difference, a stage in which one views differences as a “threat to the 
centrality of one’s world view.”154  In this phase, learners recognize cultural 
differences but negatively evaluate those differences.155  People at this level 
tend to either denigrate other cultures, exaggerate the positive characteristics 
of their own culture, or in some cases see another culture as superior to their 
own.156  At this stage, students need to work on developing less polarized 
views about cultural differences.157  Bennett describes the third level, 
Minimization of Difference, as a “last-ditch attempt to preserve the centrality 
of one’s own world view”158 by trivializing differences.159  Learners 
recognize and accept superficial cultural differences but insist that all human 
beings are essentially the same, with the same basic values.160  At this stage, 
students need to work on development of cultural self-awareness, including 
understanding their own values and beliefs and exploring issues of dominant 
group privilege.161  The goal is to help students at this stage develop open-
mindedness, the ability to perceive others accurately, and the capacity to 
maintain a nonjudgmental interaction posture.162 
                                                            
 149. Bennett, supra note 147, at 180. 
150. Greenholtz, supra note 148, at 413; see also Bennett, supra note 147, at 
190–91. 
151. Bennett, supra note 147, at 182. 
152. Id. at 182–83, 187. 
153. Id. at 187–88. 
154. Id. at 183. 
155. Id. at 183, 188. 
156. Bennett, supra note 147, at 183, 188. 
157. Id. at 189. 
158. Id. at 183. 
159. Id. at 184. 
160. Id. 
161. See Bennett, supra note 147, at 190–91. 
162. See id.; Bryant, supra note 31, at 56 (noting that “non-judgmental 
[thinking] is a core cross-cultural skill and one that is particularly difficult for lawyers”).  For 
an insightful discussion of why it is important to help law students move from an ethnocentric 
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At the fourth level, Acceptance of Difference, learners recognize and 
appreciate cultural differences in behavior and values.163  Learners are able to 
differentiate and elaborate various cultural categories and develop a meta-
level view of cultural difference, including knowledge about the multi-
faceted aspects of their own culture.164  At this stage, educators should work 
with students to help them refine their analysis of cultural contrasts and 
deepen cultural self-awareness.165  Students should begin to learn how to 
shift their frame of reference to incorporate willingness to learn about other 
cultures without judgment.166  Bennett’s fifth level, Adaptation to Difference, 
is the stage at which students are aware of the role culture plays in 
interactions and have developed the communication skills that enable 
effective intercultural communication.167  Students at this level consciously 
understand the need to shift their frame of reference in intercultural situations 
so that they are not looking at the situation only through their own cultural 
lens.168  At this stage, students are working at problem solving and 
interaction skills from the perspective of one who understands that culture is 
multi-faceted and relative, and that there is no one good or bad cultural 
perspective.169  Bennett’s final level, Integration of Difference, is when 
learners have internalized multicultural frames of reference and do not self-
identify with any one particular culture, but rather look at themselves as 
having a multicultural identity and having the ability to unconsciously adjust 
to a wide range of cultural beliefs and practices.170  At this stage, educators 
help students understand their multicultural identity and how that identity is a 
work-in-progress based upon continuing experiences and interactions.171 
As learners progress through these stages, they move from a lack of 
recognition of the role culture plays in their own interactions to fully 
understanding and integrating cultural sensibility into their lives by 
accounting for, and adjusting to, differing cultural perspectives.  Underlying 
Bennett’s model is the need to help students develop self-awareness in order 
to progress from ethnocentrism—the first three stages—to ethnorelativism—
the latter three stages.172 
                                                                                                                                            
to an ethnorelative perspective, see Shiv Narayan Persaud, Is Color Blind Justice Also 
Culturally Blind, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR. AM. L. & POL’Y 23, 63–64 (2012). 
163. Bennett, supra note 147, at 184–85. 
164. Id. 
165. See id. at 191–92. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 185–86. 
168. Bennett, supra note 147, at 185–86. 
169. Id. at 192–93. 
170. Id. at 186. 
171. See id. at 193–94. 
172. Greenholtz, supra note 148, at 412–13. 
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William Howell designed a slightly different model173 that 
Professors Bryant and Koh adapted to describe the stages of law student 
cultural competence.  Using Howell’s model, they identify the first stage as 
unconscious incompetence, one that involves a total lack of awareness of the 
role culture plays in the lawyering process.174  Students at this stage do not 
recognize cultural differences and are unaware of cross-cultural 
miscommunications.  In Howell’s second stage, conscious incompetence, 
students recognize that culture plays a role in how they understand and 
perceive communications and interactions, but they do not have the skills 
necessary to engage in effective cross-cultural interactions.175  In this stage, 
students recognize cross-cultural miscommunications and 
misunderstandings, but they do not know how to avoid them or how to build 
positive and trusting relationships with clients.176  The third stage is one of 
conscious competence, in which students understand how to effectively 
communicate across cultures, and are aware of the need to use cross-cultural 
lawyering skills that they consciously apply to their interactions with 
clients.177  Finally, students reach Howell’s fourth stage:  The level of 
unconscious competence.178  At this stage, the understanding of the role 
culture plays in the lawyering process, and the skills necessary to deal 
effectively across cultures, has become so ingrained that students 
unconsciously incorporate cross-cultural skills and perspectives into their 
interactions with others.179 
For cultural sensibility, the learning continuum is slightly different 
than the continua described above in that the best practice or highest level in 
cultural sensibility education is achieved when the individual incorporates 
the principles regarding culture and diversity as an integral part of their daily 
practice.180  That is, practitioners reflect on their communications and 
interpretations as they are happening—reflection in action—and modify 
them as they receive cues that clients are disengaging or that client and 
practitioner perspectives are too far apart.181  In recognizing potential 
differences at an individual level, practitioners avoid falling into the trap of 
using stereotypes.182  Practitioners are also skilled at making subtle changes 
                                                            
173. See WILLIAM S. HOWELL, THE EMPATHIC COMMUNICATOR 29–33 (1982). 
174. Bryant, supra note 31, at 62–63 (describing how Howell’s work applies to 
law students). 
175. Id. at 62. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 62–63. 
178. Id. at 63. 
179. Bryant, supra note 31, at 63. 
180. See Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 724–25. 
181. See id. at 725. 
182. Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 80, at 511–12. 
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to accommodate different perspectives and bring them closer together if 
needed to avoid miscommunication.183  The cultural sensibility model also 
recognizes that students may need to be aware of the fact that our emotional 
contexts can influence how comfortably we are able to challenge our 
perspectives and understandings.  For example, when we are anxious or 
afraid, we are less likely to feel comfortable challenging our perspective or 
even questioning our perspectives.184 
However, it is important not to view stages along learning 
continuums as linear and unidirectional.  Individuals will move between 
stages at different times and in different contexts.  The stages in these 
theoretical models are fluid and should not be viewed in absolute terms.  
Also, as with all theoretical models, they do not operate as neatly in practice 
as they do on paper.  Nonetheless, the models are useful because they may 
help faculty set realistic cultural sensibility learning outcome goals.185  
Although it may not be realistic to hope law graduates all attain the highest 
level of cultural sensibility, a reasonable goal might be that all law graduates 
reach recognize and appreciate that everyone approaches issues through their 
own cultural lens, which varies based upon each person’s cultural 
experiences—Bennett level 4/Howell level 2.186  It may be that the goal is 
simply to get students to the point where they accept the roles of cultural 
beliefs, values, and behaviors in the lawyering process, understand that all 
behavior, including their own, exists in a cultural context187 and understand 
that good and bad ways of being in the world exist in cultural context.188  
This does not mean students should be taught to blindly accept the status 
quo.  For example, attitudes towards sexual orientation, gender, and race 
have changed significantly over the last century.  These changes would not 
                                                            
183. See Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 728 tbl.1. 
184. “Research indicates that we are more likely to fall prey to stereotype when 
we are feeling stress and unable to monitor ourselves for bias.”  Bryant, supra note 31, at 78. 
“Stress inhibits students from receiving and processing information when anxiety distracts 
them from the learning task.”  Nancy L. Schultz, Lessons from Positive Psychology for 
Developing Advocacy Skills, 6 JOHN MARSHALL L.J. 103, 134 (2012).  See also Jacobs, supra 
note 39, at 400–01 (noting that learning more about clients’ cultural backgrounds will help 
reduce student anxiety when working with clients and enable the students to recognize that a 
client may have a perspective which differs from the student’s). 
185. See, e.g., Sonia J. Crandall et al., Applying Theory to the Design of 
Cultural Competency Training for Medical Students:  A Case Study, 78 ACAD. MED. 588, 
588–89 (2003) (using the theoretical models described above to shape course and curricular 
learning outcomes). 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 163–66, 175–76. 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 163–66, 175–76. 
188. John Alan Cohan, Honor Killings and the Cultural Defense, 40 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 177, 225 (2010) (discussing cultural relativism). 
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have happened if accepted norms had not been challenged.189  Thus, when 
developing learning outcomes for cultural sensibility, educators should 
consider including, as an outcome, preparing students to become reflective 
practitioners willing to examine, and potentially challenge, social norms.  
They should also consider where on the cultural sensibility continuum they 
hope their students will be at the completion of a given course or curriculum. 
IV. DEVELOPING A BASELINE MEASURE OF STUDENTS’ CULTURAL 
SENSIBILITY 
In light of the move to incorporate learning outcomes into legal 
education and mindful of the theoretical underpinnings of cultural sensibility 
education, we developed a measure to assess some aspects of law students’ 
cultural sensibility knowledge, attitudes, and skills.  The initial development 
work has been detailed elsewhere.190  As described below, the initial 
instrument has since been revised. 
The revised instrument described herein is a starting point in 
measuring some law student cultural sensibility learning outcomes and we 
share it with many caveats in the hope that it can continue to be further 
refined and improved.  First, we note that cultural sensibility cannot be 
measured by a single instrument.  We also acknowledge that despite the 
efforts described below to develop a valid and reliable instrument, some may 
disagree with the questions we asked or the language we used.  Our goal with 
this work is not to develop the definitive cultural sensibility learning 
outcome instrument.  Rather, it is to present a tool legal educators can use to:  
Assess the need for cultural sensibility education, develop cultural sensibility 
learning outcomes, design courses and curriculum that meet students’ 
educational needs, and track changes in students’ cultural sensibility 
knowledge, attitudes, and skills.191  The completion of the tool can also serve 
as an educational intervention in itself because it enables students to consider 
their responses and prompts them to think about the role culture plays in the 
lawyering process.  Finally, we hope the instrument will be further tested as a 
tool for measuring student learning outcomes. 
                                                            
189. For examples of these changes and other efforts to challenge accepted 
norms, see Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race 
Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 330–40 (2006) (discussing legal 
scholars’ challenges to race and class based legal norms). 
190. Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers, supra note 9, 
passim. 
191. These goals are similar to those identified by pharmacy school educators 
who performed a factor analysis on a pharmacy education cultural competence tool.  See 
Margarita Echeverri et al., Nine Constructs of Cultural Competence for Curriculum 
Development, AM. J. PHARMACEUTICAL EDUC. Dec. 15, 2010, at 1, 1. 
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A. Initial Survey Design and Development 
Health care educators,192 as well as educators in other disciplines,193 
have developed numerous instruments to measure what they identify as 
students’ cultural competence learning outcomes.  We used those survey 
instruments194 and the scholarship of clinical legal educators who have 
incorporated cultural sensibility into their teaching,195 to develop an initial 
twenty-nine-question, anonymous electronic survey using a five-point 
semantic differential response scale—one equals strongly disagree and five 
equals strongly agree—that sought information about students’ knowledge of 
how culture affects the lawyering process, their attitudes toward cultural 
diversity education, and their awareness of how their cultural background 
affects the ways in which they, and others, communicate and interact.  The 
survey also asked demographic questions and contained a series of open-
ended questions seeking information about the survey design as well as 
students’ thoughts about the role culture plays in their world-view and 
interactions.  After obtaining Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) approval, 
we conducted an initial study.  The survey was distributed to incoming law 
students during their orientation week at a second-tier, southern, urban state 
law school that has both a full and part-time program.  The survey was also 
distributed to a small number of upper level students enrolled in one of the 
school’s clinics.  A total of 138 students participated in the initial study.  The 
initial study provided valuable insights into students’ knowledge and 
attitudes. 
                                                            
192. See, e.g., Gozu et al., supra note 41, at 182–83 (reviewing forty-five 
instruments used to measure nurses, physicians, and other health care professionals’ cultural 
competence). 
193. Alvino E. Fantini, Assessing Intercultural Competence:  Issues and Tools, 
in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE 456, 466–75 (Darla K. Deardorff 
ed., 2009) (listing various assessment tools used in a wide range of disciplines to measure 
ability to communicate effectively across cultures). 
194. Instruments that helped us develop this survey include those set out in the 
following articles:  Jesse C. Crosson et al., Evaluating the Effect of Cultural Competency 
Training on Medical Student Attitudes, 36 FAM. MED. 199, 201 (2004) (medical students); 
D’Andrea et al., supra note 109, at 145 (counselors); Nisha Dogra & David Stretch, 
Developing a Questionnaire to Assess Student Awareness of the Need to be Culturally Aware 
in Clinical Practice, 23 MED. TCHR. 59, 60 (2001) (medical students); Gamst et al., supra note 
109, at 164–65 (counselors); Gozu et al., supra note 41, at 181–82 (assorted health care 
professions); Khanna et al., supra note 109, at 887–89 (assorted health care professionals); 
Stephanie Myers Schim et al., Development of a Cultural Competence Assessment Instrument, 
11 J. NURSING MEASUREMENT 29, 34–35 (2003) (nurses). 
195. See Bliss et al., supra note 46, at 126–27; Bryant, supra note 31, at 38–48; 
Helen Y. Kim, Note, Do I Really Understand?  Cultural Concerns in Determining Diminished 
Competency, 15 ELDER L.J. 265, 286–88 (2007); Sedillo López, supra note 51, at 42–45. 
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Although the survey instrument used in the initial study reached an 
acceptable level of statistical reliability (α = 0.713) and provided useful 
information,196 we decided to further refine the instrument.  To do this, we 
used the data collected from the open-ended questions in the initial study.  
We also asked two faculty members of divergent political and cultural 
perspectives, to review the survey.  Finally, after obtaining IRB approval to 
do so, we conducted three student focus groups.  Based upon information 
gathered in these processes, we made some significant changes to the 
original instrument.  We included a definition of culture197 and drafted 
survey questions that encompassed a wider range of cultural factors.  These 
changes were made to both ensure students approached the questions with 
the same understanding of the term culture and to educate them that culture 
is multi-faceted.  We also added an initial set of questions that alerted 
students to the fact that because not all individuals in a given cultural group 
hold the same views or have the same experiences,198 it is our cultural 
experiences, rather than our culture, that impacts our perspective.  In addition 
to these structural changes, we re-worded questions that students found 
confusing and re-worded or eliminated questions students and expert 
reviewers identified as seeming to call for a correct answer.  We also added 
the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale199 to determine whether the 
survey answers were tainted by the desire to answer in a socially desirable 
manner.  Finally, we expanded the response scale to a 6-point semantic 
differential scale.  This change controlled for a perceived neutral point. 
Our goal was to produce an instrument that could be used to provide 
law faculty with information about their students’ views and where their 
students were on the cultural sensibility education continuum to help faculty 
develop tailored learning outcomes.  We also hoped to develop an instrument 
that ultimately could be used to measure whether some cultural sensibility 
learning outcomes were achieved.  In the survey design, we focused on 
                                                            
196. For a discussion of our initial findings, see Curcio et al., Using Existing 
Frameworks to Develop Ways to Teach and Measure Law Students’ Cultural Competence, 
supra note 9, at 25–27. 
197. The survey began with the following statements: 
There are many different definitions of culture, race, and ethnicity and 
these terms are sometimes used interchangeably.  In this questionnaire by the term 
culture we mean:  Culture is a historically transmitted pattern of shared meaning by 
which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge and attitudes 
about life.  An individual’s cultural identity may be affected by such factors as race, 
ethnicity, age, language, country of origin, acculturation, sexual orientation, gender, 
socioeconomic status, religious/spiritual beliefs, physical abilities, occupation, 
among others. 
198. Bergey & Kaplan, supra note 32, at 1; Steven A Ramirez, A General 
Theory of Cultural Diversity, 7 MICH. J. RACE & LAW 33, 51–52 (2001). 
199. See infra text accompanying notes 200–08. 
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broad-based learning outcomes built upon a structural framework that 
provides a starting point from which to develop and evaluate courses.  Using 
this framework, the final version of the re-designed survey consisted of 
twenty-four questions relating to cultural sensibility.  The first six questions 
asked students to identify which of their cultural experiences has influenced 
their views of the U.S. legal system using a scale of 1 to 6—no influence at 
all to very strong influence—(Appendix A).  The remaining eighteen 
questions sought students’ views on a variety of questions related to the role 
culture plays in the lawyering process.  Students were asked to respond on a 
scale of 1 to 6—strongly disagree to strongly agree—(Appendix A).  The 
reliability alpha for the new survey instrument was .842, indicating a high 
degree of internal consistency in the instrument. 
B. Survey Methodology 
One issue with any self-assessment instrument is whether 
respondents are answering in a socially desirable manner—i.e., choosing 
answers that they believe “conform to socially acceptable values, avoid 
criticism, or gain social approval.”200  We took the opportunity to measure 
whether social desirability would be an issue since such bias is “most likely 
to occur in response[] to socially sensitive questions.”201  Although there is 
no absolute way to determine if the answers are based upon a desire to 
answer correctly, social scientists often use the social desirability scale 
developed by Marlowe and Crowne.202  This scale serves as a test for 
whether surveyors are getting accurate or tainted responses.203  We used the 
thirteen-question Marlowe-Crowne short form204 with the 191 incoming 
student cohort at the Southern Urban School.  Although there is some debate 
about whether the Marlowe-Crowne test is a valid measure of social 
desirability bias,205 it continues to be the instrument most frequently used to 
assess whether respondents were answering in what they believe was the 
                                                            
200. Thea F van de Mortel, Faking It:  Social Desirability Response Bias in 
Self-Report Research, AUSTRALIAN J. ADVANCED NURSING, June–Aug. 2008, at 40, 41. 
201. Id. 
202. Id.; see Douglas P. Crowne & David Marlowe, A New Scale of Social 
Desirability Independent of Psychopathology, 24 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 349, 351 (1960). 
203. Van de Mortel, supra note 200, at 40. 
204. See William M. Reynolds, Development of Reliable and Valid Short 
Forms of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, 38 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 119, 124 
(1982). 
205. See Steven D. Barger, The Marlowe-Crowne Affair:  Short Forms, 
Psychometric Structure, and Social Desirability, 79 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 286, 289 
(2002) (critiquing the use of the Marlowe-Crowne instrument to determine social desirability 
responses). 
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correct socially desirable manner.206  An analysis of the social desirability 
scale compared favorably with the literature standards.207  Results indicated 
that 17% of our respondents were low scorers (e.g., answering in a socially 
undesirable direction), 60.2% were average scorers (showing an average 
degree of concern for social desirability), and 22.5% scored high (indicating 
a high degree of concern for social approval).208  These percentages suggest 
that general survey responses were not due to a social desirability bias.  
Having checked the instrument for social desirability responses, we then 
eliminated the Marlowe-Crowne questions from the remaining survey 
administrations to shorten the instrument. 
After receiving IRB approval, the revised survey was initially 
administered to incoming students at a second-tier, southern, urban state law 
school.  Time was set aside during orientation week for completion of the 
revised survey; thus, the response rate was very high (n = 191, 94% response 
rate).  The revised survey also was administered to incoming law students at 
a top-tier, northern, metropolitan state law school that purposefully seeks to 
promote diversity in viewpoint, experience, and background among its 
faculty and students.  At that school, during orientation week, students were 
asked to complete the survey via an email solicitation.  A total of 118 
incoming students (response rate of 58%) chose to complete the survey. 
In the spring semester, upper level students at both the Southern 
Urban and the Northern School were asked, via email, to complete the 
revised survey.  The response rate for upper level students at the Northern 
School was 32% (n = 127).  At the Southern Urban School, 27% (n = 155) of 
the upper level students completed the survey.  The total response rate for 
upper level students was 30% (n = 282).  The combined total response rate 
for the survey was 591 with an average response rate of 43%.  The 
overwhelming majority of respondents self-identified as white, while gender 
distribution was virtually equal (see Table 1). 
 
                                                            
206. See Van de Mortel, supra note 200, at 42–45 tbl.1 (listing thirty-one 
studies in 2004–2005 that used Marlowe-Crowne instrument to check for social desirability 
response); Shana L. Lassiter, Cultural Competency Training in Dental Education and 
Implications for the Elimination of Oral Heath Disparities:  Results from a Quantitative and 
Qualitative Investigation (May 16, 2009) (unpublished E.d. dissertation, Columbia University) 
(microformed on UMI 3368358); see also Maria Antonia Marzan, Incoming Medical 
Students’ Perceptions of Knowledge, Attitudes and Skills Regarding Cross-Cultural Medical 
Education (May 16, 2008) (unpublished E.d. D. dissertation, Columbia University) 
(microformed on UMI 3327063). 
207. The scoring key is available at Self-Assessment: Dare You Say What You 
Think?  The Social–Desirability Scale, CENGAGE LEARNING, http://www.cengage.com/
resource_uploads/downloads/0495092746_63626.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
208. These results are based upon the scoring key, see id. 
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Table 1:  Respondent Demographics. 
N %
Gender 
 
Female 287 48.6
Male 291 49.2
  
Ethnicity/Race Asian 46 8.1
 Black 37 6.5
 Hispanic/Latino(a) 17 3.0
 White 435 76.7
 Two or More 32 5.6
  
Age 20–25 years 323 55.9
 26–30 years 181 31.3
 31–35 years 43 7.4
 36–40 years 11 1.9
 41–45 years 15 2.6
 46–50 years 3 .5
 Over 50 years 2 .3
  
Student Type Entering Law Students 309 52.3
 2L or 3L 282 47.7
  
School Type Northern  273 46.2
 Southern Urban 318 53.8
 
An exploratory factor analysis (“EFA”) was performed on the data to 
identify, through statistical exploration, inter-relationships between items 
that are part of a unified concept or underlying structure.209  Social scientists 
use exploratory factor analysis to reduce a number of interrelated items (e.g., 
items on a survey) into factors that can be conceptually grouped together.210 
The Kaiser-Meyer Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .843 
(excellent) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was p < .000 (the strength of 
the relationship among the survey items is strong), indicating that a factor 
analysis was appropriate.  Using Principal Component Analysis (“PCA”) as 
                                                            
209. See DENISE F. POLIT & CHERYL TATANO BECK, RESOURCE MANUAL FOR 
NURSING RESEARCH:  GENERATING AND ASSESSING EVIDENCE FOR NURSING PRACTICE 255 (9th 
ed. 2012). 
210. DENNIS CHILD, THE ESSENTIALS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS 12 (3d ed. 2006); 
see Anna B. Costello & Jason W. Osborne, Best Practices in Exploratory Factor Analysis:  
Four Recommendations for Getting the Most from Your Analysis, PRAC. ASSESSMENT RES. & 
EVALUATION, July 2005 at 1, 8. 
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our extraction method and Varimax with Kaiser Normalization as our 
rotation method, we retained five factors (Table 2). 
Table 2:  Factor Descriptives. 
 No. of Items Mean (SD) Alpha 
Factor 1 9 4.25 (0.81) .827 
Factor 2 6 3.17 (1.16) .827 
Factor 3 3 4.57 (1.08) .778 
Factor 4 3 4.88 (0.79) .588 
Factor 5 2 4.40 (0.87) .726 
 
The five identified factors group the survey findings into conceptual 
constructs that correspond to various aspects of cultural sensibility learning.  
The first factor examines students’ understanding of how culture influences 
lawyers, judges, and clients in the context of legal decision-making and 
representation.  The second factor assesses students’ self-awareness about 
the role their cultural experiences play in their own perceptions of the legal 
system.  The third factor looks at students’ desires to learn how culture 
affects the lawyering process.  The fourth factor examines students’ 
understanding of client behaviors that may be based upon cultural practices 
different from their own.  The fifth factor looks at how students self-assess 
their ability to identify their own unconscious biases and stereotypes.  These 
factors help educators assess students’ openness to learning about the role 
culture plays in the lawyering process, students’ understanding of how 
culture may influence others, and their understanding of how their own 
cultural experiences affect their perceptions and actions.  This information 
can be useful in designing courses, curricula, and teaching methods that are 
best suited to a given group of students’ educational needs.  It also can be 
useful to those who want to assessin a big picture waythe effectiveness 
of education geared toward developing certain aspects of cultural sensibility, 
such as developing students’ awareness that cultural experiences affect 
everyone, not just clients or those belonging to specific racial or ethnic 
groups.  Below, we set forth each factor and the survey questions that 
grouped with that factor. 
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Table 3:  Cultural Sensibility Survey Structure. 
Factor Survey Item 
Factor 1 
Cultural 
Influences 
2.16.  White lawyers bring culturally biased assumptions 
into the lawyer/client relationship. 
2.2.  Lawyers look at legal problems through their own 
cultural lens. 
2.6.  A lawyer’s socioeconomic background influences how 
the lawyer perceives a client’s behavior. 
2.11.  How a lawyer communicates with his or her client is 
not influenced by the lawyer’s cultural background. 
2.9.  Judges do not look at legal problems through their 
own cultural lenses. 
2.14.  Lawyers belonging to racial and ethnic minorities 
bring culturally biased assumptions into the lawyer/client 
relationship. 
2.4.  I do not view the legal system through a culturally 
biased lens. 
2.1.  Clients look at legal problems through their own 
cultural lenses. 
2.3.  How a client communicates with his or her lawyer is 
not influenced by the client’s cultural background. 
Factor 2 
Self-
Awareness 
 
(Influences views about the U.S. legal system) 
1.1.  Experiences arising from your racial identity. 
1.2.  Experiences arising from your ethnic identity. 
1.4.  Experiences arising from your socioeconomic 
background. 
1.3.  Experiences arising from your religious identity. 
1.5.  Experiences arising from your gender. 
1.6.  Experiences arising from your sexual identity. 
Factor 3 
Desire to 
Learn 
 
2.17.  Law professors should discuss with their students the 
cultural assumptions embedded in appellate legal opinions. 
2.18.  A law student’s ability to recognize cultural diversity 
issues as they relate to the lawyering process should be 
assessed during law school. 
2.7.  Legal education should not include education about 
cultural issues that may arise when providing legal services 
to people from different cultural backgrounds than my own. 
55
: Nova Law Review 38, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
216 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
Factor 4 
Client 
Behaviors 
 
2.8.  A lawyer should assume that a client’s visible lack of 
emotion means that the client does not feel strongly about 
what is being discussed. 
2.12.  When a client refuses to look his or her lawyer in the 
eyes, the lawyer should assume the client is not being 
truthful. 
2.15.  When a client shakes hands with a male attorney, but 
refuses to shake hands with a female attorney, the lawyers 
should assume the client will not respect advice given by 
the female attorney. 
Factor 5 
Self-
assessment 
2.13.  In general, I can accurately identify my culturally 
biased assumptions about others who are from cultures 
different from my own. 
2.10.  In general, I am able to recognize when my reactions 
to others are based on stereotypical beliefs. 
Excluded 
Item 
2.5.  If a client’s cultural practice is to defer decision 
making to others in the client’s family, a lawyer should 
help the client understand why he or she should make his or 
her own decisions about the case. 
C. Survey Results 
Below we explain the factors in greater detail and identify key 
findings from the data.  Throughout our descriptions, we note when there are 
significant differences between incoming and upper level students, between 
students at the two schools, and differences in survey responses, by gender 
and race or ethnicity.  It should be noted that for analytical purposes we 
collapsed all Asians, Blacks, Latinos, and Two or More races into one group 
to ameliorate the differences in numbers between those groups and Whites.  
We are, however, mindful that collapsing these groups is a study limitation. 
Factor 1:  Understanding How Culture Influences Lawyers, Judges, and 
Clients in Context of the Legal Decision-Making and Legal 
Representation. 
The first factor includes nine items that can be grouped under the 
construct of understanding how culture influences lawyers, judges, and 
clients in the context of legal decision-making and legal representation 
(Table 3).  This factor relates to students’ understanding that lawyers, judges, 
and clients look at legal problems through their own cultural lenses and that 
lawyer-client communications are influenced by both the lawyer’s and the 
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client’s cultural backgrounds.211  Factor 1 also looks at students’ 
understanding that all lawyers, regardless of racial or ethnic background, 
bring culturally biased assumptions into the lawyer-client relationship212 and 
their self-assessment about whether, as future lawyers, they bring culturally 
biased assumptions into the lawyering process (Table 3).213  The items in this 
factor all deal with students’ perceptions of the role culture plays in others’ 
perceptions of legal problems and interactions, with the exception of item 
2.4I do not view the legal system through a culturally biased lens.  That 
item was grouped with this factor because it sought information about how, 
as future lawyers, students believed their cultural biases would affect their 
assessment of legal problems. 
Findings showed that there was a statistically significant difference 
(p<.000) in the mean scores for this factor between incoming and upper level 
students, with upper level students more likely to recognize that cultural 
experiences and perspectives affect lawyer-client communications and the 
lawyering process (Table 4).  Women were significantly more likely than 
men to recognize the affect culture has on various aspects of the lawyering 
process (Table 4).  There was also a statistically significant difference 
between students at the two schools, with the Northern School’s students 
more likely to recognize that lawyers’, clients’, and judges’ cultural 
backgrounds and experiences influence legal decision-making and 
representation (Table 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
211. Miller et al., supra note 6, at 104–07. 
212. See id. at 104–05. 
213. For a discussion of the implications of students’ awareness of their 
culturally biased assumptions and the impact of those assumptions on the lawyering process, 
see infra text accompanying notes 252–256. 
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Table 4:  Comparisons for Factor 1 (Understanding how culture 
influences lawyers, judges, and clients). 
Comparison Variables N M(SD) Sig. 
Incoming Law Students 
Upper Level Law Students 
309 
282 
4.04 (0.78) 
4.48 (0.80) 
p<.000 
Female 
Male 
287 
291 
4.39 (0.82) 
4.11 (0.79) 
p<.000 
 
Asian 
Black 
Latino/a 
White 
Two or More 
46 
37 
17 
435 
32 
4.29 (0.81) 
4.37 (0.97) 
4.31 (0.76) 
4.22 (0.81) 
4.29 (0.81) 
 
Southern Urban School 
Northern School 
318 
273 
4.05 (0.79) 
4.49 (0.78) 
p<.000 
Note.  Mean range = 1–6 with the higher mean score representing higher level of 
cultural sensibility. 
Factor 2:  Self-Awareness About the Role Culture Plays in Students’ Own 
Perceptions of the Legal System 
The second factor groups six items that ask students to self-assess 
whether experiences arising from their own cultural backgrounds have 
influenced how they view the U.S. legal system.214  Students of color were 
more likely than white students to identify experiences arising from their 
racial identity, ethnic identity, and gender, as influencing their view about 
the U.S. legal system (Table 5).  Women were also more likely than men to 
indicate that their cultural experiences influenced how they view the legal 
system (Table 5). 
 
                                                            
214. Scholars have discussed how individuals’ culturally based experiences 
affect their views and understandings of the legal system.  See Marjorie Florestal, Is a Burrito 
a Sandwich?  Exploring Race, Class, and Culture in Contracts, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 7–8 
(2008) (discussing how cultural experiences permeate one’s understanding of contracts and 
contract law); Carolyna Smiley-Marquez, Bias in the Legal System, COLO. LAW., Mar. 1996, 
at 19, 19 (noting that various state task forces on gender and racial bias in the justice system 
found women’s and minorities’ experiences led them to view the justice system from a 
different perspective than their white male counterparts). 
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Table 5:  Comparison for Factor 2 (Self-awareness about the role 
culture plays in students’ own perceptions of the legal 
system). 
Comparison Variables N M(SD) Sig. 
Incoming Law Students 
Upper Level Law Students 
309 
282 
3.14 (1.13) 
3.21 (1.19) 
 
Female 
Male 
287 
291 
3.52 (1.05) 
2.83 (1.15) 
p<.000 
 
Asian 
Black 
Latino/a 
White 
Two or More 
46 
37 
17 
435 
32 
3.52 (1.09) 
3.95 (1.07) 
3.44 (1.05) 
3.03 (1.11) 
3.50 (1.33) 
 
 
 
p<.000* 
Southern Urban School 
Northern School 
318 
273 
3.10 (1.15) 
3.25 (1.16) 
 
Note.  Mean range = 1–6 with higher mean score representing higher level of 
cultural sensibility. 
*Significance test performed on categories White and Non-White (Asian, Black, 
Latino/a, Two or More). 
Factor 3:  Openness to Learning About the Role Culture Plays in the 
Lawyering Process 
Factor 3 contains three items related to the importance of learning 
about how culture affects legal rule-making and the provision of legal 
services.  Overall, students expressed a high degree of interest in learning 
about the role culture plays in the lawyering process.  There was a 
statistically significant difference in responses between women and men and 
between white and non-white students’ responses to the questions in this 
factor (Table 6).  Women and non-white students expressed a greater 
openness to learning how culture affects legal rule-making and lawyer-client 
interactions (Table 6).  There also was a difference in attitudes between 
upper level and incoming students, with incoming students being more 
receptive to this kind of education (Table 6). 
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Table 6:  Comparison for Factor 3 (Openness to learning about the 
role culture plays in the lawyering process). 
Comparison Variables N M(SD) Sig. 
Incoming Law Students 
Upper Level Law Students 
309 
281 
4.66 (0.96) 
4.46 (1.19) 
p<.05 
Female 
Male 
287 
290 
4.83 (0.95) 
4.34 (1.12) 
p<.000 
Asian 
Black 
Latino/a 
White 
Two or More 
46 
37 
17 
434 
32 
4.76 (0.81) 
5.03 (1.16) 
4.92 (0.98) 
4.50 (1.05) 
4.91 (0.89) 
 
 
 
p<.000* 
 
Southern Urban School 
Northern School 
317 
273 
4.53 (1.04) 
4.61 (1.13) 
 
Note.  Mean range = 1–6 with higher mean score representing higher level of 
cultural sensibility. 
*Significance test performed on categories White and Non-White (Asian, Black, 
Latino/a, Two or More). 
Factor 4:  Understanding Differing Cultural Backgrounds and Lawyers’ 
Perceptions About Client Behaviors 
This factor groups three items that deal with students’ awareness of 
the assumptions that lawyers may make if they do not understand that some 
behaviors may be based upon clients’ cultural beliefs and practices.215  The 
behaviors chosen were just a small sampling of conduct that may vary 
between cultures.  This factor measures students’ understanding that lawyers 
should examine their own cultural assumptions when assessing client 
behaviors so as not to misinterpret particular behaviors.  Students at the 
Northern School had a greater level of awareness of the need to assess 
underlying cultural assumptions in context of lawyer-client relationships 
(Table 7). 
                                                            
215. The behaviors chosen included:  Lack of eye contact, displays of emotion, 
and refusal to shake hands with a woman.  Each of these behaviors may be affected by 
cultural factors.  See Jacobs, supra note 39, at app., tbl.1, at 414 (shaking hands with member 
of opposite sex); Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap:  Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 
CONN. L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2000) (displays of emotion); Tremblay, supra note 51, at 393–94 
(eye contact). 
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Table 7:  Comparison for Factor 4 (Understanding differing 
cultural backgrounds and lawyers’ perceptions about 
client behaviors). 
Comparison Variables N M(SD) Sig. 
Incoming Law Students 
Upper Level Law Students 
309 
281 
4.89 (0.77) 
4.88 (0.83) 
 
Female 
Male 
287 
290 
4.89 (0.82) 
4.87 (0.77) 
 
Asian 
Black 
Latino/a 
White 
Two or More 
46 
37 
17 
434 
32 
4.87 (0.79) 
4.86 (0.96) 
4.73 (0.66) 
4.87 (0.78) 
4.98 (0.82) 
 
Southern Urban School 
Northern School 
317 
273 
4.79 (0.83) 
5.00 (0.74) 
p<.01 
Note.  Mean range = 1–6 with higher mean score representing higher level of 
cultural sensibility. 
*Significance test performed on categories White and Non-White (Asian, Black, 
Latino/a, Two or More). 
Factor 5:  Identifying Own Unconscious Biases and Stereotypes 
Factor 5 has two items that assess students’ openness and 
willingness to admit the difficulty of accurately identifying when reactions 
are based upon stereotypes and cultural biases.216  While factors are generally 
composed of three or more items, we felt that the loading and Eigenvalues,217 
as well as the construct itself, warranted including these two survey items as 
a factor.  Students rated themselves moderately high in terms of their ability 
to identify both their culturally biased assumptions and when they were 
reacting based upon stereotypical beliefs (Table 8).218  For this factor, 
                                                            
216. For a discussion of the implicit bias literature and the potential 
relationship between the social cognition implicit bias theories and self-perceptions as they 
relate to students’ survey responses, see Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers, 
supra note 9, at 114–19. 
217. In factor analysis, an Eigenvalue represents how much variance is 
accounted for in a correlation matrix.  See BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, CAL. 
STATE UNIV., USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 398 (5th ed. 2007).  It is one of several 
methods used to determine the number of factors or constructs that can be selected from the 
data.  See RICHARD L. GORSUCH, FACTOR ANALYSIS 97 (2d ed. 1983); TABACHNICK & FIDELL, 
supra note 217, at 398. 
218. This result parallels findings from the pilot study.  See Curcio et al., 
Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers, supra note 9, at 112. 
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southern students were statistically more likely to think that they could 
identify their own unconscious biases and stereotypes (Table 8). 
Table 8:  Comparison for Factor 5 (Identifying Own Unconscious 
Biases and Stereotypes). 
Comparison Variables N M(SD) Sig. 
Incoming Law Students 
Upper Level Law Students 
309 
280 
4.47 (0.84) 
4.33 (0.89) 
 
Female 
Male 
287 
290 
4.46 (0.87) 
4.36 (0.87) 
 
Asian 
Black 
Latino/a 
White 
Two or More 
46 
37 
17 
434 
32 
4.43 (0.85) 
4.69 (0.95) 
4.50 (1.10) 
4.37 (0.83) 
4.48 (1.10) 
 
Southern Urban School 
Northern School 
316 
273 
4.46 (0.87) 
4.34 (0.88) 
p<.01 
Note.  Mean range = 1-6 with higher mean score representing higher level of cultural 
sensibility. 
*Significance test performed on categories White and Non-White (Asian, Black, 
Latino/a, Two or More). 
Discarded Item 
A factor analysis groups different items that form patterns.  There 
was one item that was not associated with any other group of items that made 
up the factors.  That item asked students to agree or disagree with the 
following statement:  “If a client’s cultural practice is to defer decision 
making to others in the client’s family, a lawyer should help the client 
understand why he or she should make his or her own decisions about the 
case.”  This item was designed to inferentially test whether students believe 
that a lawyer should impose his or her cultural beliefs upon a client.  In 
retrospect, the question does not lead to a clear answer because it is so 
context-based.  Thus, it is not surprising that it did not load with any factor.  
We discarded this item in the factor analysis discussion and the question 
should be eliminated from future surveys. 
V. USING THE SURVEY TO INFORM TEACHING AND DEVELOP 
LEARNING OUTCOMES 
The survey provides information about students’ openness to 
learning about the role culture plays in the lawyering process, awareness of 
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how culture affects others, and awareness of how culture affects them.  The 
survey provides useful information to legal educators considering developing 
course and institutional learning outcomes.219  It is also helpful as educators 
try to get a sense of where their students are on the cultural sensibility 
continuum.220  This tool can be used as students enter and leave law school to 
assess students’ progress towards cultural sensibility over the course of their 
legal education.  It can also potentially be used as a pre- and post-course 
assessment to inform educators about the effect of their teaching on students’ 
cultural sensibility development.  Thus, the survey may help educators refine 
teaching methodologies and materials in light of students’ learning. 
In context of the learning outcome domains, the survey instrument 
encompasses students’ self-assessments of their knowledge about how 
culture affects lawyers’, judges’, and clients’ perceptions and reactions, as 
well as students’ understandings of how different value systems and 
communications styles may affect lawyers’ interpretation of clients’ 
reactions and behaviors (knowledge domain).221  The survey looks at 
students’ awareness of the affect that their own cultural beliefs, experiences, 
biases, and prejudices have upon their perceptions, and their openness to 
learning about the role culture plays in the lawyering process (attitudes 
domain).222  Finally, this survey assesses students’ abilities to apply their 
understandings of how culture affects the lawyering process to situations in 
which lawyers’ perspectives may be affected by cultural misunderstandings 
(skills domain).223  Because learning outcome domains overlap,224 some 
factors apply to more than one learning outcome domain. 
A. Students Want to Learn About the Role of Culture in the Lawyering 
Process 
Factor 3 relates to students’ attitudes about the inclusion of cultural 
sensibility teaching into the law school curriculum.  Our findings indicate 
that law students are generally receptive to learning about the role culture 
plays in the lawyering process (Table 6) although somewhat more 
ambivalent about being assessed on the issues (Appendix B).  Openness to 
learning about how one’s own and others’ socio-cultural beliefs and 
behaviors affect the lawyering process is one of the key attitude learning 
                                                            
219. See supra text accompanying notes 97–98. 
220. See supra Part III. 
221. See supra Part II.A. 
222. See supra Part II.B. 
223. See supra Part II.C. 
224. See supra text accompanying note 96. 
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outcomes.225  The data indicates that in this survey cohort, women were 
statistically significantly more open to learning about how culture affects the 
lawyering process than men, and those self-identifying as non-white were 
more receptive to cultural diversity education than those self-identifying as 
white (Table 6).  We do not know why the differences exist, although we 
suspect that the real world may present more everyday challenges for 
females and non-white students both within and outside the law school 
classroom226 so that the teaching may be less threatening to them, or they 
have greater interest in raising others’ awareness about these issues.227  
White male students may feel more defensive about learning about the role 
culture plays in the lawyering process as there can be an actual or perceived 
tendency for cultural and diversity education to dismiss and denigrate their 
perspective.228  In discussing culture and diversity, white males may feel that 
they have the most to lose and may feel uncomfortable, especially if the 
blame for historical wrongs is laid at their door.229 
Interestingly, incoming students expressed a greater interest than 
upper level students in learning about how culture affects the lawyering 
process (Table 6).  It is unclear why this difference exists.  Some upper level 
students may have experienced cultural diversity education in some law 
school classes that they found alienating.  Or, incoming students may be 
eager to learn about everything while upper level students are more jaded.  
Or, some other reason altogether could explain this difference.  Again, this 
                                                            
225. Bryant, supra note 31, at 50–51. 
226. See Celestial S.D. Cassman & Lisa R. Pruitt, A Kinder, Gentler Law 
School?  Race, Ethnicity, Gender and Legal Education at King Hall, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1209, 1251 (2005) (discussing women’s experiences in law school classrooms); Charles E. 
Daye et al., Does Race Matter in Educational Diversity? A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 
RUTGERS RACE & L. REV., 2012, at 75S, 124S (reporting results of large national survey of 
law students in which Black students reported experiencing discrimination at much higher 
rates than their white counterparts). 
227. These results are consistent with findings in a study of medical students.  
See Carol L. Elam et al., Diversity in Medical School:  Perceptions of First-Year Students at 
Four Southeastern U.S. Medical Schools, 76 ACAD. MED. 60, 64–65 (2001) (finding that 
students with the most diverse first year class placed the greatest value on the contributions of 
diversity to the learning environment.  Female students placed more value on the inclusion of 
diversity issues in the curriculum than did male students and also placed greater value on 
understanding diversity issues in their future medical practices.  In this survey, African-
American students were the least likely to think that the curriculum contained adequate 
information about diversity). 
228. David Barnhizer, A Chilling of Discourse, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 361, 378–
79 n.40 (2006) (recounting an anecdotal story of the denigration of a white male for 
expressing opposition to homosexuality). 
229. Sharon E. Rush, Emotional Segregation:  Huckleberry Finn in the Modern 
Classroom, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 305, 358 (2003) (noting that white students often are 
uncomfortable talking about race and often feel defensive about being white). 
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question merits further study.  Future survey administrations should provide 
room for student comments that might provide insights into the reasons for 
these differences. 
The survey data provides useful information both in terms of 
students’ general receptivity and desire to learn about the role culture plays 
in the lawyering process and in terms of potential approaches to teaching.  
For example, the data indicates varying levels of openness—with women and 
students of color indicating a higher degree of receptivity to cultural 
sensibility education.230  These survey results suggest that educators need to 
be careful not to alienate students by presenting cultural sensibility education 
as political correctness231 or give some groups more validity than others.  
Varying levels of openness to such education also means that educators need 
to carefully think of how to engage male and white students.  When 
developing teaching modules and methods, educators should focus on how 
cultural sensibility relates to becoming an effective lawyer.232  Any teaching 
needs to engage students and while effective teaching may be—and probably 
should be—challenging, educators must be wary of presenting the material in 
a way that creates a defensiveness in students rather than fostering 
curiosity.233  Educators must be cautious not to focus on teaching culture as 
belonging to the Other.234  Rather, educators should help students recognize 
that everyone comes to the table with multiple cultural experiences that 
affect perceptions, legal analysis, and interactions.235 
The survey instrument itself may also serve as a teaching tool.  In the 
open-ended question section of the initial survey, many incoming students 
noted that simply taking the survey prompted them to begin thinking about 
how culture may affect the lawyering process.236  Administering the survey 
to incoming students sets the stage for discussions during orientation and 
first year courses about cultural perspectives that influence legal decision-
making and individuals’ perceptions and actions.  Thus, the instrument can 
be a valuable educational tool, as well as a tool that provides faculty with 
                                                            
230. See supra Table 6; infra Appendices D, E. 
231. See Sedillo López, supra note 51, at 43. 
232. Miller et al., supra note 6, at 105–08. 
233. Sara Gronningstarter, A Patient’s Right to Choose is Not Always Black 
and White: Long Term Care Facility Discrimination and the Color of Care, 26 J. CIV. RTS. & 
ECON. DEV. 329, 353–54 (2012) (noting “Cultural competency teachings are not meant to 
make care providers feel as if they are incompetent or racist, they are meant to enhance 
professional development and facilitate the education of care providers on the latest science in 
communications and communicating effectively across cultures). 
234. Kumas-Tan et al., supra note 42, at 551–52; see also Weng, supra note 
61, at 373. 
235. See supra text accompanying notes 27–33. 
236. Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers, supra note 9, at 113. 
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information.  Administering the survey may also communicate to students 
that the law school considers cultural sensibility an important lawyering skill. 
B. Understanding How Culture Influences Lawyers, Judges, and 
Clients 
Factors 1 and 4 relate to students’ understanding of how culture may 
influence lawyers’, clients’, and judges’ perceptions and behaviors.  On a 
scale of 1 to 6, a mean of 4.04 for incoming students and 4.48 for upper level 
students for Factor 1 suggests that, although incoming students may have a 
basic understanding that culture plays a role in how lawyers, clients, and 
judges understand, react to, and communicate about legal problems, students 
may not fully recognize the extent to which people’s cultural experiences 
affect their perceptions and behaviors. 
The difference between upper level and incoming students indicates 
that upper level students have a greater awareness of the role culture plays in 
how judges, lawyers, and clients view legal problems and communicate 
about legal issues.  It may be that exposure to the law and legal processes 
raised students’ awareness of how cultural experiences influence legal 
decision-making and interactions.  However, we cannot say for certain that 
legal education made a difference in students’ perceptions because the 
survey did not track a group of students from law school orientation through 
their upper level legal education.  However, the results do suggest that 
something may happen to students during law school to increase their 
awareness of the role culture plays in the lawyering process.  Increased 
awareness may be attributed to exposure to probing questions in doctrinal 
courses, experiences in clinics or externships, or simply a maturation 
process.  Or, the survey results could be a variation caused by self-selection 
on the part of upper level students where the response rate was much smaller 
than for incoming students.237  Whatever the reason, we found it interesting 
that at both schools there was a statistically significant difference between 
incoming and upper level students with regard to this factor.  The results also 
suggest that this instrument is a viable tool for those schools that want to 
track changes in students’ cultural sensibility attitudes from when students 
enter school to when they graduate. 
The responses to individual items provide some insights to educators 
wishing to use the survey responses to develop cultural sensibility learning 
outcomes.  Students believed white lawyers were more likely than lawyers of 
color to bring culturally biased assumptions into the lawyer-client 
relationship (Appendices B–E).  This suggests the need to educate students 
                                                            
237. See supra Part IV.B. 
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that everyone has cultural biases and brings those biases and perspectives to 
the table.238  Students also thought that clients were much more likely than 
lawyers to be influenced by their cultural backgrounds (Appendices B–E).  
Students may believe that, as professionals, lawyers are more able to be 
objective and to put aside their cultural biases and perspectives.  These 
findings suggest that one learning outcome should be to build students’ 
understanding that cultural experiences affect all people and that a particular 
racial background or profession does not make one more or less likely to be 
influenced by his or her cultural experiences. 
The survey also identified whether students recognized that some 
behaviors might be based upon cultural practices.  In the consent forms and 
introduction of the survey, students understood they were being asked about 
the role culture plays in the lawyering process.  In this context, there was 
generally a high level of awareness that some client behaviors may be based 
upon cultural practices and that lawyers should not make assumptions about 
those behaviors.239  Whether that awareness carries over to actual lawyer-
client situations was not measured.  Also, although students seemed able to 
easily identify some commonly understood culturally based behaviors, such 
as refusal to look a lawyer in the eye or lack of visible emotion (Appendices 
B–E),240 they were less aware that other behaviors, such as refusal to shake 
hands with a woman, might also be a cultural practice (Appendices B–E).241  
The inability to recognize potentially lesser-known cultural practices 
suggests the need for learning outcomes that focus on developing students’ 
abilities to identify situations in which differing cultural perspectives and 
practices may arise and may influence their perceptions about a client’s 
behavior.242  We do not suggest that the survey results indicate a need to 
teach more about a litany of cultural practices.  Rather, the survey results 
suggest a need to develop students’ curiosity about client behaviors that may 
be different than their own and indicate a need to work with students to help 
them suspend judgment.  Students should develop a level of comfort that 
                                                            
238. See Miller et al., supra note 6, at 105–08; Silver, supra note 67, at 238–
39; Weng, supra note 61, at 369, 372–73. 
239. See supra Table 7.  The students’ responses to individual questions aimed 
at assessing their awareness of the need to avoid assumptions about clients’ behaviors can be 
found in, infra Appendices B–E. 
240. See sources cited supra note 215. 
241. Sayedeh Kasmai-Nazeran, Between Gender Equality and Religious 
Freedom, ISLAMIC INSIGHTS (Nov. 23, 2008), http://www.islamicinsights.com/news/
community-affairs/between-gender-equality-and-religious-freedom.html (noting that some 
Muslims’ and Orthodox Jews’ religious beliefs prohibit them from shaking hands with 
someone of the opposite sex). 
242. For examples of a wide array of conduct that may be based upon cultural 
practices, see Jacobs, supra note 39, app. at 413–14 tbl.1. 
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allows them to ask questions and explore potential cultural practices that 
might be unfamiliar.243 
C. Understanding How Cultural Experiences Affect Perceptions and 
Actions 
A culturally sensible lawyer understands culture is multi-faceted, and 
that everyone’s worldviews, conduct, perceptions, and actions are based 
upon a complex compilation of numerous cultural factors and experiences.244  
A culturally sensible lawyer is aware of the need to be self-reflective about 
the role culture plays in our interactions.245  Being self-aware and reflective 
about our own socio-cultural beliefs, and how those beliefs affect our 
perceptions and actions, is a critical attitude learning outcome.  Factors 2 and 
5 address these concepts. 
Factor 2 assesses students’ self-awareness about the role culture 
plays in students’ perceptions about the legal system.246  The mean scores for 
this factor were 3.14 for incoming students and 3.21 for upper level students 
(Table 5).  These scores suggest that many students do not believe their 
views about the U.S. legal system are influenced by experiences arising from 
various cultural factors such as their race, ethnicity, religious identity, socio-
economic background, gender, or sexual orientation.247  The responses to 
individual items in this factor suggest that although students generally 
understood that their view of the U.S. legal system was probably influenced 
by their socio-economic experiences, they were much less likely to recognize 
that their views about the legal system were affected by their racial identity 
                                                            
243. This skill was originally identified by Professors Bryant and Koh as a 
critical one for clinical students to develop.  Bryant, supra note 31, at 64–78. 
244. See Karnik & Dogra, supra note 37, at 724, 726–28 tbl.1. 
245. Id. at 724, 728 tbl.1. 
246. See supra text accompanying note 214. 
247. One way to begin educating students about how experiences based upon 
race, ethnicity and gender affect people’s perceptions of the legal system would be to expose 
them to the various state and federal court studies on race and gender within the courts.  
Throughout those studies, women and people of color discuss how their experiences affected 
their views of the legal system.  See generally REPORT OF THE WORKING COMMITTEES TO THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACIAL AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS 
(1997), reprinted in 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 117 (1997); THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS:  THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE (July 
1993), reprinted in 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1994).  For an excellent discussion of a survey 
that looked at how racial experiences affect individuals’ perceptions of the justice system, see 
MARK PEFFLEY & JON HURWITZ, JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE SEPARATE REALITIES OF BLACKS 
AND WHITES 28–67 (2010).  For a discussion of how religious identity affects one’s view of 
the law and legal systems, see Amy Porter, Representing the Reprehensible and Identity 
Conflicts in Legal Representation, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 143, 155–61 (2004). 
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or sexual orientation (Appendices B–E).  Perhaps, not surprisingly, non-
white students were more likely to believe that experiences arising from their 
racial identity influenced their views of the U.S. legal system248 (mean score 
for non-white students:  4.11; mean score for white students:  2.83) 
(Appendix D).  Students were least likely to believe that experiences arising 
from their sexual orientation influenced their views (mean score for entering 
students:  2.31; mean score for upper level students:  2.60) (Appendix B).249  
The responses to this question suggest a need to identify attitude learning 
outcomes that seek to develop students’ abilities to identify and be more 
reflective about their own varied cultural experiences, and how those 
experiences affect their perceptions and interactions.250  They also suggest 
that many students may be in the ethnocentric stages of Bennett’s 
intercultural competence continuum in that they are not aware of how their 
own values and beliefs have shaped their perceptions.251 
Factor 5 also relates to students’ awareness of the role that their own 
cultural experiences, biases, and stereotypes play in their perceptions and 
interactions.252  A mean of 4.40 (Table 2) suggests that many students felt 
they were able to identify their culturally biased assumptions and were able 
to identify when they were reacting based upon stereotypical beliefs.  This 
finding is consistent with the findings in our initial study.253  This self-
assessment could mean that students already understand when and how their 
unconscious biases and stereotypes affect their perceptions and actions.  
However, this result may indicate that students do not fully grasp how 
subconscious cognitive categories and schemas are susceptible to 
unconscious biases and stereotyping.254  These results may demonstrate that 
students do not understand how difficult it is to recognize our embedded 
                                                            
248. Whites tend not to think about themselves or experiences in terms of race.  
“‘Whites’ consciousness of whiteness is predominantly unconsciousness of whiteness.”  
Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”:  White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 970 (1993). 
249. Some courts have formed task forces on how sexual orientation affects 
fairness within the judicial system document how sexual orientation plays a role in how 
straight and LGBT people experience the justice system.  For a discussion of the findings of 
some court task forces, see Pamela D. Bridgewater & Brenda V. Smith, Introduction to 
Symposium:  Homophobia in the Halls of Justice:  Sexual Orientation Bias and its 
Implications Within the Legal System, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 3–8 (2002–
2003). 
250. See supra Part II.B. 
251. See supra text accompanying notes 147–62. 
252. See supra text accompanying notes 216–18. 
253. Curcio et al., Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers, supra note 9, at app. 
B at 127–28. 
254. See Kang, supra note 123, at 1508; Weng, supra note 61, at 394. 
69
: Nova Law Review 38, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
230 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
assumptions and how those attitudes and assumptions affect our perceptions 
and interactions.255 
In self-assessments, people tend to overestimate their abilities.256  
Factor 5 suggests the need for knowledge learning outcomes that build 
students’ understandings of subconscious and implicit biases and stereotypes.  
This data suggests that useful attitude learning outcomes might focus on 
helping students accept that both conscious and unconscious bias and 
stereotyping affect our perceptions and behaviors.  Learning outcomes 
should emphasize understanding the insidious nature of subconscious and 
implicit bias, acknowledging the challenges inherent in recognition of 
subconscious and implicit biases, and realizing the power of subconscious 
and implicit biases to affect our conduct, communications, and reactions, 
even if we wish it were otherwise.  The associated skill learning outcome 
could be recognition of the drivers and biases behind our own behaviors.  
Students need to understand that we all have cultural biases.  Rather than 
denying biases, we need to acknowledge they exist and become aware of 
how they affect our interactions and decision-making processes.257  If 
students will not acknowledge they have biases, they cannot develop 
methods to help avoid being adversely influenced by them in their dealing 
with others.258 
The survey results suggest that an important aspect of cultural 
sensibility teaching is developing students’ understanding that we all bring 
our cultural biases into the legal profession.259  Without this understanding, 
students may be unable to move toward an ethnorelative view of the world, 
                                                            
255. Kang, supra note 123, at 1528–29.  Recognition of the role played by 
unconscious biases is critical both in terms of lawyer-client relationships and in terms of 
adequately representing clients.  Professor Justin Levinson conducted two studies 
demonstrating the impact of biases on jurors’ decision making.  See generally Justin Levinson, 
Forgotten Racial Equality:  Implicit Bias, Decision Making, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 345 (2007) (discussing the role of implicit bias on jurors’ memories of facts presented); 
Justin Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias:  Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias 
and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307 (2010) (discussing the role 
implicit bias plays in jurors’ interpretation of ambiguous evidence). 
256. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:  
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 955 (2006) (discussing how people are 
generally unaware of their biases and over-estimate their abilities to identify their biases); 
Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It:  How Difficulties in 
Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1121 (1999) (discussing how self-assessments are often inaccurate 
with those least skilled most likely to over-estimate their abilities). 
257. Weng, supra note 61, at 396–97; see also Silver, supra note 67, at 237–
39. 
258. Kang, supra note 123, at 1528–29. 
259. See Miller et al., supra note 6, at 105–07. 
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in which they understand that everyone has a multi-faceted cultural 
perspective and that there is no single good or bad cultural perspective.260  
However, cultural sensibility is not a model that accepts that anything goes.  
While students need to understand that there is no single good or bad cultural 
perspective, they also need to develop the skills to challenge perceived unjust 
cultural norms, but should do so sensitively and after exploring all 
perspectives. 
D. Study Limitations 
This study has several limitations, some of which we discussed 
above.  Additional limitations are discussed below. 
First, we acknowledge that there are a wide range of cultural 
sensibility learning outcomes that are not assessed by this instrument and 
may not lend themselves to a quantitative self-assessment instrument.261  
This instrument does not address, and is not meant to address, the full range 
of cultural sensibility learning outcomes necessary to assess whether students 
are able to effectively work across cultures. 
Second, despite efforts to assess the role of social desirability 
response bias in the data,262 all self-assessments, including this one, remain 
vulnerable to self-evaluations based upon students’ perceptions of the correct 
response rather than students’ actual beliefs and perceptions. 
Third, in Factor 4, which assesses students’ understanding of the 
need to be curious about what may be culturally based behaviors, there were 
likely an insufficient number of examples of various types of behaviors that 
may be based upon cultural practices.263  Also, it is difficult to write 
statements that describe what may be culturally based behaviors outside of 
any particular context.  This factor may thus be inadequately explored via 
this instrument.  This limitation was based upon the necessity of limiting the 
survey length in order to increase response rate. 
Fourth, students’ self-assessment of their ability to identify their 
culturally biased assumptions and when they are acting based upon 
                                                            
260. See supra Part III (discussing Bennett’s stages of intercultural 
competence). 
261. Others have attempted to measure additional learning outcomes via 
various self-assessment instruments.  See sources cited supra note 194.  However, self-
assessment instruments are not, and should not be, the only way students’ cultural sensibility 
learning is assessed.  For example, in doctrinal courses, students could be assessed via essay 
or short answer questions asking them to incorporate cultural perspectives into their analysis.  
In experiential learning classes students could be assessed via journal entries, simulation 
exercises and actual interactions with clients and court personnel. 
262. See supra text accompanying notes 201–07. 
263. See supra Table 3. 
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stereotypes (Factor 5) presents a difficult dilemma.  The data indicates that 
students, on average, rate themselves moderately highly when it comes to the 
ability to self-identify when they are acting based upon stereotypes or biases.  
However, the literature suggests most people underestimate the effect of 
biases on their behaviors, often because they are unaware of the impact of 
implicit biases on decision making.264  Thus, we cannot make the assumption 
that those who scored highly on this factor are able to accurately self-assess 
when they are acting based upon stereotypes and biases. 
Finally, as stated earlier, there may be a possible effect of 
nonresponse bias with the Northern School data and upper level student 
response data in general.265  It may be that non-responders were not as 
interested in participating in a survey on the role culture plays in the 
lawyering process, or conversely, those responding were more interested in 
the topic. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Whatever the individual views of legal educators might be, learning 
outcomes will soon become part of the legal education accreditation 
process.266  The decision about whether the outcomes include teaching our 
students to work effectively across cultures will be left to law schools.267  We 
believe that in today’s multicultural world, students must develop into 
culturally sensible lawyers who understand how their own cultural 
experiences affect their legal analysis, behaviors, and perceptions; who do 
not make assumptions about other cultures or legal systems; and who avoid 
behaviors based upon cultural domination or superiority of their own 
perspectives. 
The cultural sensibility framework helps legal educators begin to 
conceptualize learning outcomes related to students’ abilities to work 
effectively across cultures.  It also serves as the basis for a statistically 
reliable survey instrument we developed to help law faculties better 
                                                            
264. For a summary of various studies demonstrating the impact of implicit 
bias on the behavior of various actors within the legal system, see Jerry Kang et al., Implicit 
Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012).  For a review of the literature on 
implicit bias and how it potentially relates to the survey results, see Curcio et al., Educating 
Culturally Sensible Lawyers, supra note 9, at 117–19. 
265. See supra Part IV.B.  Incoming students at the Southern Urban School 
took the survey as part of the scheduled orientation process.  The other survey cohorts were 
asked, via email, to complete the survey. 
266. See supra notes 4, 19–20. 
267. See Proposed Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, on Chapter 3: Program of Legal Education 
(Mar. 2014), supra note 4. 
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understand some aspects of their students’ cultural sensibility knowledge, 
attitudes, and skills.  The survey described herein can help faculties gauge 
their students’ receptivity to learning about the role culture plays in the 
lawyering process and assist educators in identifying where to devote 
educational time and effort.  Additionally, the survey can help faculties 
identify potential learning outcomes and track students’ cultural sensibility 
development over the course of their legal education.  Specifically the 
instrument can help assess:  1) students’ understanding of how culture 
influences judges, lawyers and clients; 2) students’ self-awareness of the 
influence their cultural experiences have on how they view the legal system; 
3) students’ desire to learn about the role culture plays in the lawyering 
process; 4) students’ awareness of the need to evaluate whether unfamiliar 
behaviors may be based upon cultural beliefs and practices; and 5) students’ 
understanding of the difficulty inherent in identifying when we are acting 
based upon our biases and stereotypes. 
Although we do not suggest that the survey instrument discussed 
herein can, or should, be the sole measure of student cultural sensibility 
learning outcomes, its statistical reliability and validity and its demonstrated 
ability to identify differences amongst incoming and upper level students 
indicates that it may be a useful learning outcome measurement tool for 
some aspects of cultural sensibility learning.268  While more work needs to 
be done to develop a wide range of cultural sensibility learning outcome 
assessments, the research provided in this paper provides legal educators a 
starting point as they begin to consider the need for cultural sensibility 
education, what that education should entail, and whether that education is 
effective. 
                                                            
268. This survey may be useful as a pre- and post-course survey.  However, 
faculty must be cognizant of the fact that cultural sensibility learning may not click 
immediately after a course has been completed.  Thus, immediate post-course survey results 
may not indicate the full extent of student learning.  Additionally, faculty members must be 
cautious in how they present the survey to avoid students trying to answer in a way that 
pleases the faculty member rather than truly reflects the students’ own views. 
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APPENDIX A 
Survey Instrument 
1.  Please indicate the degree to which the following influences your views 
about the U.S. legal system. 
Scale:  1=No influence at all to 6=Very strong influence 
 
1.1 Experiences arising from your racial identity 
1.2 Experiences arising from your ethnic identity 
1.3 Experiences arising from your religious identity 
1.4 Experiences arising from your socio-economic background 
1.5 Experiences arising from your gender 
1.6 Experiences arising from your sexual orientation 
 
2. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following 
statements: 
Scale:  1=Strongly disagree to 6=Strongly agree 
 
2.1 Clients look at legal problems through their own cultural lens. 
2.2 Lawyers look at legal problems through their own cultural lens. 
2.3 How a client communicates with his or her lawyer is not influenced by 
the client’s cultural background. 
2.4 I do not view the legal system through a culturally-biased lens. 
2.5 If a client’s cultural practice is to defer decision making to others in the 
client’s family, a lawyer should help the client understand why he or she 
should make his or her own decisions about the case. 
2.6 A lawyer’s socioeconomic background influences how the lawyer 
perceives a client’s behavior. 
2.7 Legal education should not include education about cultural issues that 
may arise when providing legal services to people from different cultural 
backgrounds. 
2.8 A lawyer should assume that a client’s visible lack of emotion means that 
the client does not feel strongly about what is being discussed. 
2.9 Judges do not look at legal problems through their own cultural lens. 
2.10 In general, I am able to recognize when my reactions to others are based 
on stereotypical beliefs. 
2.11 How a lawyer communicates with his or her client is not influenced by 
the lawyer’s cultural background. 
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2.12 When a client refuses to look his or her lawyer in the eyes, the lawyer 
should assume the client is not being truthful. 
2.13 In general, I can accurately identify my culturally-biased assumptions 
about others who are from cultures different from my own. 
2.14 Lawyers belonging to racial and ethnic minorities bring culturally-
biased assumptions into the lawyer/client relationship. 
2.15 When a client shakes hands with a male attorney but refused to shake 
hands with a female attorney, the lawyers should assume the client will not 
respect advice given by the female attorney. 
2.16 White lawyers bring culturally-biased assumptions into the 
lawyer/client relationship. 
2.17 Law professors should discuss with their students the cultural 
assumptions embedded in appellate legal opinions. 
2.18 A law student’s ability to recognize cultural diversity issues as they 
relate to the lawyering process should be assessed during law school. 
 
3. Law School Classes 
 
3.1 Have you taken any clinics in law school? 
3.2 Please tell us which clinic(s) you have taken. 
3.3 Have you taken any law school classes in which the role of culture in the 
lawyering process was discussed? 
3.4 Please tell us which course(s) or professor(s). 
3.5 What have you encountered in your classes that has helped to foster, or to 
inhibit, discussion of the role of culture in the lawyering process? 
 
4. Demographics 
 
4.1 Please indicate your current year in law school. [I am a 2L (have 
completed 29 to 57 law school credit hours]  
[I am a 3L (have completed in excess of 57 law school credit hours] 
 
Gender [Female] [Male] [Transgender] 
 
Ethnicity/Race (Choose all that apply.)  [American Indian or Alaska Native] 
[Asian] [Black] [Hispanic/Latino(a)] [Hawaiian or Pacific Islander]  [White] 
 
Age [20-25] [26-30] [31-35] [36-40] [41-45] [46-50] [over 50] 
 
We would appreciate any comments or suggestions you may have regarding 
the questionnaire or the topic. 
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APPENDIX B:  SURVEY ITEM MEANS BY STUDENT LEVEL 
Survey Items  N Mean SD Sig. 
Experiences arising from 
your racial identity 
Entering law students 309 3.14 1.55  
2L or 3L 282 3.10 1.66  
Total 591 3.12 1.60  
Experiences arising from 
your ethnic identity 
Entering law students 309 2.85 1.60  
2L or 3L 282 2.70 1.62  
Total 591 2.78 1.61  
Experiences arising from 
your religious identity 
Entering law students 309 3.20 1.59  
2L or 3L 280 2.95 1.60  
Total 589 3.08 1.59  
Experiences arising from 
your socio-economic 
background 
Entering law students 309 3.92 1.43  
2L or 3L 281 4.10 1.47  
Total 590 4.01 1.45  
Experiences arising from 
your gender 
Entering law students 309 3.41 1.59  
2L or 3L 282 3.80 1.61 p<.01 
Total 591 3.60 1.61  
Experiences arising from 
your sexual orientation 
Entering law students 309 2.31 1.54  
2L or 3L 280 2.60 1.69 p<.05 
Total 589 2.45 1.62  
Clients look at legal 
problems through their 
own cultural lens. 
Entering law students 309 5.04 0.97  
2L or 3L 281 5.16 0.95  
Total 590 5.09 0.97  
Lawyers look at legal 
problems through their 
own cultural lens. 
Entering law students 307 3.72 1.31  
2L or 3L 281 4.33 1.18 p<.000 
Total 588 4.01 1.28  
How a client 
communicates with his or 
her lawyer is not 
influenced by the client’s 
cultural background.† 
Entering law students 309 5.09 1.06  
2L or 3L 281 5.30 1.00 p<.05 
Total 590 5.19 1.04  
I do not view the legal 
system through a 
culturally-biased lens.† 
Entering law students 309 3.66 1.38  
2L or 3L 280 4.09 1.34 p<.000 
Total 589 3.86 1.37  
If a client’s cultural 
practice is to defer 
Entering law students 306 2.82 1.23  
2L or 3L 278 2.54 1.20  
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Survey Items  N Mean SD Sig. 
decision making to others 
in the client’s family, a 
lawyer should help the 
client understand why he 
or she should make his or 
her own decisions about 
the case.† 
Total 584 2.68 1.22 p<.05 
A lawyer’s 
socioeconomic 
background influences 
how the lawyer perceives 
a client’s behavior. 
Entering law students 307 4.03 1.22  
2L or 3L 279 4.58 1.12 p<.000 
Total 586 4.29 1.20  
Legal education should 
not include education 
about cultural issues that 
may arise when 
providing legal services 
to people from different 
cultural backgrounds 
than my own.† 
Entering law students 308 5.08 1.13  
2L or 3L 280 5.04 1.31  
Total 588 5.06 1.22  
A lawyer should assume 
that a client’s visible lack 
of emotion means that 
the client does not feel 
strongly about what is 
being discussed.† 
Entering law students 305 5.36 0.87  
2L or 3L 281 5.39 0.99  
Total 586 5.37 0.93  
Judges do not look at 
legal problems through 
their own cultural lens.† 
Entering law students 309 4.42 1.24  
2L or 3L 279 4.91 1.18 p<.000 
Total 588 4.65 1.23  
In general, I am able to 
recognize when my 
reactions to others are 
based on stereotypical 
beliefs. 
Entering law students 307 4.68 0.89  
2L or 3L 280 4.52 0.92 p<.05 
Total 587 4.61 0.91  
How a lawyer 
communicates with his or 
her client is not 
influenced by the 
lawyer’s cultural 
background.† 
Entering law students 309 4.50 0.96  
2L or 3L 280 4.86 0.99 p<.000 
Total 589 4.67 0.99  
When a client refuses to 
look his or her lawyer in 
the eyes, the lawyer 
should assume the client 
is not being truthful.† 
Entering law students 307 5.16 0.93  
2L or 3L 279 5.21 0.91  
Total 586 5.19 0.92  
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In general, I can 
accurately identify my 
culturally-biased 
assumptions about others 
who are from cultures 
different from my own. 
Entering law students 308 4.26 1.01  
2L or 3L 279 4.14 1.06  
Total 587 4.20 1.04  
Lawyers belonging to 
racial and ethnic 
minorities bring 
culturally-biased 
assumptions into the 
lawyer/client 
relationship. 
Entering law students 309 3.22 1.32  
2L or 3L 281 3.65 1.33 p<.000 
Total 590 3.42 1.34  
When a client shakes 
hands with a male 
attorney but refuses to 
shake hands with a 
female attorney, the 
lawyers should assume 
the client will not respect 
advice given by the 
female attorney.† 
Entering law students 308 4.15 1.28  
2L or 3L 281 4.04 1.35  
Total 589 4.10 1.31  
White lawyers bring 
culturally-biased 
assumptions into the 
lawyer/client 
relationship. 
Entering law students 309 3.26 1.36  
2L or 3L 280 3.93 1.37 p<.000 
Total 589 3.58 1.40  
Law professors should 
discuss with their 
students the cultural 
assumptions embedded in 
appellate legal opinions. 
Entering law students 308 4.67 1.08  
2L or 3L 279 4.44 1.39 p<.05 
Total 587 4.56 1.24  
A law student’s ability to 
recognize cultural 
diversity issues as they 
relate to the lawyering 
process should be 
assessed during law 
school. 
Entering law students 309 4.23 1.31  
2L or 3L 281 3.93 1.54 p<.05 
Total 590 4.09 1.43  
† Item was reverse coded 
Note.  Mean range = 1-6 with higher mean score representing higher level of cultural 
sensibility. 
**Survey Item Means by Student Level (cont.) 
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APPENDIX C:  SURVEY ITEM MEANS BY UNIVERSITY 
Survey Items  N Mean SD Sig. 
Experiences arising from your 
racial identity 
Southern Urban 318 3.06 1.61  
Northern 273 3.19 1.60  
Total 591 3.12 1.60  
Experiences arising from your 
ethnic identity 
Southern Urban 318 2.85 1.63  
Northern 273 2.69 1.58  
Total 591 2.78 1.61  
Experiences arising from your 
religious identity 
Southern Urban 317 3.14 1.57  
Northern 272 3.00 1.62  
Total 589 3.08 1.59  
Experiences arising from your 
socio-economic background 
Southern Urban 317 3.86 1.42  
Northern 273 4.18 1.46 p<.05 
Total 590 4.01 1.45  
Experiences arising from your 
gender 
Southern Urban 318 3.45 1.57  
Northern 273 3.77 1.65  
Total 591 3.60 1.61  
Experiences arising from your 
sexual orientation 
Southern Urban 317 2.27 1.51  
Northern 272 2.66 1.71  
Total 589 2.45 1.62  
Clients look at legal problems 
through their own cultural lens. 
Southern Urban 317 5.04 0.97  
Northern 273 5.15 0.96  
Total 590 5.09 0.97  
Lawyers look at legal problems 
through their own cultural lens. 
Southern Urban 317 3.79 1.28  
Northern 271 4.27 1.24 p<.000 
Total 588 4.01 1.28  
How a client communicates 
with his or her lawyer is not 
influenced by the client’s 
cultural background.† 
Southern Urban 317 5.10 1.07  
Northern 273 5.30 0.99 p<.05 
Total 590 5.19 1.04  
I do not view the legal system 
through a culturally-biased 
lens.† 
Southern Urban 316 3.61 1.37  
Northern 273 4.16 1.32 p<.000 
Total 589 3.86 1.37  
If a client’s cultural practice is 
to defer decision making to 
others in the client’s family, a 
lawyer should help the client 
understand why he or she 
should make his or her own 
decisions about the case.† 
Southern Urban 311 2.71 1.25  
Northern 273 2.65 1.19  
Total 584 2.68 1.22  
A lawyer’s socioeconomic 
background influences how the 
Southern Urban 315 4.03 1.18  
Northern 271 4.60 1.16 p<.000 
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lawyer perceives a client’s 
behavior. 
Total 586 4.29 1.20  
Legal education should not 
include education about cultural 
issues that may arise when 
providing legal services to 
people from different cultural 
backgrounds than my own.† 
Southern Urban 316 4.99 1.23  
Northern 272 5.14 1.20  
Total 588 5.06 1.22  
A lawyer should assume that a 
client’s visible lack of emotion 
means that the client does not 
feel strongly about what is 
being discussed.† 
Southern Urban 314 5.30 0.94  
Northern 272 5.46 0.90  
Total 586 5.37 0.93  
Judges do not look at legal 
problems through their own 
cultural lens.† 
Southern Urban 316 4.50 1.28  
Northern 272 4.83 1.16 p<.01 
Total 588 4.65 1.23  
In general, I am able to 
recognize when my reactions to 
others are based on 
stereotypical beliefs. 
Southern Urban 315 4.66 0.90  
Northern 272 4.55 0.92  
Total 587 4.61 0.91  
How a lawyer communicates 
with his or her client is not 
influenced by the lawyer’s 
cultural background.† 
Southern Urban 316 4.47 1.01  
Northern 273 4.90 0.91 p<.000 
Total 589 4.67 0.99  
When a client refuses to look 
his or her lawyer in the eyes, 
the lawyer should assume the 
client is not being truthful.† 
Southern Urban 314 5.08 0.99  
Northern 272 5.31 0.82 p<.01 
Total 586 5.19 0.92  
In general, I can accurately 
identify my culturally-biased 
assumptions about others who 
are from cultures different from 
my own. 
Southern Urban 315 4.26 1.05  
Northern 272 4.13 1.03  
Total 587 4.20 1.04  
Lawyers belonging to racial and 
ethnic minorities bring 
culturally-biased assumptions 
into the lawyer/client 
relationship. 
Southern Urban 317 3.27 1.26  
Northern 273 3.60 1.41 p<.01 
Total 590 3.42 1.34  
When a client shakes hands 
with a male attorney but refuses 
to shake hands with a female 
attorney, the lawyers should 
assume the client will not 
respect advice given by the 
female attorney.† 
Southern Urban 316 3.97 1.35  
Northern 273 4.24 1.26 p<.05 
Total 589 4.10 1.31  
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White lawyers bring culturally-
biased assumptions into the 
lawyer/client relationship. 
Southern Urban 317 3.25 1.35  
Northern 272 3.96 1.37 p<.000 
Total 589 3.58 1.40  
Law professors should discuss 
with their students the cultural 
assumptions embedded in 
appellate legal opinions. 
Southern Urban 315 4.51 1.18  
Northern 272 4.61 1.31  
Total 587 4.56 1.24  
A law student’s ability to 
recognize cultural diversity 
issues as they relate to the 
lawyering process should be 
assessed during law school. 
Southern Urban 317 4.08 1.41  
Northern 273 4.10 1.45  
Total 590 4.09 1.43  
† Item was reverse coded 
Note.  Mean range = 1-6 with higher mean score representing higher level of cultural 
sensibility. 
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APPENDIX D**:  SURVEY ITEM MEANS BY RACE/ETHNICITY  
Survey Items  N Mean SD Sig. 
Experiences arising from your 
racial identity 
Non White 132 4.11 1.56  
White 435 2.83 1.49 p<.000 
Total 567 3.13 1.60  
Experiences arising from your 
ethnic identity 
Non White 132 3.91 1.70  
White 435 2.43 1.41 p<.000 
Total 567 2.78 1.60  
Experiences arising from your 
religious identity 
Non White 132 3.27 1.73  
White 433 3.00 1.54  
Total 565 3.06 1.59  
Experiences arising from your 
socio-economic background 
Non White 131 4.18 1.38  
White 435 3.95 1.44  
Total 566 4.00 1.43  
Experiences arising from your 
gender 
Non White 132 3.91 1.72  
White 435 3.53 1.56 p<.05 
Total 567 3.62 1.61  
Experiences arising from your 
sexual orientation 
Non White 132 2.36 1.74  
White 434 2.47 1.56  
Total 566 2.44 1.60  
Clients look at legal problems 
through their own cultural lens. 
Non White 132 5.14 1.05  
White 435 5.08 0.94  
Total 567 5.09 0.97  
Lawyers look at legal problems 
through their own cultural lens. 
Non White 132 4.07 1.47  
White 433 3.97 1.23  
Total 565 4.00 1.29  
How a client communicates with 
his or her lawyer is not influenced 
by the client’s cultural 
background.† 
Non White 132 5.13 1.20  
White 435 5.21 0.99  
Total 567 5.19 1.05  
I do not view the legal system 
through a culturally-biased lens.† 
Non White 132 3.91 1.37  
White 434 3.85 1.36  
Total 566 3.86 1.36  
If a client’s cultural practice is to 
defer decision making to others in 
the client’s family, a lawyer should 
help the client understand why he 
or she should make his or her own 
decisions about the case.† 
Non White 131 2.64 1.29  
White 430 2.69 1.19  
Total 561 2.68 1.21  
A lawyer’s socioeconomic 
background influences how the 
Non White 132 4.33 1.35  
White 431 4.27 1.15  
82
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1
2014] INSTRUMENT TO DEVELOP AND TAILOR LAW STUDENT 243 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY EDUCATION LEARNING OUTCOMES 
Survey Items  N Mean SD Sig. 
lawyer perceives a client’s 
behavior. 
Total 563 4.28 1.20  
Legal education should not include 
education about cultural issues that 
may arise when providing legal 
services to people from different 
cultural backgrounds than my 
own.† 
Non White 131 5.25 1.14  
White 433 5.03 1.20  
Total 564 5.09 1.19  
A lawyer should assume that a 
client’s visible lack of emotion 
means that the client does not feel 
strongly about what is being 
discussed.† 
Non White 129 5.40 0.98  
White 433 5.36 0.91  
Total 562 5.37 0.92  
Judges do not look at legal 
problems through their own 
cultural lens.† 
Non White 131 4.81 1.20  
White 434 4.60 1.24  
Total 565 4.65 1.23  
In general, I am able to recognize 
when my reactions to others are 
based on stereotypical beliefs. 
Non White 132 4.70 0.99  
White 432 4.58 0.89  
Total 564 4.61 0.91  
How a lawyer communicates with 
his or her client is not influenced 
by the lawyer’s cultural 
background.† 
Non White 132 4.89 1.00  
White 433 4.61 0.98 p<.05 
Total 565 4.67 0.99  
When a client refuses to look his or 
her lawyer in the eyes, the lawyer 
should assume the client is not 
being truthful.† 
Non White 131 5.23 0.96  
White 432 5.17 0.90  
Total 563 5.18 0.92  
In general, I can accurately identify 
my culturally-biased assumptions 
about others who are from cultures 
different from my own. 
Non White 132 4.35 1.13  
White 432 4.15 1.01  
Total 564 4.20 1.04  
Lawyers belonging to racial and 
ethnic minorities bring culturally-
biased assumptions into the 
lawyer/client relationship. 
Non White 132 3.14 1.40  
White 434 3.49 1.31 p<.05 
Total 566 3.41 1.34  
When a client shakes hands with a 
male attorney but refuses to shake 
hands with a female attorney, the 
lawyers should assume the client 
will not respect advice given by the 
female attorney.† 
Non White 132 4.02 1.33  
White 433 4.09 1.31  
Total 565 4.07 1.31  
White lawyers bring culturally-
biased assumptions into the 
lawyer/client relationship. 
Non White 132 3.69 1.38  
White 433 3.53 1.40  
Total 565 3.57 1.40  
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Law professors should discuss with 
their students the cultural 
assumptions embedded in appellate 
legal opinions. 
Non White 131 4.89 1.06  
 
White 432 4.49 1.23 p<.01 
Total 563 4.58 1.20  
A law student’s ability to recognize 
cultural diversity issues as they 
relate to the lawyering process 
should be assessed during law 
school. 
Non White 132 4.55 1.29  
White 434 3.97 1.40 p<.000 
Total 566 4.11 1.39  
† Item was reverse coded 
Note.  Mean range = 1-6 with higher mean score representing higher level of cultural 
sensibility. 
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APPENDIX E**:  SURVEY ITEM MEANS BY GENDER 
Survey Items  N Mean SD Sig. 
Experiences arising from your racial 
identity 
Female 287 3.55 1.61  
Male 291 2.71 1.49 p<.000 
Total 578 3.13 1.61  
Experiences arising from your 
ethnic identity 
Female 287 3.13 1.65  
Male 291 2.43 1.50 p<.000 
Total 578 2.78 1.61  
Experiences arising from your 
religious identity 
Female 286 3.21 1.54  
Male 290 2.93 1.62 p<.05 
Total 576 3.07 1.59  
Experiences arising from your 
socio-economic background 
Female 286 4.21 1.35  
Male 291 3.79 1.51 p<.01 
Total 577 4.00 1.45  
Experiences arising from your 
gender 
Female 287 4.39 1.35  
Male 291 2.83 1.45 p<.000 
Total 578 3.61 1.60  
Experiences arising from your 
sexual orientation 
Female 286 2.65 1.67  
Male 291 2.25 1.53 p<.01 
Total 577 2.45 1.62  
Clients look at legal problems 
through their own cultural lens. 
Female 287 5.26 0.92  
Male 291 4.93 0.99 p<.000 
Total 578 5.10 0.97  
Lawyers look at legal problems 
through their own cultural lens. 
Female 286 4.23 1.29  
Male 290 3.77 1.25 p<.000 
Total 576 4.00 1.29  
How a client communicates with his 
or her lawyer is not influenced by 
the client’s cultural background.† 
Female 287 5.34 0.96  
Male 291 5.038 1.10 p<.000 
Total 578 5.19 1.04  
I do not view the legal system 
through a culturally-biased lens.† 
Female 287 4.04 1.34  
Male 290 3.67 1.39 p<.01 
Total 577 3.85 1.38  
If a client’s cultural practice is to 
defer decision making to others in 
the client’s family, a lawyer should 
help the client understand why he or 
she should make his or her own 
decisions about the case.† 
Female 285 2.66 1.18  
Male 287 2.67 1.25  
Total 572 2.66 1.21  
A lawyer’s socioeconomic 
background influences how the 
lawyer perceives a client’s behavior. 
Female 285 4.40 1.17  
Male 289 4.19 1.23 p<.05 
Total 574 4.29 1.21  
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Legal education should not include 
education about cultural issues that 
may arise when providing legal 
services to people from different 
cultural backgrounds than my own.† 
Female 285 5.3439 1.11  
 
Male 290 4.8069 1.25 p<.000 
Total 575 5.0730 1.21  
A lawyer should assume that a 
client’s visible lack of emotion 
means that the client does not feel 
strongly about what is being 
discussed.† 
Female 285 5.43 .95  
Male 288 5.32 .91  
Total 573 5.37 .93  
Judges do not look at legal problems 
through their own cultural lens.† 
Female 286 4.77 1.20  
Male 290 4.52 1.26 p<.05 
Total 576 4.64 1.24  
In general, I am able to recognize 
when my reactions to others are 
based on stereotypical beliefs. 
Female 287 4.65 .88  
Male 288 4.57 .93  
Total 575 4.61 .91  
How a lawyer communicates with 
his or her client is not influenced by 
the lawyer’s cultural background.† 
Female 286 4.83 1.00 p<.000 
Male 290 4.52 .96  
Total 576 4.67 .99  
When a client refuses to look his or 
her lawyer in the eyes, the lawyer 
should assume the client is not being 
truthful.† 
Female 287 5.24 .90  
Male 287 5.12 .94  
Total 574 5.18 .92  
In general, I can accurately identify 
my culturally-biased assumptions 
about others who are from cultures 
different from my own. 
Female 286 4.26 1.06  
Male 289 4.15 1.02  
Total 575 4.21 1.04  
Lawyers belonging to racial and 
ethnic minorities bring culturally-
biased assumptions into the 
lawyer/client relationship. 
Female 287 3.38 1.41  
Male 290 3.46 1.27 p<.05 
Total 577 3.42 1.34  
When a client shakes hands with a 
male attorney but refuses to shake 
hands with a female attorney, the 
lawyers should assume the client 
will not respect advice given by the 
female attorney.† 
Female 287 4.02 1.34  
Male 289 4.15 1.28  
Total 576 4.09 1.31  
White lawyers bring culturally-
biased assumptions into the 
lawyer/client relationship. 
Female 287 3.74 1.39  
Male 289 3.44 1.41 p<.05 
Total 576 3.59 1.40  
Law professors should discuss with 
their students the cultural 
assumptions embedded in appellate 
legal opinions. 
Female 286 4.79 1.10  
Male 288 4.38 1.29 p<.000 
Total 574 4.59 1.22  
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A law student’s ability to recognize 
cultural diversity issues as they 
relate to the lawyering process 
should be assessed during law 
school. 
Female 287 4.38 1.35  
 
Male 290 3.85 1.43 p<.000 
Total 577 4.11 1.42  
† Item was reverse coded 
Note.  Mean range = 1-6 with higher mean score representing higher level of cultural 
sensibility. 
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PROLOGUE 
The sting of recession that grips the American economy is even more 
dramatic in the realm of legal education. 1   Law schools, in addition to 
producing too many graduates for an already too full legal economy, also 
face a barrage of bad press,2 dwindling LSAT takers,3 and sharp declines in 
student applications, 4  not to mention sharp criticism about high costs of 
tuition and spiraling student debt.5  Due to this perfect storm of troubles, law 
schools are now being forced to plan more strategically than in decades of 
																																																								
* Associate Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern 
University.  Special thanks to Professor Olympia Duhart, Dr. Docia Rudley, and Dean Dannye 
R. Holley for their insights and intellectual support. 
** Assistant Professor and Director of Experiential Learning Programs, Thurgood 
Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University. 
1. Stanley Fish, The Bad News Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012, 
9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/the-bad-news-law-schools/.	
2. See, e.g., id. (summarizing much of the negative press). 
3. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Drop in LSAT Takers Shows Legal Field’s 
Slump, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2013, at A.20. 
4. Three-Year ABA Volume Comparison, LSAC, http://www.lsac.org/
lsacresources/data/three-year-volume (last updated March 7, 2014). 
5. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS ix (John M. 
Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2012). 
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prosperity.6  Among the implicit critiques of legal education are the more 
direct critiques coming from the corporate world.7  In particular, large law 
firms are demanding in growing unison that J.D. graduates be more practice 
ready for the rigors of corporate practice.8  Although big firms employ only a 
small percentage of all J.D. graduates, they are influencing the discussion 
with support from members of the academy, bench, and bar, all of whom 
support increasing practical skills training, albeit under different rationales.9 
This article examines this transformation in legal education through 
the lens of critical pedagogy.  At its base, critical pedagogy is about 
“devis[ing] more equitable methods of teaching, help[ing] students develop 
consciousness of freedom, and [helping them] connect knowledge to 
power.” 10   The insights of critical pedagogy are valuable for a fuller 
understanding of experiential education and its potential to affect students in 
profound ways, particularly as a means of empowerment.11  Although this is 
an understudied area of pedagogical scholarship, as one scholar notes, 
[p]ower relations pervade the regime of practices that constitute 
legal education, operating in subtle but nevertheless concrete ways 
to shape the actions of students, teachers, professionals, and 
administrators.  Yet, despite their pervasiveness, legal education 
scholarship does not effectively grasp or explore power relations—
they do not feature as objects of research in an explicit manner, 
and when they are considered, they are understood in problematic 
ways.12 
																																																								
6. THE N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON NEW LAWYERS IN A CHANGING 
PROFESSION, N.Y.C. BAR, DEVELOPING LEGAL CAREERS AND DELIVERING JUSTICE IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 45–47 (2013), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/developing-legal-careers-
and-delivering-justice-in-the-21st-century.pdf.	
7. See	id. at 23.	
8. See id. at 22–23. 
9. See id. at 26–27 (citing that firms of 501 or more employees employed 
“nearly [twenty percent] of 2010 graduates from law schools in New York State”); Press 
Release, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, New York City Bar Association Task Force Calls for Changes in 
Education and Career Focus for New Lawyers—Report Announces Pilot Programs and Urges 
Focus on Unmet Middle Class Legal Needs (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.nycbar.org/media-
aamp-publications/press-releases/press-archives–2013/1885–new-york-city-bar-association-
task-force-calls-for-changes-in-education-and-career-focus-for-new-lawyers-report-
announces-pilot-programs-and-urges-focus-on-unmet-middle-class-legal-needs/. 
10. SpearIt, Priorities of Pedagogy:  Classroom Justice in the Law School 
Setting, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 467, 469 (2012) [hereinafter SpearIt, Priorities of Pedagogy:  
Classroom Justice in the Law School Setting]. 
11. See id. at 472. 
12. Matthew Ball, Power in Legal Education:  A (New) Critical and 
Analytical Approach, 12 QUEENSL. U. TECH. L. & JUST., Apr. 12, 2012, at 157, 157. 
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Critical pedagogy is a frame for considering how experiential education 
empowers students and leads to other positive outcomes. 13   Although 
advocates of experiential education typically emphasize the needs of the 
profession and student marketability, critical pedagogy reveals more at stake 
for students—including experiencing greater agency, autonomy, and 
hopefully, greater justice.14 
The article outlines a student-centered set of rationales for adopting 
experiential principles.  As such it seeks to engage law professors of all 
persuasions to consider what experiential education means for students 
personally.  More pointedly, this article attempts to break down some of the 
great divide between teaching doctrine and experiential education.15  Infusing 
doctrinal courses with opportunities for experiential learning will be 
imperative for law schools; and so it will be imperative to engage doctrinal 
faculty.16  The pages that follow are an attempt. 
Among the most compelling rationales for enhancing experiential 
education is its potential to engage students in justice directly, and not simply 
as a lesson from a book.17  For example, students who experience the law 
through direct interaction with indigent clients learn valuable lessons in 
justice and the unmet legal needs that affect the most vulnerable and 
marginalized segments of society.18  Students learn through their experience 
that justice is complex and multilayered, and indeed unstable.  Yet, by 
assisting such clients, students experience the law as stewards of justice, 
rather than floundering law students.  Students get the opportunity to learn 
justice inside and outside of the classroom setting, and are assessed in 
abilities other than typical law school test-taking. 19   A more variegated 
approach to assessments promises more student evaluation of the skills and 
values that lawyers need for successful and meaningful practice.20 
																																																								
13. SpearIt, Priorities of Pedagogy:  Classroom Justice in the Law School 
Setting, supra note 10, at 469. 
14. See id. at 469–70, 479. 
15. Jessica Erickson, Experiential Education in the Lecture Hall, 6 N.E. U. 
L.J. 87, 87 (2013) (describing doctrine faculty and skills faculty as “composed of two separate 
worlds”). 
16. Id. at 87–88. 
17. SpearIt, Priorities of Pedagogy:  Classroom Justice in the Law School 
Setting, supra note 10, at 470. 
18. See, e.g., VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIVE LAW 
TEACHING: A CRITICAL READER 62–63, 399 (Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers & Golden Gate 
Univ. Sch. of Law eds., 2011). 
19. Deborah Maranville et al., Re-Vision Quest:  A Law School Guide to 
Designing Experiential Courses Involving Real Lawyering, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517, 527, 
530–32 (20112012). 
20. See id. at 531–32. 
90
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1
252 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
The potential benefit of experiential education hardly means there is 
not a potential for pitfalls in implementing and maintaining experiential 
curricula.21  For example, as one commentator notes: 
[D]eveloping a conceptual framework for articulating options may 
provoke controversy because of its potential to be misunderstood 
as suggesting that all experiences have equal value.  Such an 
interpretation would permit law schools to ignore the 
consequences of the choices that they explicitly and implicitly 
make, as long as they provide some kind of experiential 
opportunity.22 
Accordingly, one might easily imagine courses consisting of little more than 
a mundane, semester-long task, or students unable to match their practical 
interests with the available curriculum.23  Educators must avoid these pitfalls 
through praxis in pedagogy, and further develop ways to exploit experiential 
education as a means to enhance the law school experience.24 
I. REFORMING LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA:  MORE EXPERIENTIAL 
EDUCATION 
With the employment market for attorneys currently in a subpar 
state, 25  legal employers have the attention of both the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) and law schools, and these employers are demanding 
practice-ready graduates. 26   Historically, the legal academy has been 
generally content with a model of education that focuses on legal theory and 
case law doctrine, with schools typically leaving most of the practical 
																																																								
21. E.g., Martin J. Katz, Facilitating Better Law Teaching—Now, 62 EMORY 
L.J. 823, 833 (2013) (describing the pitfalls of simulation training and the “vast difference 
between good simulations and bad ones”). 
22. Maranville et al., supra note 19, at 51920. 
23. See David F. Chavkin, Experiential Learning:  A Critical Element of 
Legal Education in China (and Elsewhere), 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 3, 
5 (2009) (describing apprentice-lawyers who spent hours “photocopying or delivering 
documents for their host law practices”); Nantiya Ruan, Experiential Learning in the First-
Year Curriculum:  The Public-Interest Partnership, 8 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC:  JALWD 
191, 194 (2011) (advocating “the public-interest-partnership . . . as an approach that best 
integrates the experiential learning of simulated and live client interactions, while lessening 
the impact of the negative aspects of both traditional approaches”). 
24. Ruan, supra note 23, at 191–93. 
25. See, e.g., William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School 
Bubble: Federal Loans Inflate College Budgets, but How Long Will that Last if Law Grads 
Can’t Pay their Bills?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2012, at 30, 32. 
26. See, e.g., David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students:  Lawyering, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1. 
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training of new attorneys to the auspices of employers.27  However, in the 
most recent response to the call for more practice-ready graduates, law 
schools are increasingly turning to experiential models of various types.28  
Notwithstanding the push towards more experiential education, there is great 
uncertainty as to how to implement experiential curricula within law school, 
where not even field trips are a regular feature of the law school syllabus.29 
Experiential education offers a very different model, one that 
concentrates on teaching through real-life work experience. 30   Broadly 
speaking, experiential education may be viewed as a form of active learning 
that has conceptual overlap with European models of work-based learning, 
which attempt to formalize the workplace as an authentic learning 
environment. 31   It is broad in scope and “incorporates a continuum of 
learning opportunities.”32 
The animating theory of experiential education draws on a 
distinguished history and lineage, including the works of John Dewey, David 
Kolb, and Paulo Freire, among others.33  It involves “[l]earning from an 
																																																								
27. Id.  But see David M. Siegel, The Ambivalent Role of Experiential 
Learning in American Legal Education and the Problem of Legal Culture, 10 GERMAN L.J. 
815, 815–16, 818 (2009) (noting that despite criticism of theory-driven rather than practice-
driven education, American law schools expressly draw on experiential learning through the 
use of legal clinics and by bringing in adjunct instructors who are engaged in full time 
practice). 
28. See Ed Finkel, Schools Respond to Shifts in Legal Landscape, STUDENT 
LAW., Jan. 2012, at 20, 21–22 (examining various programs developed in law schools to make 
students more ready for practice); Robert A. Parker & Sue Schechter, The Ugly Duckling 
Comes of Age:  The Promise of Full-Time Field Placements 2 (Soc. Sci. Research Network, 
Working Paper No. I20, K19, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1886509. 
29. Noelle Higgins et al., Field Trips as Teaching Tools in the Law 
Curriculum, 88 RES. EDUCATION 102, 105 (2012) (stating that even when field trips are 
undertaken in the law school setting, “they are generally included in an ad hoc manner, often 
with no real context and/or without learning outcomes attached, or no post-trip analysis 
undertaken.”). 
30. See Katz, supra note 21, at 830. 
31. See C.U. Chisholm et al., The Characterisation of Work-Based Learning 
by Consideration of the Theories of Experiential Learning, 44 EUR. J. EDUCATION 319, 319 
(2009) (discussing “how experiential learning theories can contribute to the development of a 
common theoretical framework which draws together lifelong learning practice to support the 
conceptualization of work-based learning”). 
32. Chavkin, supra note 23, at 11. 
33. Robert Dinerstein, Experiential Legal Education:  New Wine and New 
Bottles, SYLLABUS, Winter 2012-2013, at 2, 2; see generally JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK: A 
RESTATEMENT OF THE RELATION OF REFLECTIVE THINKING TO THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS (1933); 
PAOLO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Myra Bergman Ramos trans., 30th Anniversary 
ed. 2005); DAVID A. KOLB, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: EXPERIENCE AS THE SOURCE OF 
LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT (1984). 
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individual’s own experiences” 34  or a type “of learning undertaken by 
students who are given a chance to acquire and apply knowledge, skills, and 
feelings in an immediate and relevant setting.”35  This definition is partially 
based on the model developed by David Kolb and Roger Fry, which outlines 
four primary elements:  1) concrete experience, 2) observation and reflection, 
3) formation of abstract concepts, and 4) testing the abstract concepts in new 
situations. 36   Conceptually, these elements overlap with Patrick Brayer’s 
definition of social practice theory of learning as one that emphasizes the 
importance of the social content of learning; “the student learns laterally 
through collaborat[ion] . . . with an . . . array of workers and peers and 
vertically through the central, fluid dyad involving the supervisor/expert and 
the student/novice.” 37   In all regards, then, experiential learning is a 
“pedagogy of systemic interaction.”38 
In legal education, there is no unanimous theory on the content of 
experiential education, but there has been headway.39   For example, the 
Clinical Legal Education Association’s (“CLEA”) Best Practices for Legal 
Education report has reiterated how experiential learning is distinct from 
experiential education.40  According to this report, “[e]xperiential education 
integrates theory and practice by combining academic inquiry with actual 
experience”; it is focused on academic inquiry and in the way teachers 
design and structure the student’s experience. 41   Whereas experiential 
education focuses on the intentional design to teach by experience, 
experiential learning corresponds to student learning, and thus can occur in 
informal settings—even though the learning is not experiential by design.42  
																																																								
34. Patrick C. Brayer, A Law Clinic Systems Theory and the Pedagogy of 
Interaction:  Creating a Legal Learning System, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 49, 49 (2012). 
35. Mark K. Smith, David A. Kolb on Experiential Learning, INFED (2010), 
http://infed.org/mobi/david-a-kolb-on-experiential-learning/. 
36. Id.; see also ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL 
EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 122 (1st ed. 2007). 
37. Brook K. Baker, Practice-Based Learning:  Emphasizing Practice and 
Offering Critical Perspectives on the Dangers of “Co-Op”tation, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 619, 
624 (2011–2012); see also Brayer, supra note 34, at 50. 
38. Brayer, supra note 34, at 50. 
39. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 36, at 121–22. 
40. Id. at 121; see also Lewis Jackson & Doug MacIsaac, Introduction to a 
New Approach to Experiential Learning, 62 N. DIRECTIONS FOR ADULT & CONTINUING EDUC. 
17, 22 (1994); James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and 
Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71, 78 (1996) (emphasizing that 
“[l]earning is not education, and experiential learning differs from experiential education.  
Learning happens with or without teachers and institutions”). 
41. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 36, at 121, 123. 
42. Id. at 121. 
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Under these terms, what law schools are attempting to attain is experiential 
education that leads to experiential learning.43 
Historically, law schools have been teaching by experience through 
clinics, externships, or course simulations, although only a minority of law 
students are typically afforded the chance to do clinical work.44  At present, 
the ABA does not mandate any specific experiential education or 
experiential learning opportunity for member schools.  The winds of change 
have been blowing, however.45  For example, at its 2011 Annual Meeting, 
the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution “urg[ing] legal education 
providers to implement curricular programs intended to develop practice-
ready lawyers.”46  More concretely, the ABA Standards Review Committee 
recently voted to put forth a proposal for a mandatory six-unit practical skills 
requirement for all graduates of accredited law schools.47  If implemented, 
this would be a mandatory requirement, whereas now the standards say that 
law schools must provide “substantial opportunities for live-client or other 
real-life practice experiences,”48 and that students should receive “substantial 
instruction in . . . other professional skills generally regarded as necessary for 
effective and responsible participation in the legal profession.”49 
 
																																																								
43. See id. at 122.  Although some law school professors would limit 
experiential education to real-life experiences, Best Practices include simulation courses, as 
well as in-house clinics and externships.  Id.  Recently, Susan Brooks has included simulation-
based courses in her definition of experiential education.  Susan L. Brooks, Meeting the 
Professional Identity Challenge in Legal Education Through a Relationship-Centered 
Experiential Curriculum, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 395, 403 (2012). 
44. See Katz, supra note 21, at 829. 
45. See AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 10B 1 (Aug. 8–9, 2011). 
46. Id. 
47. Memorandum from Solomon Oliver, Jr., Council Chairperson, Am. Bar 
Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, & Barry A. Currier, Managing Dir. of 
Accreditation & Legal Educ., Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the 
Bar to Interested Persons & Entities (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_res
olutions/201312_notice_comment_stds_205_207_303a3_603a_c.authcheckdam.pdf; Karen 
Sloan, ABA Reconsiders Practical Skills Mandate for Law Schools, NAT’L L.J., (Dec. 09, 
2013, 3:49 PM) http://www.ctlawtribune.com/id=1202631585383/ABA-Reconsiders-
Practical-Skills-Mandate-for-Law-Schools. 
48. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 22 (2013) 
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS], 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/
Standards/2013_2014_final_aba_standards_and_rules_of_procedure_for_approval_of_law_
schools_body.authcheckdam.pdf (noting in interpretation 302-5 that these can be clinics or 
field placements). 
49. Id. at 21. 
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The ABA does not define experiential, but states: 
To qualify as experiential, a course must be primarily 
experiential in nature and: 
(a) integrate doctrine, theory, skills and legal ethics, and 
engage students in performance of one or more 
professional skills identified in Standard 302; 
(b) develop the concepts underlying the professional skills 
being taught; 
(c) provide multiple opportunities for performance; and 
(d) provide opportunities for self-evaluation.50 
Although the ABA’s attempt to require more experiential learning for law 
students is a step in the right direction, the California State Bar Task Force 
has adopted a model that would require “all new Bar admittees [to] 
demonstrate . . . at least [fifteen hours] of practice based, experiential 
coursework.”51  This figure is also the minimum recommendation endorsed 
by the CLEA.52  More recently, the ABA has revisited the six unit proposal 
and has invited comment on whether the ABA should make fifteen hours of 
experiential learning a requirement for all graduates of accredited law 
schools.53  The Society of American Law Teachers has been among the 
voices in support of the proposal.54 
																																																								
50. Draft for November Meeting, Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. & 
Admission to the Bar, Standards Review Comm. (Nov. 16–17, 2012), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/
standards_review_documents/July2012/2012_nov_src_meeting_materials.authcheckdam.pdf. 
51. TASK FORCE ON ADMISSIONS REGULATION REFORM, STATE BAR OF CAL., 
PHASE I FINAL REPORT 10 (2013), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/
bog/bot_ExecDir/STATE_BAR_TASK_FORCE_REPORT_(FINAL_AS_
APPROVED_6_11_13)_062413.pdf. 
52. Michele Pistone, CLEA Calls on ABA to Require 15 Credits of 
Experiential Learning, BEST PRAC. FOR LEGAL EDUC. (July 1, 2013), http://
bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/2013/07/01/clea-calls-on-aba-to-require-15-credits-
of-experiential-learning/. 
53. Karen Sloan, ABA Reconsiders Practical Skills Mandate for Law Schools, 
NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 09, 2013, 3:49 PM), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/id=1202631585383/ABA-
Reconsiders-Practical-Skills-Mandate-for-Law-Schools. 
54. Letter from Jackie Gardina, Co-President, Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers & 
Ngai Pindell, Co-President, Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers, to Dean Jeffrey E. Lewis, Chair, 
Am. Bar Ass’n Standards Review Comm. (Apr. 13, 2012), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/stan
dards_review_documents/20120416_comment_outcome_measures_salt.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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While the actions of the ABA convey a sense of urgency, the call to 
make law students more practice ready is not new.55  Publications like Best 
Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a Roadmap, 56  Educating 
Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law (“Carnegie Report”) in 
2007,57 and Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession:  
Narrowing the Gap in 1992 58  have inspired subsequent revisions of 
Curriculum Standards 302 (b)(1) and 305 of the ABA Standards and Rules of 
Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 59 —all of which stress the 
importance of applied legal training in the modern law school curriculum. 
One of the most prominent voices among these is the Carnegie 
Report and its advocacy of apprenticeships in legal education—particularly, 
third apprenticeships, which allow for “knowledge, skills, and the social-
ethical dimensions of lawyering [to] come together [and] help students 
bridge the gap from law school to practice.”60  The report’s recommendations 
have been recently criticized for teaching students “what experts are doing 
[rather than] what they are thinking as they deal with a lawyering 
problem.”61 
Despite such criticism, the report is correct to note that few students 
are afforded the chance to mimic lawyers by doing what experts do, let alone 
to delve into conceptual competences.  Instead, law schools have strongly 
																																																								
55. See Keith A. Findley, Rediscovering the Lawyer School:  Curriculum 
Reform in Wisconsin, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 295, 305–07 (2006). 
56. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 36, at 123. 
57. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF 
LAW 8 (2007), available at http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/publications/
elibrary_pdf_632.pdf. 
58. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM:  
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:  NARROWING THE GAP 
331 (1992), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/
legal_education/2013_legal_education_and_professional_development_maccrate_report).auth
checkdam.pdf. 
59. ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS, supra note 48, at 21–22 (requiring that approved law schools “offer substantial 
opportunities for . . . real-life practice experiences, appropriately supervised”). 
60. Laurie Morin & Susan Waysdorf, The Service-Learning Model in the Law 
School Curriculum, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 561, 562 (2011–2012); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra 
note 57, at 8. 
61. Stefan H. Krieger & Serge A. Martinez, Performance Isn’t Everything:  
The Importance of Conceptual Competence in Outcome Assessment of Experiential Learning, 
19 CLINICAL L. REV. 251, 251, 256 (2012) (admonishing that the ABA or a law school 
following the lead of the Carnegie Report “will unreflectively define ‘competency of an entry-
level practitioner’ primarily in terms of the ability to perform certain lawyering tasks rather 
than the capacity to reason in practice”). 
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emphasized legal reasoning, black letter law, and standardized testing, with 
some schools adhering to mandatory course schedules that leave students 
little opportunity for the sort of courses that would provide personal 
interaction with lawyers or other legal professionals.62 
How a non-client model became the dominant model of legal 
education is a curious development. 63   One researcher suggests that law 
schools followed flawed assumptions about learning.64  For example, one 
was to understand learning as primarily theoretical rather than contextual, 
and more precisely, that cognitive attainment was synonymous with the 
“ability to assimilate abstract knowledge and . . . apply that knowledge.”65  
Research shows, however, that human cognition is situational more than 
abstract; “[h]umans do not confront a particular place and time, a local field 
of action, with a predetermined set of responses.”66  “Instead, the primary 
resources humans bring to bear are exemplars of past practice—memories of 
comparable dilemmas . . . [which] are typically derived from practice [and] 
only secondarily [derived] from classroom investigations . . . .”67 
Another errant assumption was “that learning should be controlled 
and relatively selfless or disinterested rather than self-directed, identity-
focused, and self-actualizing.”68  From this perspective, students held little 
agency and autonomy.69  Related was the assumption that legal education 
was primarily a solitary rather than a social endeavor.70  Under this premise, 
students were expected to “read, research, and write largely on their own,” 
producing a solitary model that made the student dependent on what was in 
one’s own head.71 
Experiential education represents the antithesis to these 
misunderstandings about education.  The approach provides students the 
opportunity to practice as they learn, and practice what they learn.  The 
apprenticeship-like experiences of experiential learning have been likened to 
“a cornerstone for effective learning” 72  that contributes to a process of 
acculturating students to legal practice by interaction with clients, attorneys, 
and judges, which provides tools necessary to succeed in the legal 
																																																								
62. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 5–6. 
63. For a historical perspective, see A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School 
Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1949, 1949 (2012). 
64. Baker, supra note 37, at 621. 
65. Id. at 621–22. 
66. Id. at 622. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 621. 
69. See Baker, supra note 37, at 621. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 624. 
72. Id. at 620. 
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profession. 73   Learning in practice encourages students to enter a 
participatory and cognitive apprenticeship with senior practitioners where 
they can collaborate to resolve authentic dilemmas while conceptualizing the 
workplace as an organic place of learning.74 
Experiential education is thus the means to practice-based 
competence, by which students develop “[r]elational skills, situation skills, 
[and] gap-closing skills.”75   The skills are learned best through repeated 
collaborative experiences—through increasing social practice, or as one 
commentator put it, “[q]uite simply, if learning is about increased access to 
performance, then the way to maximize learning is to perform, not to talk 
about it,” but to do it.76  “[P]edagogy that empowers . . . students to develop 
genuine understandings must [thus] be primarily contextual rather than 
didactic and prescriptive.”77  “[L]earning in the workplace also permits the 
development of relational skills and situation assessment skills that thereafter 
permit the adaptation, transfer, and deployment of performance 
competencies to new and unfamiliar tasks.” 78   The end result of repeat 
experience in the field of practice is a full repertoire of collaborative skills 
that are impossible to achieve in the classroom alone. 
From the student’s perspective, perhaps the most significant aspect 
of experiential learning is the opportunity for reflection.  The ability to look 
to the past as a means of making a better decision in the present is the 
pathway for students to become self-learners.  It is also a chance to reflect on 
the force of law, as well as one’s duty to the legal profession, and more 
importantly, to society at large, all of which are detailed in the following 
section. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE SHIFT WITHIN A CRITICAL FRAMEWORK 
The growing emphasis on practical skills in law schools may be 
properly understood as a critique of a teaching model that has dominated law 
schools for the last century.79  Critical pedagogy is a power-full analytic for 
																																																								
73. Id. at 629 n.27. 
74. See John Seely Brown et al., Situated Cognition and the Culture of 
Learning, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Jan.–Feb. 1989, at 32, 37. 
75. Baker, supra note 37, at 627. 
76. William F. Hanks, Foreword to JEAN LAVE & ETIENNE WENGER, 
SITUATED LEARNING: LEGITIMATE PERIPHERAL PARTICIPATION 13, 22 (1991). 
77. Baker, supra note 37, at 628. 
78. Id. at 626. 
79. Erickson, supra note 15, at 110 (arguing “that the push for experiential 
education in law schools is really a push for better teaching”); Moliterno, supra note 40, at 94 
(describing how the basic model of legal education has not changed since the time of 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, “except for a modest and separatist move toward the 
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assessing this revolution in legal education.  As an interpretive lens, it 
reveals experiential education as a boon not for the legal profession alone, 
but also for the soon-to-be-lawyer; it provides insight to the practical and 
professional outcomes associated with experience-based learning, including 
those that bear directly on students.  The reformation thus represents not only 
more opportunity for students to gain hands on or on the job experience, but 
an opportunity for teachers to create a more meaningful experience for 
students. 
A. Theoretical Overview 
A central tenet of the critical theory of legal education has been to 
focus on power relations within law schools.  The dominant theme of 
theorists, however, has been largely evaluative, as one scholar notes: 
[T]he exercise of power was a bad thing.  It was understood as a 
possession that was held by some—primarily the legal 
profession—and exercised over others—namely law students—in 
order to achieve the ends of those wielding it.  The exercise of 
power was positioned as negative and repressive, as stifling or 
denying the real interests of law students and leading to 
ideological indoctrination.  It was implied that good could only 
come from . . . total removal of power relations. . . . [P]ower was 
assumed to operate upon an inert and passive material, with 
ideologies being deposited into the empty receptacle that is the 
student, and teaching and assessment practices working to 
determine the shape of the legal graduate.80 
Of course removing all power relations from education rings impossible, so 
rather than try to eliminate power, the idea has been to try to recalibrate the 
balance of power. 81   Critical pedagogy provides a theoretical basis for 
achieving a better balance by its commitment to a dialectical understanding 
of the student and teacher relationship.82  Conceptually, this understanding 
renders the identity of each party dependent upon the existence of the other; 
that is, the teacher cannot exist without the student, and vice-versa.83  This 
																																																																																																																																		
experiential model resulting from the clinical education movement.  All of the changes in 
legal education, aside from the clinical education movement, have been about what is taught, 
not how it is taught.  The mainstream of legal education remains almost as alien from the 
apprentice system as at the time of Langdell’s revolution . . . .”). 
80. Ball, supra note 12, at 159–60 (emphasis in original). 
81. See id. at 161–62, 166. 
82. See id. at 161. 
83. See id. 
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base proposition situates the student and teacher on equal conceptual terrain 
and proclaims their interdependence.84 
Experiential education may be properly viewed as a species of 
critical pedagogy, particularly in its advocacy of the apprenticeship model—
the “apprenticeship of identity and purpose”85—which “introduces students 
to the purposes and attitudes that are guided by the values for which the 
professional community is responsible.”86 
As such, experiential education in law school provides students 
unique opportunities to immerse themselves within the trenches of the 
profession, alongside other professionals, thereby encouraging students to 
form professional relationships.  “In forming professional relationships, the 
student is provided with multiple experiences from the other members of the 
[legal] system . . . .”87  Students who participate in experiential education 
programming enter a learning system that has a multitude of subsystem 
relationships: student-attorney, student-support staff, student-investigator, 
student-student, student-court clerk, student-judge and student-client.88 The 
student is then empowered through “learning [that] occurs when the student 
utilizes interpersonal skills to achieve a desired outcome, while [developing 
and] maintaining a differentiated professional identity.” 89   The learning 
continues on several different levels, horizontally and vertically.  “[F]or 
instance, [externships] provide students with the opportunity to develop 
relationships with judges, clerks, opposing counsel, support staff, 
investigators, social workers, supervising attorneys, fellow students and most 
importantly, clients and their support systems.”90  If the learning system 
environment is properly designed with sufficient interaction, this cycle of 
student learning will continue to advance the student toward higher levels of 
individual complexity.91 
“Students learn how to develop and change by interacting with their 
environment while learning the importance of maintaining a personal style 
and philosophy that brings value and power to their interactions with 
																																																								
84. See id. at 161–62. 
85. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 8, 28 (proposing that professional 
schools must expose students to three apprenticeships to prepare them for professional 
practice:  The first apprenticeship (cognitive) focuses on knowledge and ways of thinking; the 
second apprenticeship is to the shared forms of expert practice through experience; and the 
third apprenticeship of identity and purpose). 
86. Id. at 28. 
87. Brayer, supra note 34, at 55. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 56. 
90. Id. at 55. 
91. Id. at 57. 
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others.”92  When students are able to learn from the legal system directly to 
maximize both institutional and individual practice goals, “they achieve 
equilibrium with the new social learning system.”93  When students reach 
this state, they become “better prepared to learn and grow in future work 
environments.”94 
Another critical aspect of experiential education is its emphasis on 
reflective learning.  Reflective learning is founded on the premise that 
intelligent individuals continually attempt to restructure their 
environment to maximize individual purposes and goals [and 
ultimately,] “the maintenance and enhancement of one’s self.”  
The individual accomplishes this task by way of experiential 
experimentation, attempting various courses of action, and 
adopting the one that proves the most effective.  A person’s 
understanding grows when this form of experimentation is used to 
learn from experience.95 
In order to engage law students and provide opportunities for them to 
become what the market is now demanding—more practice ready law 
school graduates—some schools have chosen to use more formal models 
such as the service learning model or the systems theory model to implement 
experiential learning. 96   Externship programs, pro bono programs, and 
clinical programs are common in law schools, and they correspond with both 
service-learning and systems theory models of education. 
“Service-learning is a [domain] of experiential [education in 
which] students and faculty collaborate with communities to 
address problems and issues, simultaneously gaining knowledge 
and skills and advancing personal development. . . .”  [A] critical 
aspect of the [service-learning] experience, in order to differentiate 
it from other volunteer activities, is making certain there is a 
means for critical reflection by students.  [It has been stated that] 
in any discussion of service-learning “it is particularly important to 
distinguish between two levels of learning . . .—learning to give 
service and learning how to learn . . . from the giving of service. . . 
. .”  [S]ervice-learning is beneficial to students because . . . it 
																																																								
92. Brayer, supra note 34, at 58–59. 
93. Id. at 55. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 59. 
96. This term practice ready was criticized by Dean Gilbert Holmes—during 
a work in progress session of the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship—as 
somewhat impossible to achieve, and that instead, law schools should be teaching students 
how to become a proficient practitioner.  Gilbert Holmes, Dean, Univ. La Verne, Training the 
Lawyer in the 21st century (Jan. 24, 2013). 
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“increases [cognitive] retention; . . . increases the relevancy of 
education to students [by involving them in real world situations]; . 
. . enhances personalized education for students; teaches positive 
values, leadership, citizenship and personal responsibility; 
empowers students as learners, teachers, achievers, and leaders; 
[and] invites students to become members of their own 
community; [and] teaches job skills.”97 
Distinct from service learning, a systems theory model is a clinical 
refram[ing] [of] professional experience as an interaction with a 
professional environment. . . .  [The] theory operates on the 
premise that students should reframe how they look at their 
[environment] so that the challenges that make up their 
professional system are not seen as problems but as means to a 
solution.  Reframing by the student is realized in a clinical system 
as educators maximize professional interactions and teach from 
emerging interactive patterns.98 
This reframing necessarily guides students in the “creation of a professional 
learning environment that enhances the practice of reflective learning, 
teaching, and thinking.”99  Under this system, learning “from experience is 
impossible if numerous, complex, and diverse interactions do not exist.”100 
B. Critical Shifts at a Historically Black University 
The critical underpinnings of experiential education are easy to 
outline, but determining how to create such learning environments on the 
ground is a greater challenge.  The experiential learning program at 
Thurgood Marshall School of Law (“TMSL”) is a model that is striving for a 
synthesis of these complex and diverse interactions.  However, as a 
historically black university (“HBCU”), the institution faces unique 
challenges in incorporating its rendition of the Carnegie approach to legal 
education. 
The mission of TMSL is to prepare a diverse group of students for 
leadership roles in the legal profession, business, and government.  In 
																																																								
97. Katryna Johnson, Creating Experiential Learning in the Graduate 
Classroom Through Community Engagement, 6 AM. J. BUS. EDUC. 149, 149 (2013) 
(discussing how business school educators can create “[e]xperiential learning opportunities 
through client-based projects”); Mary Pat Treuthart, Weaving a Tapestry:  Providing Context 
Through Service-Learning, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 215, 220–21 (2002) (last alteration in original). 
98. Brayer, supra note 34, at 50. 
99. Id. at 59. 
100. Id. at 52. 
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keeping with its rich tradition as an HBCU, TMSL is recognized as one of 
the most diverse Law Schools in the country.101  Guided by this mission, the 
experiential learning program’s focus is to create a vibrant learning 
environment grounded in a legal educational program that immerses each 
student in multi-level learning opportunities.  This experiential education is 
designed by forging stronger connections among the cognitive, practical and 
professional identity aspects of becoming a lawyer.  This model engages 
legal education from the perspective of the student; and thus, the program is 
oriented around student-centered teaching and seeks to increase student 
opportunity to learn-by-doing; learn-by-experiencing; learn-by-observing; 
learn-by-evaluating, assessing, and incorporating these experiences; learn-
by-self transformation; and learn-by-developing a professional identity. 
A host of animating questions guide the model of experiential 
education at TMSL:  What do students value in legal education?  How best 
do students believe they should be trained and about what do they feel they 
should be trained?  What do students expect to receive from their legal 
education?  What transformation do law students expect to experience in law 
school as a direct result of their legal education and how does this 
transformation translate to being better practitioners?  How do students 
measure the worth and value of their legal education? 
These questions are foundational for creating and incorporating the 
experiential program.  The program takes a holistic approach to the process 
of experiential education, which involves a number of distinct, yet 
interrelated programs: Lawyer Processing; Appellate Litigation-Bridge to 
Practice Skills Program; Trial Simulation; Classroom Simulations; Live-
client Clinical Programs; Externship Programs; Client Counseling Programs; 
Mediation Certification Courses; Mock Trial; Moot Court; and a Texas 
Legislative Internship Program. 
Lawyer Processing (“LP”) is a two-semester course and is required 
of all first-year students. 102   LP is the first-year students’ foundational 
clinical course and focuses on practice-oriented legal analysis and writing.103  
LP introduces students to fundamentals of legal reasoning, basic forms of 
legal writing, including objective memoranda of law, client opinion letters 
and trial court motion practice briefs, and the basic sources and processes of 
legal research.104  These skills are taught using the clinical method, with the 
client’s perspective firmly in mind and with the students learning by acting 
																																																								
101. Mission and History, TEX. S. U., http://www.tsulaw.edu/history.html (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2014). 
102. Thurgood Marshall School of Law, American Bar Association Report, 
Lawyering Process Program Description and Assessment (last updated January 2011). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
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as lawyers. 105   The LP professors have voluntarily adopted a uniform 
syllabus with agreed to student learning outcomes that are assessed at the end 
of each semester.106 
The Appellate Litigation-Bridge to Practice Program is a one-
semester course that is required for all 2L students.  The Appellate Litigation 
professors with the assistance of the Director of Assessments have 
collectively identified minimum Student Learning Outcomes that all students 
should achieve while enrolled in Appellate Litigation.  Students are required 
in each section of the class, taught by different professors, to attend a 
minimum number of live appellate court oral arguments, conduct legal 
research and write an appellate brief based on an adopted case book or based 
on an actual case that was pending before an appellate tribunal, and present 
an oral argument, based on the written brief, before a panel of practicing 
attorneys or sitting judges.  At least one section videotapes the student’s oral 
argument presentations for later individual evaluation and critique.  By 
requiring the students to read like lawyers, research as lawyers, observe 
practicing attorneys and sitting judges, write as lawyers, present oral 
arguments as lawyers and accept critique as lawyers receive, the model aims 
to utilize multi-level learning and equip students with resources needed to 
develop and refine their professional identities.  The model also prepares 
students to participate in internal and external Moot Court competitions, 
giving students enhanced opportunities to develop their legal writing and oral 
advocacy skills. 
Trial Simulation at TMSL is a one-semester course that is required 
of all 3L students.  Students are immersed in a courtroom setting as a means 
of learning strategies for courtroom litigation under the instruction of leading 
jurists and lawyers.  Utilizing a “learn by doing” approach, students in the 
Trial Simulation program practice direct and cross examinations of 
witnesses, learn how to make memorable opening statements, craft powerful 
closing arguments, as well as interview and prepare witnesses.  The course 
concludes with students conducting a full trial before a presiding judicial 
officer. 
Classroom Simulations are another way that students encounter 
experiential learning at TMSL.  Through classroom simulations, professors 
incorporate opportunities for students to acquire doctrinal knowledge 
through traditional and non-traditional modalities, alike.107  For instance, one 
																																																								
105. Id. 
106. Interview with Casandra Hill, Director of Lawyer Processing at Thurgood 
Marshall School of Law. 
107. For further ideas on how to incorporate experiential education in doctrinal 
courses, see Margaret B. Kwoka, Intersecting Experiential Education and Social Justice 
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Evidence course requires students to draft trial pleadings based on fact 
patterns, statutes, and other materials distributed and studied over the course 
of the semester.108  In addition to the drafting of pleadings, students in the 
course are given the opportunity to observe evidentiary hearings and are 
given directed, reflective journal writing assignments that examine, analyze, 
and evaluate the adherence to or the violation of evidentiary practices.  In 
addition, one of the Property courses has adopted a “Bridge to Practice” 
course book that contains simulations covering varying issues, which allows 
and encourages students to take on the role of attorney, oral advocate, or 
legal writer.  These simulations encourage students to take information from 
a case book and a rule book, analyze it, evaluate it, and then apply it to a 
given context that has meaning in the benefit of a client.  In another course, 
Criminal Procedure, students are similarly required to draft trial pleadings 
and are given the opportunity to present mock trial arguments in support of 
the drafted motions to a panel of professors serving as the presiding bench. 
For TMSL and other schools committed to serving the community, a 
learning experience that also offers service to disenfranchised and 
underserved communities is paramount to the law school’s existence.  The 
school’s live-client clinical program is designed to give students an 
opportunity to serve the community in the role of attorney, putting into 
practice what they have learned in their substantial courses, while developing 
their professional identity.  As attorneys, students are supervised by licensed 
attorneys who direct the individual legal clinics.  Students are responsible for 
every aspect of an attorney-client relationship, including client interviewing, 
file maintenance, maintaining client confidentiality, trial preparation, and 
direct client representation.  Students have the opportunity to put into 
practice what they have learned from their doctrinal classes and the 
opportunity to see how the application of the law affects clients.  Students 
are able to work in several legal environments where they learn vertically 
from their clients, their supervising attorneys, managing attorneys, and 
judges, and where they learn horizontally from their fellow student attorneys, 
new associates, paralegal professionals, and other support faculty.  In the 
process of serving clients, students have the opportunity to find and hear 
their voice as an advocate for others, as well as uphold justice on behalf of 
their clients.  They experience study as a legal professional and develop their 
professional identity in accepting the call to represent another human being 
in the pursuit of justice.  Live-client clinics give students the opportunity to 
																																																																																																																																		
Teaching, 6 NORTHEASTERN U. L.J. 111, 115 (2013) (describing ways that doctrinal professors 
“can incorporate experiential components into the curriculum”). 
108. Pedro A. Malavet, Evidence:  Law 6330, U. FLORIDA (2013), http://
nersp.osg.ufl.edu/~malavet/evidence/evmain.htm.  Some courses, such as Professor Pedro 
Malavet’s Evidence course, have been incorporating such assignments for years.  See id. 
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learn through directed service and gives them the chance to become agents of 
positive change while directing the transformation that they—as students—
expect from their legal education. 
The Externship Program is designed to give students an opportunity 
for immersion into a legal environment outside the law school setting with 
simultaneous study in the classroom. 109   The program is a bifurcated 
experience that requires students to participate in the off-campus practicum 
and in the classroom.  The structure of the off-campus practicum is such that 
the supervising attorney at the placement is the primary contact for the 
student, similar to that of a new associate answering to a junior or senior 
partner.  Student work schedules are submitted by the student and approved 
by the supervising attorney.  Students engage in basic professional practices 
and are responsible for documenting their time, calendaring, and for 
completing their assignments timely.  They must also maintain professional 
decorum in the legal office and in the courtroom, and communicate 
effectively with their superiors, colleagues, and clients.  Students are 
evaluated by their placement supervisor that holds them accountable for 
matters involving legal advocacy, professionalism, ethical responsibility, and 
client and office management.  The classroom component of the externship 
program is designed as a reflective group class, whose goal is two-fold:  1) to 
meet the identified student learning outcomes and the educational mission of 
the law school and 2) to develop an environment for reflective personal and 
professional growth.  The classroom component seeks to enhance legal 
writing skills by requiring reflective journals, as well as improve legal 
analysis by engaging students in thoughtful and critical guided reflection 
about live legal scenarios occurring in their placements. 
The Client Counseling program is an example of how TMSL has 
identified a necessary skill set and provided it with a platform to be explored 
with greater focus and clarity.  This program takes the form of a competition 
team, conceived and developed as a legal teaching technique, intended to 
promote greater knowledge and interest among law students in the 
preventive law and counseling functions of practice.  It also encourages 
students to develop interviewing, planning, and analytical skills in the 
lawyer-client relationship in the law office. 
Recognizing that resolution of legal matters is the reason clients seek 
legal representation, TMSL offers a mediation certificate that allows students 
																																																								
109. Various outside offices include the offices of District Attorneys, County 
Attorneys, City Attorneys, the Attorney General, the United States Department of the 
Treasury, non-profit organizations, such as Legal Aid organizations, immigrant rights 
organizations, public policy organizations, and legislative organizations, Federal Courts, State 
Courts, Appellate Courts, the United States Attorney’s office, and other governmental, non-
profit, and judicial offices. 
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to serve as bona fide mediators in actual, live legal disputes.  As TMSL is 
committed to providing budding attorneys the skill of resolution, this 
certification is a requirement for enrollment in the mediation live-client 
clinic.  This mediation training, coupled with the experience that students 
receive in the live-client mediation clinic, allows them to graduate well-able 
to enter the legal community credentialed and experienced in the area of 
legal dispute resolution. 
The aim of the TMSL Mock Trial Advocacy Program is to create 
competent trial lawyers. Student knowledge of substantive law is integrated 
in an intensive course study of trial skills that prepares students for national 
competition.  The program provides all students an opportunity to experience 
the vigor of trial preparation in a controlled classroom environment, coupled 
with the opportunity to compete against top ranked law schools in a state and 
national arena.  The classroom component of the program surpasses the skills 
taught in Trial Simulation and introduces the students to advanced learning 
in the art of questioning technique, evidence, jury profiling and selection, 
theory, and platform skills. 
The Moot Court program is designed to be a comprehensive 
experience, with a goal of giving each participant opportunity to handle an 
appellate case from beginning to end.  Under the guidance of faculty and 
subject matter experts from the legal community, students are trained for the 
challenge of competing in intramural, intermural and national moot court 
competitions while learning legal professionalism.  This opportunity to take 
doctrinal knowledge and use that knowledge in the context of advocating for 
a client enhances the educational experiences of each student.  Through this 
program, students participate in multi-level learning that encourages them to 
excel in the art of persuasive oral advocacy while solidifying their legal 
research and writing skills. 
The Texas Legislative Internship Program (“TLIP”) is an 
educational internship program sponsored by Senator Rodney Ellis and 
administered by Texas Southern University.110  TLIP provides opportunities 
for graduate students to serve as interns in the Texas Legislature, in various 
state agencies, and in local government.111   A TLIP internship lasts one 
academic semester and affords students the experience public service. 112  
During legislative sessions, TLIP interns are placed as legislative assistants 
in the offices of ranking members of the Legislature, including the offices of 
the Governor, Lieutenant Governor and the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
																																																								
110. Texas Legislative Internship Program, SENATE TEX., http://
www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/members/dist13/tlip/about.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2014). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
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Court.113  The experience offered to students often initiates or focuses a 
career in public service, with several TLIP participants having continued in 
public service at the federal, state and local levels of government.114 
Although the vision of experiential education at TMSL is easy to 
outline, life on the ground is a work-in-progress, and there is still a lot of 
work ahead.  Implementation of experiential learning at TMSL, perhaps like 
other HBCUs, comes with high trade-off costs.  For example, bar passage 
has been a perpetual nemesis of the school.  Yet in the most recent Texas Bar 
Examination, nearly eighty percent of the school’s students passed on the 
first attempt, which is among the school’s highest scores ever.115  Part of the 
success in passage may be the product of a concerted effort at creating a 
curricular regime based on bar subjects, enhancing academic support, and 
developing assessment tools.  The mandatory course regime alone leaves 
students little say for the first two years in the name of concentrating on bar 
subjects and bar-style multiple choice and essay questions.  Needless to say, 
greater emphasis on skills training sits in tension with the need to teach 
students how to pass the bar; time and resources spent on practice training 
leaves less time for practicing the exam. 
The program plans to continue researching and developing ways to 
maintain its bar passage rate at the same time it graduates law students with 
skills to compete in the legal market.  It will continue exploring ways to 
incorporate student-centered teaching, with identified student learning 
outcomes, in all aspects of the law school curriculum, as well as explore how 
greater cultural competency training can be implemented in professionalism 
training. 116   One of the tangible goals of the program is to create 
opportunities for every student to take at least thirty credits of recognized, 
upper level experiential learning courses that would include non-traditional 
business association and appellate litigation courses, traditional clinical 
offerings, trial advocacy and externship courses, and newly designed pro-
bono externship opportunities.  Additional aspirations include developing 
affiliations with associations, such as the Alliance for Experiential Learning 
																																																								
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. See TSU’s Thurgood Marshall School of Law Improves Performance on 
Texas Bar Examination, TSU E-NEWS NOW (Tex. S. Univ.), Nov. 11–17, 2013, at 1, 1–2, 
http://www.tsu.edu/About/Administration/University_Advancement/Communications/
Publications/enews/TSU%20E-News%20NOW%20Nov%2011-17%202013a.pdf. 
116. E.g., Brooks, supra note 43, at 408 (“Effective interactions with clients 
and other individuals encountered in our daily work require attention to four key dimensions 
to build positive professional relationships:  (1) culture, (2) empowerment . . . .”). 
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in the Law, 117  and establishing new affiliations with other experiential 
alliances such as Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers.118 
III. UNINTENDED OUTCOMES:  STUDENT SATISFACTION 
As described above, the call for more experiential education 
conceives of skills development largely in terms of the benefits to the 
profession, however there is more to experiential education than the 
competencies and skills students acquire.  Indeed, the shift to a more skills-
based approach promises more than simply greater practical and professional 
development for law students.  There are collateral benefits that impact the 
students personally as well.  This section considers how pedagogy can 
catalyze student transformation and lead to greater personal satisfaction.119  
This account of experiential education sets the stage for this article’s finale, 
which stresses critical pedagogy as essential to the praxis of exploiting 
experiential education and maximizing the benefits for students. 
																																																								
117. Alliance for Experiential Learning in Law, NORTHEASTERN U. SCH. LAW, 
http://www.northeastern.edu/law/experience/leadership/alliance.html (last visited Mar. 16, 
2014). 
 The Alliance for Experiential Learning in Law was convened by 
Northeastern University School of Law in 2011 when a small group of legal 
educators met to discuss how best to improve legal education in response to 
significant disruptions in the profession and changes in our society.  The Alliance 
has grown to include legal educators and practitioners affiliated with almost [one 
hundred] law schools and legal service organizations who have joined together to 
develop a new approach to legal education and promote transformative approaches 
and programs for curriculum reform.  The Alliance’s ultimate goal is to ensure that 
law graduates are ready to practice with a full complement of skills and ethical and 
social values necessary to serve clients and the public interest, now and in the 
future. 
Id. 
118. Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Univ. of Fla., About 
ETL, EDUCATING TOMORROW’S LAW., http://educatingtomorrowslawyers.du.edu/about-etl/ 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
 [Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers] is an initiative of IAALS, the Institute 
for the Advancement of the American Legal System.  We work to align legal 
education with the needs of an evolving profession by facilitating, evaluating, and 
promoting law teaching methods designed to produce graduates who are 
employable and practice-ready; able to meet the needs of their employers, their 
clients, and society; and prepared to lead and respond to changes in the legal 
profession throughout their careers. 
Id. 
119. E.g., Carolyn Grose, Beyond Skills Training, Revisited:  The Clinical 
Education Spiral, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 489, 510–11 (2013) (describing reflections made by 
students in an Estates and Trusts course, including one student who writes, “‘[c]lient work is 
rewarding because it matters—helping people who depend on us’”). 
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A. Greater Autonomy and Agency 
Experiential learning promises greater autonomy and agency for 
students, both of which are largely suppressed in dominant models of legal 
education.  As used here, autonomy and agency are not synonymous; they 
indicate different capacities.  Whereas autonomy indicates the ability to 
choose or decide a course of action, agency refers to the ability to act.  
Experiential education contributes to both. 
Students have greater autonomy in multiple ways.  Most basically, 
experiential opportunities in the curriculum allow for more diverse course 
options for students.  The options increase when schools mandate fewer core 
courses to afford space for mandatory experiential courses.  Simultaneously, 
students have more variety as to how they will be evaluated, which 
ultimately affects a student’s transcript and grade point average.  Although 
the traditional model constricts student learning to perform and be evaluated 
in a singular analytical dimension, experiential learning opens up a world of 
assessment focused on various skills, including the competence to produce 
legal products, interact with clients, or effectively manage a law practice.  
The ability to choose more experiential programming also enhances 
autonomy by allowing students to work in clinics and other settings and 
represent clients.  For some, the experience is the pathway to the sort of 
justice-oriented work that drove some to law school in the first place.120  As 
one commentator noted some decades ago, clinical education furthers 
professional responsibility because students are implicated in real decision-
making.121 
Students wield greater agency through enhanced experiential 
curricula and acquire skills that are not possible through classroom 
instruction.  Although students indeed practice writing briefs, memos, and 
motions, doing so on behalf of a real-life client takes on a different meaning 
																																																								
120. See Sarah Valentine, Leveraging Legal Research, in VULNERABLE 
POPULATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIVE LAW TEACHING: A CRITICAL READER 145 (Soc’y of Am. 
Law Teachers & Golden Gate Univ. Sch. of Law eds., 2011) (describing that despite the 
observation that many “law students . . . cite working with underserved communities as a goal, 
less than three percent of . . . graduates [actually] pursue public interest work”); William P. 
Quigley, Letter to a Law Student Interested in Social Justice, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 7, 9 
(2007); Tan N. Nguyen, An Affair to Forget:  Law School’s Deleterious Effect on Student’s 
Public Interest Aspirations, CONN. PUB. INT. L.J., Spring 2008, at 95, 95. 
121. GARY BELLOW, ON TEACHING THE TEACHERS:  SOME PRELIMINARY 
REFLECTIONS ON CLINICAL EDUCATION AS METHODOLOGY IN CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE 
LAW STUDENT 391 (1973). 
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for students.122  It is a shift from focusing on one’s grade to focusing on the 
needs of the client, which has real-life consequences beyond the student.  
Accordingly as one clinician has noted, 
[s]cholars and teachers and our own human instinct tell us 
that responsibility for another human being, coupled with 
appropriate supervision and the opportunity for reflection lead to a 
deeper and richer educational experience.  Students make choices 
more intentionally and thoughtfully because something other than 
their personal academic success is at stake.  They are motivated to 
learn more thoroughly because whether they get the answer right 
matters beyond a particular test or grade. 
One of the reasons that client-centered clinical 
representation works is that students are more motivated to learn 
by being given responsibility over a case, and that this 
responsibility in turn leads to greater identification with clients and 
others who are similarly situated.123 
Under this type of learning model, students get a sense of both their power to 
influence the world and their ethical responsibilities to the profession.  
Moreover, students get the chance to cultivate compassion and judgment. 
B. Greater Justice 
Time spent in experiential settings provides students opportunity to 
confront justice issues face-to-face, while enabling students to help others 
access justice.124  It provides opportunity for instruction in the “MacCrate 
Report’s . . . core professional value of ‘[f]airness, [j]ustice, and 
[m]orality.’”125  In addition to learning about and helping to fill the justice 
gap, experiential learning leads to more just academic outcomes for students.  
Both in terms of teaching and evaluation, enhancement of experiential 
education helps to level the academic terrain, and give practical and 
professional competencies a more prominent place in the law school 
repertoire. 
																																																								
122. See, e.g., Grose, supra note 119, at 510 (noting one clinical student’s 
teaching evaluation:  “Real problems [sic] better than hypos; matters to me more to have an 
answer—more personal, seeing their faces.”). 
123. Id. at 511. 
124. See Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU 
L. REV. 1461, 1462, 1475–77 (1998) (exploring “the social justice dimensions of clinical 
design features in the deeply underserved communities”). 
125. Jane H. Aiken, Striving to Teach “Justice, Fairness, and Morality,” 4 
CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 4 (1997); Dubin, supra note 124, at 1478. 
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1. Filling the Justice Gap and Fulfilling Missions 
Justice, however defined, “is about the exercise of power.”126  “In 
order to promote justice, one must be explicit about how power operates, 
particularly in its subtle and invisible manifestations.”127  Teaching students 
about deconstructing power, identifying privilege, and taking “responsibility 
for the ways in which the law confers dominance,” is a means of using 
“power and privilege in socially productive ways.”128 
Experiential education advances justice by supporting discrete types 
of service learning as a means to apprenticeship.129  As an approach, service 
learning integrates hands-on social action, volunteerism, and learning 
objectives into an apprenticeship model that can be likened to clinical legal 
education.130  It affords opportunities for students to serve communities in 
experiential settings, allows students to fulfill their professional 
responsibilities, 131  and, for some, their school’s stated mission.  As one 
Associate Dean for Experiential Education has put it, it is not enough to 
teach students to be practice ready; educators must teach students how to be 
justice ready.132  This is especially so for those students who come to law 
school as an advocate of justice.133 
																																																								
126. Aiken, supra note 125, at 10. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 11. 
129. See Morin & Waysdorf, supra note 60, at 568–72. 
130.  Id. at 590. 
A set of service-learning principles, first drafted in 1979 by educator Robert 
Sigmon and generally accepted across the discipline, highlight three fundamental 
principles that may or may not intersect with principles of clinical legal education.  
The Sigmon principles are:  “1. [t]hose being served control the service(s) 
provided; 2. [t]hose being served become better able to serve and be served by their 
own actions; and 3. [t]hose who serve also are learners and have significant control 
over what is expected to be learned.” 
Id. at 565 n.16. 
131. See Grose, supra note 119, at 495 (describing one of the broad goals of 
traditional clinical pedagogy as “teach[ing], or at least expos[ing] students to, concepts of 
social justice”). 
132. Jane H. Aiken, The Clinical Mission of Justice Readiness, 32 B.C. J. L. & 
SOC. JUST. 231, 231 (2012); Our Faculty: Jane H. Aiken, GEORGETOWN L., 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/aiken-jane-h.cfm (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).  But see 
Praveen Kosuri, Losing My Religion:  The Place of Social Justice in Clinical Legal Education, 
32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 331, 331 (2012). 
133. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Teaching the Tensions, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
739, 743 (2010) (“Justice is the reason why many of my students have come to law school.  
But justice is not what the law provides.”). 
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Service learning furthers student development by allowing 
representation of clients who cannot afford legal representation,134  which 
“contribute[s] to the student’s development as a critically thinking, socially 
responsible practitioner.”135  Through experience, students grapple with the 
real world of need, where “less than one in ten of those involved in the 
justice system have legal representation”136 and few legal problems of low-
income individuals are dealt with by legal professionals.137 
As a general rule, law professors fail to integrate any sort of access 
to justice commitment into the curriculum and law schools have ignored their 
role in helping students appreciate that lawyers have unique social 
obligations to the public.  “The Society of American Law Teachers’ 
Committee on Access to Justice attributes this failure to law schools and 
their curricula, . . . assert[ing] that schools fail to cultivate a service mentality 
among law students, graduating few with any understanding of the crisis.”138  
However, too often the justice element of the law is relegated to those few 
who identify strongly with a public interest track. 
Nonetheless, providing service to the community is also a means for 
students to fulfill one’s professional responsibility.  According to ABA 
Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 6.1, a lawyer has a duty to 
provide pro bono legal services for others with limited means, charities, and 
the government, among others.139  Despite this noble aspiration of the bar, 
Rule 6.1 stands as a minority rule among bar members, as indicated by “the 
ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service, [which] reported 
that only one-fourth of all respondents met the minimum 
																																																								
134. See THE N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON NEW LAWYERS IN A 
CHANGING PROFESSION, supra note 6, at 90. 
135. Grose, supra note 119, at 511; Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 
CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 328–30 (2001) (asserting that “[s]erving as an advocate on behalf of a 
low-income client under good supervision can deepen the student’s understanding and 
compassion, and cause her to affirm the common humanity she shares with her client and with 
others in her client’s position”). 
136. SpearIt, Model Rule 6.1:  A Lawyer’s Duty to Increase Access to Justice, 
A.B.A. (Nov. 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/young_lawyer/2012-13/
november_2012_vol_17_no_2/model_rule_6_1.html [hereinafter SpearIt, Model Rule 6.1:  A 
Lawyer’s Duty to Increase Access to Justice]. 
137. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: 
THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 19–20 (2009), 
available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_
in_america_2009.pdf. 
138. SpearIt, Model Rule 6.1:  A Lawyer’s Duty to Increase Access to Justice, 
supra note 136. 
139. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2013); see also SpearIt, Model 
Rule 6.1:  A Lawyer’s Duty to Increase Access to Justice, supra note 136. 
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recommendation.”140  Representing needy clients thus advances justice for 
students and fulfills a lawyer’s ethical responsibility. 
Whether experiential learning, when fully embraced, will produce 
law students who indeed pursue justice and service upon graduation is 
uncertain.  Determining this with precision is constrained by the need to sift 
such students from those who came into law school determined to advance 
social justice, from those influenced by a faculty member, from those 
targeted by a specific strategic planning goal.  Despite these uncertainties, 
experiential education promises a greater commitment to measuring 
effectiveness in terms of student outcomes over faculty performance, which 
effectively changes the power dynamic of a law school’s learning culture. 
Finally, for other students, helping individuals with their legal 
problems advances the school’s mission.  For many law schools, religious 
and secular alike, being of service to the community is integral to the 
school’s identity.  Experiential learning is a means to connect students to the 
community for the benefit of both, which abides by institutional ideals of 
service of humanity141 and social justice,142 among other humanistic goals. 
2. More Variety in Learning and Fairness in Grading 
Experiential education leads to greater classroom justice by offering 
more variety in coursework, which concomitantly requires greater variety in 
the way students are evaluated and graded.  Teaching students in practical 
settings also recalibrates the heavy reliance on casebook study and doctrine.  
There would be less emphasis on Socratic regimes and the suffocating 
environments143 they create, and more involvement with actual lawyering 
practices, including interviewing clients, drafting and filing documents, and 
meeting work deadlines.  The opportunity for more on-the-job learning 
means more justice for those who learn best by doing. 
																																																								
140. SpearIt, Model Rule 6.1:  A Lawyer’s Duty to Increase Access to Justice, 
supra note 136; see also ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., SUPPORTING 
JUSTICE II: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS vii (2009). 
141. E.g., Mission Statement, SAINT LOUIS U., http://www.slu.edu/x5021.xml 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
142. E.g., Mission Statement, GONZAGA U., http://issuu.com/gonzaga/docs/
mission-statement?mode=embed&layout=http://skin.issuu.com/v/light/layout.xml&showFlip
Btn=true&viewMode=presentation (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
143. See Andrew J. McClurg, Poetry in Commotion: Katko v. Briney and the 
Bards of First-Year Torts, L. TCHR., Fall 1996, at 1, 1; Kenneth L. Schneyer, Bully Pulpit: 
Effective Teachers Face Their Power over Students Honestly, L. TCHR., Spring 1996, at 1, 1 
(describing the Socratic method as “where systematic humiliation of the student is only a 
hair’s breadth away from the formal structure and purpose of the pedagogical method”). 
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More curricula based on experiential learning potentially levels the 
field in evaluating and grading students as well.  With more courses being 
evaluated by different metrics, experiential learning provides greater 
opportunity to be graded by options other than the typical multiple-choice 
exam.  More experience-based learning frees students from typical pen-and-
paper-type examinations and doles out more grades for specific legal tasks 
such as writing briefs, arguing cases, or mediating cases, thereby rewarding 
professional and practical competencies in addition to knowledge of black-
letter law. 
IV. PRAXIS IN LAW TEACHING 
The thrust of this article highlights the student benefits of 
experiential education and the transformative potential for students.  
Experience-based teaching is more than training students in particular legal 
competencies but also, a means of empowering students professionally and 
helping them achieve greater justice.  When students provide legal assistance 
to the community, they not only gain practical experience of the law, but also 
ensure that law schools do more than just teach about justice—they advance 
it.  Teachers who are cognizant of these effects on students can work to 
facilitate not only student acquisition of practical skills, but also the 
acquisition of a more meaningful investment in law school. 
Successful implementation of experiential education in law school 
depends on maximizing positive outcomes and minimizing the negatives.  
Toward this end, critical pedagogy provides a theoretical frame for 
exploiting experiential education in order to maximize outcomes for both 
students and the legal profession.  This article offers a candid look at a 
program that is engaged in the process, including adding more skills training 
on the syllabus of doctrinal courses.  Although such courses have not been 
the traditional locus of experiential education in law school, there are 
compelling reasons for rethinking this tradition and reimagining the 
possibilities. 
Ultimately, this work is about experiential education’s personal 
impact on students.  As much of the clamor for more practical skills training 
has been voiced in terms of benefit to the legal profession, there has been 
little inquiry into what it means for students or the law school experience.  
This article has attempted to fill in some of the void. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, reality television programming has fed 
the American audience’s increasing interest in how people behave in The 
Real World.1  Today’s law students approach their legal education with a 
similar focus.  With a drive to acquire skills needed to succeed in the real 
world of lawyering, students highly value work done by real lawyers2 on 
behalf of real clients.3 
Law professors who teach persuasive writing can leverage this 
interest in the real world by using materials from real cases to teach 
important persuasive writing techniques.  Happily, using real cases does 
more than simply pique students’ interest in learning.  Materials from real 
cases, when used in an active learning environment,4 are exemplary tools to 
teach the most critical components of persuasive writing.  Among those 
critical components are development of a theme, organization of legal 
arguments, and effective use of case authority. 
This article describes a comprehensive case-study exercise that uses 
practitioners’ briefs and judicial opinions to teach these critical components 
of persuasive writing.  This exercise does more than require students to read 
an excerpt of a brief or judicial opinion that might illustrate a single 
persuasive writing technique.  Rather, students assess the strength of real 
pieces of advocacy only after they have learned the applicable law.  Students 
then step into the role of the practitioner and construct arguments by 
applying the law to facts taken from a real case.  Students compare the 
quality of their arguments to the arguments made in a real brief—a poorly 
written brief—and assess how the brief failed to meet their expectations 
about how best to persuade.  Finally, students read the decision rendered in 
the real case and analyze whether the quality of persuasive writing affected 
the outcome of the case. 
                                                            
1. See The Real World:  New York—Main, MTV, http://www.mtv.com/
shows/realworld-season1/series.jhtml#moreinfo (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).  MTV’s The Real 
World:  New York debuted in 1992.  Id.  The Real World has been cited as the show that “set 
the template for contemporary reality TV.”  Michael Hirschorn, The Case for Reality TV, 
ATLANTIC (May 1, 2007, 12:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/05/
the-case-for-reality-tv/305791/. 
2. Law professors apparently are not real lawyers.  A student once noted on 
my course evaluation that it was clear that I “used to be a lawyer.” 
3. Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost:  How Law School Disappoints Law 
Students, the Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219, 241–432 (2007). 
4. Active learning requires students to engage in higher order thinking, 
forcing them to engage in analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.  ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST 
PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 124 (1st ed. 2007). 
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Section I of this article describes the primary pedagogical goals of 
the exercise:  To focus on the most challenging aspects of persuasive writing, 
to use an active learning approach, and to add the real world element by 
using briefs and judicial opinions from real cases.  Section I also discusses 
how this exercise, by requiring students to exercise their own judgment to 
develop viable arguments, differs from past uses of briefs and judicial 
opinions to teach persuasive writing. 
Section II of the article then describes the specifics of the exercise, 
including the materials used, the class discussion, and student reactions.  
Section III discusses the multiple benefits of this exercise.  The primary 
benefit of the exercise is its effectiveness in teaching students the critical 
components of persuasive writing; namely theme, organization, and use of 
case authority.  The exercise also helps students to develop high standards 
for the quality of persuasive writing they expect to see as a reader—
standards they transfer to their own work when they begin to write.  Best of 
all, students enjoy the exercise.  Students appreciate the opportunity to see 
how advocacy is conducted in the real world and enjoy their active role in 
the learning process. 
The Appendices to this article contain the documents that students 
use to record their impressions of the documents that they analyze as part of 
the exercise. 
I. PEDAGOGICAL GOALS 
A. To Focus on the Challenging Elements of Persuasive Writing 
This exercise is designed to teach students three critical elements of 
persuasive writing:  Development of a theme,5 organization of legal 
arguments,6 and persuasive use of case authority.7  While there are several 
                                                            
5. Theme—also known as theory of the case—is a concise statement why the 
facts and the law together compel the conclusion that the result being advocated is the just 
result in the case.  See MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 
37–38 (2d ed. 2006); MICHAEL R. FONTHAM ET AL., PERSUASIVE WRITTEN AND ORAL 
ADVOCACY IN THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS 8–9 (2d ed. 2007). 
6. To create a well-organized argument, the writer must identify all relevant 
legal arguments, examine the relationship between the various arguments, and create a 
hierarchy of arguments in order to present each argument with maximum impact.  See 
BEAZLEY, supra note 5, at 70–71; FONTHAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 10–16.  After having 
identified each argument and the order in which the various arguments will be presented, the 
writer must carefully outline each particular argument so that the argument is complete.  See 
BEAZLEY, supra note 5, at 75–76. 
7. To use case authority well, the writer must provide sufficient information 
so that the reader understands the case’s relevance to the issue.  See id. at 80–81.  Poor use of 
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other important elements of persuasive writing,8 in my experience students 
do not struggle equally with all persuasive writing techniques.  With 
relatively little classroom instruction and targeted comments on students’ 
individual work, most students will improve their persuasive writing with 
regard to the more obvious issues such as proper punctuation or citation 
form.  But most students struggle quite a bit when learning the critical 
elements of persuasive writing—how to develop a strong theme, organize 
legal arguments well, and use case authority for maximum impact.9 
For example, students may construct a theme, but often they confine 
it to a short paragraph, usually at the beginning of the brief.  Students also 
may use a shrill or table-thumping10 tone when articulating a theme.  
Students likewise struggle to organize legal arguments properly; often 
students may present arguments in the wrong order or have distinct 
arguments wander in and out of each other due to a lack of structure.11  
Finally, students often do not use the cases to their best advantage in the 
brief, relying on excessive quotations or cursory citations rather than fully 
describing how the authority supports a particular position.12 
It is easy to understand why these particular elements of persuasive 
writing are difficult for students to grasp.  Unlike a spelling, grammar, or 
citation error, the elements of theme, organization, and effective use of case 
authority are more abstract and subtle.  And yet every lawyer who has 
litigated in private practice has seen a brief that, while it may contain no 
obvious errors, fails to persuade the reader.  The lack of persuasion largely is 
                                                                                                                                            
case authority—particularly an overreliance on case quotations—creates unpersuasive 
arguments.  Id. at 89–90. 
8. Other important elements of persuasive writing are the writer’s tone, good 
citation form, appropriate grammar, adherence to rules of punctuation, and lack of spelling or 
typographical errors.  See id. at 205.  While these elements of legal writing are important, 
issues of legal analysis and organization are critical to good legal writing and should take 
precedence when a legal writing professor seeks to improve students’ work.  Daniel L. 
Barnett, Triage in the Trenches of the Legal Writing Course:  The Theory and Methodology of 
Analytical Critique, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 651, 654–55 (2007) (suggesting that legal writing 
professors who are commenting on student work first address substantive issues of poor legal 
analysis or organization before grammar or punctuation issues). 
9. Cara Cunningham & Michelle Streicher, The Methodology of Persuasion:  
A Process-Based Approach to Persuasive Writing, 13 LEGAL WRITING:  J. LEGAL WRITING 
INST. 159, 193–94, 205 (2007) (identifying the failure to effectively present a theme and lack 
of organization of the argument as common persuasive writing problems exhibited by novice 
writers). 
10. Stephen V. Armstrong & Timothy P. Terrell, The Rhetoric of Persuasive 
Writing, 15 PERSP.:  TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 189, 189 (2007) (describing the tone as 
table-thumping). 
11. FONTHAM ET AL., supra note 5, at 9 (explaining that poor organization can 
cause a brief to wander). 
12. BEAZLEY, supra note 5, at 102, 115–16. 
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due to defects in these more subtle elements of persuasive writing—theme, 
organization, and use of case authority. 
Thus, the challenge is to isolate these more essential elements of 
persuasive writing to help students better understand why these elements are 
so important.13  By eliminating the distraction caused by grammar, 
punctuation, or citation errors, this exercise enables students to understand 
that a piece of advocacy can be aesthetically acceptable yet fail to persuade.  
By targeting only the more abstract concepts of theme, organization, and use 
of authority, the exercise helps students focus on the elements of persuasive 
writing that most often will make the difference between winning or losing a 
case. 
B. To Use an Active Learning Approach 
Another goal in developing this exercise was to use an active 
learning approach.  The differences between active learning and passive 
learning primarily have been described in the classroom context.14  Passive 
learning refers to class instruction in which there is a one-way transfer of 
information from the instructor to the students, whose primary job is to 
listen.15  Active learning is a method of learning that “requires students to 
[engage in] higher-order thinking [such as] analysis, synthesis, and 
evaluation.”16  Simulation exercises, where students assume the role of the 
practitioner, are a particularly effective form of active learning.17 
Reading is part of active learning,18 and students who read real world 
examples of advocacy are not entirely engaged in passive learning.  
However, depending on the manner in which the material is presented, 
students may not be actively engaged for several reasons. 
First, when asked to read a piece of well-written advocacy19 that 
addresses an unfamiliar legal issue, students may not be able to critically 
                                                            
13. Barnett, supra note 8, at 654–55. 
14. Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, Taking Back the Law School Classroom:  
Using Technology to Foster Active Student Learning, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551, 552–53 (2004). 
15. Gerald F. Hess, Principle 3:  Good Practice Encourages Active Learning, 
49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 401, 401 (1999) (Students are engaged in passive learning “when their 
primary role is to listen to an authority who organizes and presents information and concepts.  
Active learning occurs when students do more than listen.”). 
16. Caron & Gely, supra note 14, at 552; Hess, supra note 15, at 401. 
17. See Hess, supra note 15, at 410–11. 
18. Caron & Gely, supra note 14, at 553. 
19. Maria Ciampi has compiled a set of well-written briefs and judicial 
opinions, together with annotations and commentary to highlight particular persuasive writing 
techniques.  MARIA L. CIAMPI & WILLIAM H. MANZ, THE QUESTION PRESENTED: MODEL 
APPELLATE BRIEFS (2000).  Other texts compile excerpts of briefs, judicial opinions, and 
speeches, also with commentary and annotations that highlight good oral or written advocacy 
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analyze the document simply because they do not understand the law being 
applied.20  First-year law students may be particularly ill-equipped to engage 
in a critical analysis of legal arguments addressing an unfamiliar issue 
because they have so little knowledge of the law in general.  Even upper-
level law students may have difficulty evaluating the strength of an argument 
that addresses a complex legal issue beyond the students’ knowledge.21 
Without any background in the law, students assigned to read a well-
written piece of advocacy simply may accept the professor’s opinion that a 
brief is well-written at face-value and copy the document’s form or structure 
for their own work.22  Students thus will not engage in any critical analysis of 
how the writer constructed a persuasive argument.23  If students view the 
document only as a fill-in-the-blank form to be adapted for their own work, 
they are not engaged in the type of higher order thinking that is characteristic 
of active learning. 
The tendency to use the document passively may be heightened if the 
real brief addresses the same legal issue as the students’ writing assignment, 
such as an assignment to draft a trial motion or appellate brief.  If the 
document addresses the same legal issue as a writing assignment and also 
has the professor’s stamp of approval, anxious students may treat the 
document as a template to be copied rather than a tool for learning. 
One way to avoid having students use a practitioner’s brief as a 
template for their own work is to ask students to read a poorly written brief 
and analyze why it fails to persuade.  Because federal and state judges are 
increasingly willing to criticize poor writing, it is not difficult to find an 
                                                                                                                                            
techniques.  ROSS GUBERMAN, POINT MADE: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE NATION’S TOP 
ADVOCATES (2011); NOAH A. MESSING, THE ART OF ADVOCACY: BRIEFS, MOTIONS, AND 
WRITING STRATEGIES OF AMERICA’S BEST LAWYERS (2013). 
20. Andrea McArdle, Teaching Writing in Clinical, Lawyering, and Legal 
Writing Courses:  Negotiating Professional and Personal Voice, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 501, 
515 (2006) (students will better examine persuasive writing if they understand the underlying 
law). 
21. See CIAMPI & MANZ, supra note 19, at 30, 180, 230 (briefs involve issues 
such as the constitutionality and application of anti-trafficking provisions of the Federal 
Archeological Resources Protection Act, criminal violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, and alleged violations of the City Charter of the City of New York by a former 
New York City Comptroller with regard to business dealings with a business entity). 
22. McArdle, supra note 20, at 514. 
23. Miriam E. Felsenburg & Laura P. Graham, A Better Beginning:  Why and 
How to Help Novice Legal Writers Build a Solid Foundation by Shifting Their Focus from 
Product to Process, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 83, 98 (2011–2012) (students tend to use examples 
of memos and briefs as templates or go-bys); see also Anna P. Hemingway, Making Effective 
Use of Practitioners’ Briefs in the Law School Curriculum, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 417, 422 
(2010) (students should not rely on practitioners’ briefs as templates). 
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example of a poor quality brief.24  Yet the analysis of a judicially-criticized 
brief may have limited value to students, primarily due to the nature of the 
judicial criticism.  Judges generally take the time to criticize only the most 
obvious errors such as “‘deliberate mischaracterization[s] of precedent,’”25 
arguments that are “‘rambling stream[s] of consciousness,’”26 “‘inaccurate 
[or] incomplete case citations,’”27 or “‘innumerable and blatant typographical 
and grammatical errors.’”28 
Judicial criticism of poorly written briefs thus clearly delivers a do 
not do this message with regard to these blatant errors.  That cautionary 
message, however, is not much guidance in developing good persuasive 
writing techniques.  Nor does it engage students in active learning.  To the 
contrary, students need not engage in much critical analysis to determine that 
a document riddled with typographical errors will fail to persuade. 
Thus, a primary goal of the exercise is to keep students either from 
using a well-written brief only as a do this template or from dismissing a 
poorly written brief as a do not do this note of caution.  To do so, this 
exercise employs an active learning approach.29  Rather than having students 
dutifully follow along while the professor walks them through an example of 
good persuasive writing, this exercise is student-driven.30  The students take 
the lead not only in evaluating the persuasive qualities of several documents, 
but also in constructing arguments using law with which the students are 
familiar.  The exercise thus requires students to engage in active learning 
activities such as synthesizing, evaluating, and creating arguments.31 
Finally, to avoid the situation where students will use the documents 
as templates or models for their own work, this exercise is not tied to any 
graded writing assignment.  Students are explicitly told their assignment is to 
                                                            
24. See Hemingway, supra note 23, at 421–22 (discussing use of 
practitioners’ briefs as a “how not to do it” example); see generally JUDITH D. FISCHER, 
PLEASING THE COURT: WRITING ETHICAL AND EFFECTIVE BRIEFS (2d ed. 2011) (compiling 
excerpts of judicial opinions that criticize the quality of writing in briefs and other 
documents). 
25. FISCHER, supra note 24, at 5. 
26. Id. at 23. 
27. Id. at 50. 
28. Id. at 40. 
29. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 110, 123–24.  Active learning 
methods seek to replace “passive receipt of information transmitted by an instructor” with 
other activities, including “talking, writing, reading, reflecting, and evaluating information 
received.”  Caron & Gely, supra note 14, at 553. 
30. Hemingway, supra note 23, at 426–27 (noting that when the professor led 
the students through examples of strong point headings written in real briefs, the “students 
dutifully followed along . . . [but] did not seem overly enthused”). 
31. Hess, supra note 15, at 401 (Students are “more active when they discuss 
concepts or skills, write about them, and apply them in a simulation or in real life.”). 
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identify the presence or absence of persuasive writing techniques in the 
documents; consider whether, why, and how the documents persuade them 
as readers; and evaluate how persuasive writing—or lack thereof—may have 
affected the outcome of a real case.  Disconnecting the exercise from any 
graded writing assignment eliminates the worry that students will view the 
document as a form to be followed rather than a tool for learning. 
C. To Connect with the Real World 
A third goal of this exercise is to have the students understand that 
good theme, organization, and use of case authority are not academic 
concepts created by their professor, but are essential tools for the practicing 
lawyer.  The best way to drive this point home is to connect students to the 
real world of lawyering.  Once students see that these persuasive writing 
techniques can make the difference in the outcome of a real case, they are 
more eager to master the techniques.  Making it real gives the students both 
focus and incentive to improve their writing. 
II. THE EXERCISE 
A. Format of the Exercise 
This exercise is taught over two sixty-minute class sessions and 
includes both assigned readings and questionnaires for students to complete.  
The first step introduces the students to the substantive law around which the 
exercise revolves.  In this exercise, the legal issue is whether a police stop of 
a vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  This issue is not tied to the students’ writing 
assignment.  For this reason, students are able to focus on assessing the 
persuasive qualities of the documents without trying to replicate the format 
or style of the documents in their own work. 
Before the first class session, students read several Fourth 
Amendment cases to learn the applicable legal principles.  This knowledge 
of the substantive law vastly increases the students’ ability to critically assess 
whether the briefs and judicial opinions addressing this Fourth Amendment 
issue either succeed or fail to persuade them as readers. 
After completing the background reading, students read and critique 
two judicial opinions that apply the substantive law.  These opinions are 
majority and dissenting opinions from the same case.  Both opinions are very 
well-written, and they show students how two writers can effectively assert 
opposing positions when applying the same law to the same facts.  To help 
students focus on the specific elements of theme development, organization 
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of legal arguments, and use of case authority, they must complete a 
questionnaire that records their impressions of the persuasive qualities of the 
two opinions.32 
Next, we have our first class meeting in which we discuss the 
substantive legal issue and the students’ impressions of the arguments made 
in the contrasting majority and dissenting opinions.  After a thorough 
discussion on those topics, I give the students the facts of a real case that 
involves the Fourth Amendment issue.  Armed with their background 
knowledge of the law and two good examples of persuasive writing 
addressing both sides of the issue, the students together draft the outline of a 
brief advocating for one party in the case.  Students also draft a thematic 
statement and discuss strategies for using case authority for maximum 
persuasive impact. 
After class, having already developed expectations for persuasive 
writing techniques that should be present in the brief, students read the real 
brief that was filed in the actual case.  This brief is poorly written.  Students 
compare this brief to the outline we created in class and complete another 
questionnaire in which they record their impressions of the brief’s lack of 
persuasion.  When the class meets again, we discuss the students’ reactions 
to the unpersuasive brief and examine why the brief failed to persuade, 
focusing on theme, organization, and use of case authority. 
To complete the exercise, the students read the decision reached in 
the actual case in which the poorly written brief was filed.  Students examine 
how the court decided the issue adverse to the party that filed the poorly 
written brief and consider the extent to which the poor persuasive writing of 
the brief may have affected the outcome of the case.33 
B. The Fourth Amendment Issue 
The exercise involves the issue of whether police officers violate the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures 
when they stop a car based only on an anonymous, phoned-in tip that the 
driver may be intoxicated.  The real case around which the exercise revolves 
is Harris v. Commonwealth (Harris III),34 a 2008 decision by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia. 
I chose this legal issue and this case for a number of reasons.  First, 
the Fourth Amendment issue is one that first-year law students can 
understand after reading just a few cases.  Second, the background cases are 
                                                            
32. See infra Appendix A. 
33. See infra Appendix B. 
34. 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008). 
124
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1
286 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
fairly short and easy to read.  Third, because the courts have not uniformly 
applied the Fourth Amendment to anonymous phoned-in tips, I can provide 
the students with several well-written judicial opinions that use good 
persuasive writing techniques to reach opposite conclusions.  Fourth, the fact 
pattern of the Harris case is straightforward.35  Fifth, a brief filed in the 
Harris case provides numerous examples of poor persuasive writing.36  
Finally, as discussed below, the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in 
Harris arguably demonstrates that poor brief writing affected the outcome of 
the case.37 
C. The Background Reading 
To understand the Fourth Amendment issue, students first read three 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.  The first two cases, 
Adams v. Williams38 and Alabama v. White,39 applied the Court’s 1968 
decision in Terry v. Ohio40 and held that the stops made by police using 
information provided by informants were constitutional.41  In Adams, the 
police acted on a tip from a known informant that an individual was carrying 
a firearm.42  The Court in Adams held that the Terry stop43 was constitutional 
because the “informant was known to [the police] . . . and had provided 
[reliable] information in the past.”44  In White, the police acted on a tip from 
an anonymous informant who provided specific information about a drug 
                                                            
35. Id. at 144. 
36. See Brief for the Commonwealth at 2, Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 
S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008) (No. 080437). 
37. See, e.g., Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 144–45. 
38. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
39. 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
40. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
41. White, 496 U.S. at 330–31; Adams, 407 U.S. at 147–48.  In Terry, the 
Supreme Court of the United States first addressed the issue whether a police officer’s stop of 
an individual based only on a suspicion of criminal activity violates the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 4.  The Court held 
that a police officer, who both personally observes behavior that he or she considers to be 
potentially criminal activity and reasonably suspects that a firearm may be involved, may 
conduct a brief search of an individual without violating the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 27.  
The Court’s ruling in Terry does not directly address the issue of information provided by 
informants, either anonymously or otherwise, but it is the seminal case on the issue of stop 
and frisk.  See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 9.1, at 352–69 (5th ed. 2012). 
42. Adams, 407 U.S. at 146–48. 
43. A police officer’s stop of an individual or car is commonly referred to as a 
“Terry stop.”  See, e.g., 4 LAFAVE, supra note 41, at § 9.2(d), at 400–01. 
44. Adams, 407 U.S. at 146. 
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transaction.45  The Court held that the anonymous tip was sufficiently 
reliable both in its factual details and its prediction of the defendant’s future 
criminal behavior to justify the investigatory stop.46 
In the third case, Florida v. J.L.,47 the Court held that police violated 
the Fourth Amendment when they stopped and searched an individual based 
on an anonymous, phoned-in tip that a young man standing at a bus stop 
wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.48  The Court held that the tip had 
not been sufficiently reliable in its prediction of future criminal activity to 
give police a reasonable, articulable suspicion to make the Terry stop.49  In 
so holding, the Court characterized the tipster’s information as a bare report 
that essentially identified a particular person without any predictive 
information about the individual’s future movements from which the police 
could determine the reliability of the tipster’s information.50 
After reading these three cases, students should have sufficient 
background to understand the Fourth Amendment issue.  In addition, the J.L. 
decision throws a monkey wrench into the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to Terry stops that are based on anonymous tips.51  A typical 
anonymous tip about a drunk driver will consist almost entirely of 
descriptive information (make, model, color of the car, license plate number, 
description of the individual, route and direction, some past driving 
infraction)52 rather than predictive information (e.g., predicting the future 
manner of driving).53  While cases decided prior to J.L. could rely on the 
specificity of the tipster’s descriptive information to justify the Terry stop,54 
any cases decided after J.L. would have to address whether the tipster also 
provided the necessary predictive information.55  The J.L. decision thus is a 
terrific case to demonstrate one of the key elements of persuasive writing, 
namely the need to make either a strong analogy when a case favors the 
writer’s position or a compelling distinction when it does not. 
                                                            
45. White, 496 U.S. at 327, 332. 
46. Id. at 332.  The informant in White had provided specific information 
about the suspect, including the suspect’s name, address, and apartment number, the day on 
which the suspect would be possessing drugs, the route she would drive on the day in 
question, and her destination, among other details.  Id. at 327. 
47. 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
48. Id. at 268–69, 274. 
49. See id. at 271, 274. 
50. Id. 
51. See id. at 271, 274. 
52. E.g., State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 339 (N.H. 1995). 
53. E.g., State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 627 (Iowa 2001). 
54. See State v. Tucker, 878 P.2d 855, 858 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Melanson, 
665 A.2d at 339. 
55. See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 724, 733 (8th Cir. 2001); 
People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 811, 813 (Cal. 2006); Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 627. 
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D. Advocacy that Takes Opposing Positions in the Same Case 
After learning the substantive law, the students assess the persuasive 
qualities of two contrasting opinions written in a case that involved an 
anonymous tip of a drunk driver.  In State v. Boyea,56 a case decided only 
nine months after J.L., a narrow majority of the Supreme Court of Vermont 
upheld the constitutionality of a Terry stop of a suspected drunk driver who 
was brought to the police’s attention by an anonymous phoned-in tip.57  The 
case contains well-written majority and dissenting opinions, each of which 
has a well-developed theme, well-organized legal arguments, and effective 
use of case authority.58  Because the majority and dissent take opposing 
positions, students can assess the persuasive writing techniques of two 
writers who reached opposite conclusions on the same law and facts. 
1. Theme:  Public Safety v. Individual Privacy 
The majority and dissenting opinions provide starkly contrasting 
themes, and each opinion uses a different technique to integrate the particular 
theme in the opinion.59  This difference allows the students to appreciate not 
just how the writer formulates a theme but also how the theme can be used 
effectively throughout the document. 
The majority opinion, in upholding the constitutionality of the Terry 
stop, strongly asserts a public safety theme.60  The majority advances this 
theme by placing the reader in the shoes of a dedicated police officer faced 
with the following scenario: 
Having received a State Police radio dispatch—derived from an 
unnamed informant—reporting a specifically described vehicle 
with New York plates traveling in a certain direction on I-89 
operating “erratically,” a police officer locates the car, observes it 
exit the highway, and pulls out in pursuit.  The officer catches up 
with the vehicle within minutes, but then faces a difficult decision.  
He could, as the officer here, stop the vehicle as soon as possible, 
thereby revealing a driver with a blood alcohol level nearly three 
times the legal limit and a prior DUI conviction.  Or, in the 
alternative, he could follow the vehicle for some period of time to 
corroborate the report of erratic driving.  This could lead to one of 
several endings.  The vehicle could continue without incident for 
                                                            
56. 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000). 
57. Id. at 862–63, 868. 
58. See id. at 862–68 (majority opinion), 877–85 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
59. See id. at 862–68 (majority opinion), 877–85 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. at 862–68 (majority opinion). 
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several miles, leading the officer to abandon the surveillance.  The 
vehicle could drift erratically—though harmlessly—onto the 
shoulder, providing the corroboration that the officer was seeking 
for an investigative detention.  Or, finally, the vehicle could veer 
precipitously into oncoming traffic, causing an accident.61 
This compelling narrative places the reader in the role of protector of public 
safety, a perspective that will stay with the reader when evaluating the legal 
arguments that follow.62 
The majority opinion reiterates and reinforces this theme throughout 
the opinion, as is critical in good persuasive writing.63  The opinion provides 
students with numerous opportunities to note how the writer integrates the 
public safety theme into the legal arguments to persuade the reader.64  The 
majority opinion contains numerous variations of its original public safety 
theme, including such phrases as:  (1) the “imminent risks that a drunk driver 
poses to himself and the public;”65 (2) the “‘potential risk of harm to the 
defendant and the public;’”66 (3) the “‘gravity of the risk of harm;’”67 (4) the 
“public’s interest in safety;”68 (5) the “‘danger to the public [that] is clear, 
urgent, and immediate;’”69 (6) the “‘dangerous public safety hazard;’”70 and 
(7) the “‘threat to the lives or safety of others that is posed by someone who 
may be driving while intoxicated or impaired,’”71 among many other 
examples.72  The theme is articulated both as the rationale for several cases 
that upheld the constitutionality of a Terry stop of a suspected drunk driver 
and as an independent policy argument in favor of constitutionality.73  Theme 
supports precedent and precedent supports theme.  Each strengthens the other 
to create compelling arguments.74 
                                                            
61. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 862. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. at 862–68. 
64. See id. 
65. Id. at 863. 
66. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863 (quoting State v. Lamb, 720 A.2d 1101, 1104 (Vt. 
1998)). 
67. Id. at 864 (quoting Lamb, 720 A.2d at 1105). 
68. Id. at 865 (citing State v. Tucker, 878 P.2d 855, 861 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1994)). 
69. Id. (quoting Tucker, 878 P.2d at 861). 
70. Id. at 864 (quoting State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 340 (N.H. 1995)). 
71. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 866 (quoting McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 
1081 (Wyo. 1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
72. See id. at 862–68. 
73. Id. at 865 (discussing Tucker, 878 P.2d at 862). 
74. See id. (discussing Tucker, 878 P.2d at 862). 
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The dissenting opinion also has a well-crafted theme that emphasizes 
the Fourth Amendment’s central role as protecting citizens’ individual 
privacy.75  Like the majority, the dissent places this theme squarely before 
the reader at the beginning of the opinion: 
Constitutional rights are not based on speculations.  
Whatever frightening scenarios may be imagined by police 
officers or appellate judges, the Framers of our Constitution struck 
a balance between individual privacy and the intrusive power of 
government, a balance that we have a duty to protect.  The Fourth 
Amendment is the source of protection against searches and 
seizures that are based on unreliable information.  When an 
anonymous tip provides the sole basis for the seizure, the need for 
reliability is heightened.  Today’s decision allows the police to 
dispense with this constitutional requirement and turn over to the 
public the power to cause the search or seizure of a person driving 
a car.76 
After the opening paragraph, the dissenting opinion’s use of theme differs 
from the majority opinion.77  Unlike the majority opinion, which weaves 
thematic statements into its discussion of case precedent, the dissenting 
opinion rather starkly is divided between precedent arguments and policy 
arguments, the latter argument being a detailed discussion of the original 
intent of the Fourth Amendment as an essential restraint on government 
action.78  The dissent’s thematic statements appear largely in this policy 
discussion.79  This different use of theme is one technique that the students 
evaluate as part of the exercise.80 
2. Organization of Precedent Arguments 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Boyea also show student’s 
stark contrasts in the organization of legal arguments.81  In Boyea, the 
organizational structure is most evident in the manner in which the majority 
and dissent present their positive and negative precedent arguments.82  
Although the legal issue involves a federal constitutional issue, the majority 
                                                            
75. Id. at 877–85 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
76. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 877. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 863–67 (majority opinion), 877–85 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
79. Id. at 882–85 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
80. Id. at 877–85. 
81. See Boyea, 765 A.2d at 862 (majority opinion), 877 (Johnson, J., 
dissenting). 
82. Id. at 863 (majority opinion), 877 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
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opinion at first ignores the federal cases, particularly the J.L. decision.83  
Rather, the majority opinion discusses several state court cases decided 
before J.L. in which the courts upheld as constitutional Terry stops of drunk 
drivers that were based on anonymous tips.84  The Boyea majority opinion 
casts these pre-J.L. state cases as important precedent, stating when 
“[c]onfronted with this precise issue, a majority of courts have concluded 
that failing to stop a vehicle in these circumstances in order to confirm or 
dispel the officer’s suspicions exposes the public, and the driver, to an 
unreasonable risk of death or injury.”85  The majority then describes several 
of the state court cases in great detail, including both the facts of particular 
cases and the various courts’ statements about the public safety danger that a 
drunk driver presents.86 
By characterizing the state court cases as the majority view and by 
providing extensive details about the cases, the Boyea majority opinion 
causes the reader to feel the weight of precedent in favor of the 
constitutionality of the Terry stop.87  This technique first convinces the 
reader that substantial precedent supports the constitutionality of the stop.  In 
addition, it primes the reader for the majority’s later discussion of the 
Supreme Court precedent, particularly the Court’s then-recent decision in 
J.L.88 
The dissenting opinion in Boyea organizes its legal arguments in 
exactly the opposite way.89  The dissent first notes that the case involves a 
question of federal constitutional law, emphasizing that the court is “bound 
by the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment.”90  
The dissent then discusses the Supreme Court cases, particularly, the 
decisions in J.L. and White, at length.91  This discussion includes very 
specific information about both the facts and the Court’s rationale in each 
case, focusing on the Court’s requirement that the tipster’s information be 
                                                            
83. Id. at 866 (majority opinion). 
84. Id. at 864–66. 
85. Id. at 863. 
86. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863–66.  The majority does acknowledge the 
existence of some state court cases in which courts found Terry stops to be unconstitutional.  
Id. at 866–67.  This technique accomplishes two goals.  Id.  First, the majority opinion appears 
more credible because it acknowledges that the case law is not unanimous.  See id. at 866.  
Second, the majority distinguishes the facts of those cases in terms of the quality of the 
tipster’s information to bolster the reliability of the tip in the case before it.  Id. at 866–67. 
87. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863–65. 
88. Id. at 866–68. 
89. Id. at 877 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 877–81. 
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both reliable and predictive.92  The dissent concludes this discussion by 
asserting that, “[b]ecause the claim here is based solely on the Fourth 
Amendment, we must ask ourselves how the . . . Supreme Court [of the 
United States] would be likely to rule about the anonymous tip in this case 
after White and J.L.”93  The structure of the dissenting opinion thus gives the 
reader the impression that the Supreme Court itself would rule the Terry stop 
to be unconstitutional.94 
After discussing the federal cases in detail, the dissent discusses the 
state court cases only briefly.95  It cites several decisions in which state 
courts held that anonymous tips to police—reporting a variety of crimes, not 
just drunk driving—were unconstitutional for a variety of reasons.96  The 
dissent thus creates the impression that the prior precedent reaches 
inconsistent conclusion on the issue of constitutionality and, for this reason, 
no great weight should be assigned to any of the state court decisions.97 
By organizing the arguments using federal and state law in exactly 
opposite ways, the majority and dissenting opinions demonstrate the 
importance of good organization at the macro level.98  The majority 
opinion’s extended discussion of favorable precedent, albeit state court cases 
addressing a federal constitutional issue, makes a compelling argument in 
favor of constitutionality.99  In the dissenting opinion, the prominent and 
extended discussion of the Supreme Court cases diminishes the persuasive 
value of the non-binding state court decisions.100  Students thus see how two 
writers, reaching different conclusions on the same legal issue, can craft 
persuasive arguments by altering the order in which precedent-based 
arguments are presented and in varying the level of detail used to discuss 
favorable and unfavorable precedent.101 
                                                            
92. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 877–79. 
93. Id. at 880. 
94. See id. at 877–85. 
95. Id. at 881–82. 
96. Id. 
97. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 881–82. 
98. See id. at 862 (majority opinion), 877 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
99. Id. at 863–66 (majority opinion). 
100. Id. at 877–79 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. at 862 (majority opinion), 877 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
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3. Persuasive Use of Case Authority 
The Boyea opinions also illustrate effective use of case authority.102  
In each opinion, the discussion of the most favorable cases is very 
detailed.103  Both opinions go far beyond a mere fact-to-fact analogy or 
distinction of the precedent cases; rather the opinions use all of the pieces 
and parts of the cases—facts, rationale and policy arguments—to create a 
compelling argument for the advocated position.104  None of the common 
mistakes of novice legal writers, mainly overreliance on case citations or 
excessive quotes from the cases, are present.105 
The best example of how to use case authority for maximum impact 
is the two opinions’ different treatment of the J.L. decision.106  When Boyea 
was decided, the J.L. decision was the most recent and relevant precedent on 
this Fourth Amendment issue.107  For the majority, J.L. was a problematic 
case that had to be distinguished.108  The majority effectively does so by 
employing several different techniques.109  First, the majority uses words or 
phrases that characterize the decision as unimportant or narrowly decided.110  
For example, the majority characterizes J.L. as a relatively brief111 ruling in 
which the Supreme Court had been “particularly careful . . . to limit its 
holding to the facts.”112  These words and phrases give the reader the 
impression that the case does not contribute much to the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
The majority then engages in robust analogical reasoning.113  Stating 
that J.L. “provides an illuminating contrast to the case at bar,” the majority 
provides great detail about the quality of information provided by the tipster: 
The informant reported a vehicle operating erratically; provided a 
description of the make, model, and color of the subject vehicle, as 
                                                            
102. See Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863–66 (majority opinion), 877–80 (Johnson, J., 
dissenting). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. See id.  The majority opinion in Boyea does contain a few block 
quotations from cases, but the block quotations are used well.  See id. at 865–66 (majority 
opinion). 
106. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 866–68 (majority opinion), 877–81 (Johnson, J., 
dissenting). 
107. Id. at 866–67 (majority opinion), 877 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
108. Id. at 866–68 (majority opinion). 
109. See id. 
110. Id. at 868 n.8. 
111. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867. 
112. Id. 
113. See id. at 866–68. 
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well as the additional specific information that it had New York 
plates; identified the vehicle’s current location; and reported the 
direction in which it was traveling.  The officer went to the 
predicted location and within minutes confirmed the accuracy of 
the reported location and description, thus supporting the 
informant’s credibility and the reasonable inference that the caller 
had personally observed the vehicle.  The information that the 
vehicle was acting erratically equally supported a reasonable 
inference that the driver might be intoxicated or otherwise 
impaired.114 
The majority distinguishes those facts from the facts of J.L., characterizing 
the J.L. tip as “nothing more than a bare-bones description of an individual 
standing at a bus stop.”115  Finally, the majority links the facts of the tipster’s 
information to the Court’s requirements of reliability and predictability, 
stating that the information “described with particularity, and accurately 
predicted, the location of a fast moving vehicle on a freeway.”116 
Yet the majority opinion goes beyond merely comparing and 
contrasting the facts about the anonymous tips in each case.  The majority 
also uses dicta in J.L. to argue that the Fourth Amendment analysis differs 
because J.L. involved the crime of firearms possession, not drunk driving.117  
In J.L., the Court had declined to create a firearms exception that would have 
created a relaxed requirement of reliability or prediction for anonymous tips 
about alleged crimes involving firearms.118  The Court did, however, leave 
open the possibility that certain anonymous tips, such as “a report of a person 
carrying a bomb,” might present such a danger to public safety to justify a 
relaxed requirement of reliability.119 
The majority leverages this piece of the J.L. opinion to its advantage.  
It characterizes J.L. as a circumstance involving a “relative lack of 
urgency,”120 arguing that the police officers in J.L. had time to safely observe 
the individual to determine whether any criminal activity was underway.121  
The majority thus portrays J.L. as a more static situation than a situation 
involving a drunk driver, stating that “[a]n officer in pursuit of a reportedly 
drunk driver on a freeway does not enjoy [the] luxury” of observing the 
driver “without running the risk of death or injury with every passing 
                                                            
114. Id. at 868. 
115. Id. at 867. 
116. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867. 
117. Id. 
118. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272–73 (2000). 
119. Id. at 273–74. 
120. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867. 
121. Id.; see J.L., 529 U.S. at 268–69. 
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moment.”122  The majority even characterizes the drunk driver on the road as 
a mobile bomb.123 
For the students, the majority’s treatment of J.L. is an excellent 
example of how to wring everything out of an important case.  The majority 
does not simply engage in the expected argument—making a factual 
distinction between the quality of the tipster’s information in J.L. and the 
quality of the tipster’s information in Boyea.  Rather, the majority engages in 
a multi-pronged attack on the J.L. decision, choosing words and phrases that 
portray the case as not detailed—a relatively brief opinion—and extending 
the Court’s rationale on a non-decision—not creating a firearms exception—
so as to further distinguish the case.124  The students clearly see that 
persuasive arguments about the applicability of case decisions should extend 
well beyond a fact-to-fact analogy or distinction. 
The dissenting opinion takes a similar approach, but with the 
opposite goal of portraying J.L. as controlling on the issue before the 
court.125  Like the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion chooses words 
and phrases to further this goal, characterizing J.L. as “recent and relevant 
precedent from the [Supreme Court of the] United States”126 and a “recent 
pronouncement by th[e] Court on the exact issue of anonymous tips . . . 
closely analogous case.”127  The dissent then illustrates the close factual 
analogy between the tip provided in J.L. and the tip provided in Boyea.128  
The dissent notes that the description of the car, a “blue-purple Jetta with 
New York license plates,” is factually indistinguishable from the description 
of the individual in J.L., “a young black ma[n] wearing a plaid shirt.”129  The 
location identified in J.L., a “specific bus stop,” likewise is indistinguishable 
from the Boyea tipster’s statement that the car was traveling between two 
specific exits on the highway.130  Finishing the close factual analogy, the 
dissent notes that the allegation of wrongdoing in J.L., that the young man 
was carrying a gun, likewise is closely analogous to the allegation that Ms. 
Boyea was engaged in erratic driving.131 
                                                            
122. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867. 
123. Id. 
124. See id. 
125. See id. at 877–82 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
126. Id. at 877. 
127. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 877–78. 
128. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 268–69; Boyea, 765 A.2d at 877–78. 
129. J.L., 529 U.S. at 271; Boyea, 765 A.2d at 879. 
130. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268; Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863 (majority opinion), 879–80 
(Johnson, J., dissenting). 
131. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 879 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also J.L., 529 U.S. at 
268. 
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The dissent also directly addresses the majority’s assertion that the 
different crimes warrant a different analysis.132  The dissent notes that the 
J.L. Court’s rationale for declining to create a firearms exception was the 
slippery slope danger that the courts would be unable to “‘securely confine 
such an exception to allegations involving firearms.’”133  The dissent 
characterizes the majority’s ruling as an automobile exception that 
exemplifies the very danger of which the Supreme Court had warned.134  The 
dissent concludes by stating that the “automobile exception has no basis in 
Supreme Court precedent.”135 
To help students identify and assess the persuasive qualities of the 
Boyea opinions, I ask them to complete a questionnaire in which they 
critique the two opinions as to the elements of theme, organization, and use 
of case authority.  In class, we use the students’ impressions to lead our 
discussion of the persuasive writing techniques present in the two Boyea 
opinions; this discussion highlights the different approaches taken in the two 
opinions and the relative effectiveness of both opinions in making strong 
arguments on opposing sides of the same issue. 
In class, I also show students one small section of the concurring 
opinion in Boyea.  I do not ask the students to read the concurring opinion 
because it is rather lengthy; however, I do point out one section where the 
concurring opinion provides excellent imagery to support the majority’s 
public safety theme.136  The concurring opinion characterizes the threat to 
public safety as one of “a drunk driver maneuvering a thousand pounds of 
steel, glass, and chrome down a public road.”137  This compelling image is 
one that the class agrees should be used by anyone writing a brief in support 
of the constitutionality of a Terry stop involving a drunk driver.138 
E. Assessing the Disappointing Brief 
In the same class meeting, after we have fully dissected the majority 
and dissenting opinions in Boyea, we leave the realm of well-written 
advocacy and turn to the next step of the exercise.  Now we begin to work 
with the Harris III case.139 
                                                            
132. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 877. 
133. Id. at 881 (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 272). 
134. Id. at 877. 
135. Id. at 880. 
136. Id. at 875 (Skoglund, J., concurring). 
137. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 875. 
138. Id. 
139. Harris v. Commonwealth (Harris III), 668 S.E.2d 141, 143 (Va. 2008). 
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The defendant in the Harris III case was arrested in the early 
morning hours of December 31, 2005.140  On April 3, 2006, a grand jury for 
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia indicted Mr. Harris on 
one count of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a felony given Mr. 
Harris’s two prior convictions for the same offense.141  On April 26, 2006, 
Mr. Harris filed a motion to suppress any evidence stemming from the police 
officer’s stop of his car on the ground that the stop violated the Fourth 
Amendment.142  On July 7, 2006, the Circuit Court judge denied the motion 
to suppress, after which Mr. Harris was immediately found guilty.143  Mr. 
Harris then appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.144  On 
February 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the defendant’s 
conviction, ruling that the Terry stop of Mr. Harris’s car did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.145 
I give my students a set of facts from the Harris III case, as follows:  
The police received an anonymous tip of suspected drunk driving.146  The 
tipster had identified:  (1) the street location of the car; (2) the direction the 
car was driving; (3) the car’s make, color, and a partial license plate number; 
and (4) the driver’s name and the type of shirt he was wearing.147  After 
locating the car on the street named by the tipster, the police officer had 
followed the driver for a few blocks before pulling the car over.148  The 
driver failed the field sobriety tests and he was charged with operating a 
vehicle while intoxicated, his third drunk driving offense.149 
I also note the procedural history of the case and the basis for the 
appellate court’s ruling.  It is important for the students to understand that the 
defendant twice had unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the 
Terry stop.150  Students also must understand the nature of the appellate 
                                                            
140. Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 2. 
141. Grand Jury Charges, Commonwealth v. Harris, 2006 WL 6436367 (Va. 
Cir. Ct. Apr. 3, 2006) (No. 06-F-1159 BBC). 
142. Motion to Suppress at 6, Commonwealth v. Harris, No. 06F1159, 2006 
WL 6436367 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2006). 
143. Commonwealth v. Harris (Harris I), No. 06F1159, 2006 WL 6436367, at 
*1 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2006), rev’d, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008).  Westlaw incorrectly 
identifies the case at the trial court level as Commonwealth v. Moses, using the defendant’s 
middle name as his last name.  Id. 
144. Harris v. Commonwealth (Harris II), No. 2320-06-2, 2008 WL 301334, at 
*1 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2008), rev’d, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008). 
145. Id. at *3, 56. 
146. Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 2. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 3. 
149. Id. at 1, 4 (noting prior convictions). 
150. Harris II, 2008 WL 301334, at *2–3, 6; Harris I, No. 06F1159, 2006 WL 
6436367, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2006), rev’d, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008). 
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court’s ruling.  In ruling that the Terry stop was constitutional, the appellate 
court had not relied solely on the anonymous tip as justifying the stop, but 
also had noted the police officer’s own observations of the driver during the 
few minutes before the officer pulled the driver over.151 
Finally, I tell the students that the case has been appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Virginia and that we will, as a class, construct an outline 
of the Commonwealth’s brief arguing that the stop was constitutional.152  I 
tell the students that all of the cases they have read, including Boyea, are 
relevant authority that may be used in the brief.  I also give them an excerpt 
from Jackson v. Commonwealth,153 a 2004 decision in which the Supreme 
Court of Virginia had distinguished Boyea.154  The court in Jackson had held, 
on facts very similar to J.L., that a Terry stop based on an anonymous tip of 
firearms possession violated the Fourth Amendment.155  In its brief arguing 
that the stop in Jackson was constitutional, the Commonwealth had cited 
Boyea and other cases involving anonymous tips about drunk driving.156  In 
rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court of Virginia had expressed 
approval for the holding in Boyea as appropriate for a drunk driving offense, 
stating: 
Nor are we persuaded by the cases relied on by the 
Commonwealth and the Court of Appeals.  Those cases are either 
inapposite or involved tips that contained indicia of reliability not 
present here.  For example, Wheat, 278 F.3d 722; State v. 
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001); Rutzinski, 241 Wis.2d 
729, 623 N.W.2d 516; and State v. Boyea, 171 Vt. 401, 765 A.2d 
862 (2000), all addressed the reliability of anonymous reports of 
erratic or drunk drivers.  That circumstance and the imminent 
public danger associated with it are not factors in this case. . . . We 
agree that “[i]n contrast to the report of an individual in possession 
of a gun, an anonymous report of an erratic or drunk driver on the 
highway presents a qualitatively different level of danger, and 
concomitantly greater urgency for prompt action.”  Id.157 
                                                            
151. Harris II, 2008 WL 301334, at *5. 
152. Harris III, 668 S.E.2d 141, 143 (Va. 2008). 
153. 594 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 2004). 
154. Id. at 603. 
155. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268, 273–74 (2000); Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 
597, 603. 
156. See State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 2000); Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 603 (Va. 2004); Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 
36, at 13, 16, 19. 
157. Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 603 (alteration in original) (quoting Boyea, 765 
A.2d at 867). 
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Thus, armed with (1) the facts of the Harris III case; (2) the precedent cases, 
including J.L. and Boyea; and (3) the Supreme Court of Virginia’s statements 
in Jackson, the class begins to construct an outline of the Commonwealth’s 
brief in the Harris case.  We develop our theme, organize our legal 
arguments, and discuss how best to use our case authority. 
With respect to theme, the students suggest that the brief should 
adopt the threat to public safety theme articulated by the majority in 
Boyea.158  The students recognize that the theme will be strengthened by the 
Boyea concurring opinion’s image of “a thousand pounds of steel, glass, and 
chrome [being maneuvered] down a public road.”159  Students also propose 
that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s statement in Jackson should be featured 
prominently in the Commonwealth’s brief in the Harris III case.160  Several 
students suggest that the introduction of the brief filed in the Harris III case 
should remind the Supreme Court of Virginia of its statement made in 
Jackson only a few years earlier.  In the real brief that the students will later 
read, the quote from Jackson does not appear until page sixteen of a twenty-
one page brief.161 
When the class discusses how to organize legal arguments, we have 
two choices.  The appellate court in Harris II had found the stop to be 
constitutional based not solely on the tipster’s information but also on the 
police officer’s observation of unusual driving before stopping the car.162  
The Commonwealth thus has two alternative arguments.  One argument is 
that the stop was constitutional based solely on the tipster’s information.163  
The other argument is that the tip and the officer’s personal observations 
together gave rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion of drunk driving 
sufficient to justify the stop.164 
As we prepare our in-class outline of the Harris III brief, we discuss 
how best to present these two arguments.  Because the first argument—that 
                                                            
158. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 862–65, 867. 
159. Id. at 875 (Skoglund, J., concurring). 
160. Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 603. 
161. Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 16 (quoting Jackson, 594 
S.E.2d at 603).  Although this article provides the Westlaw citation to the Commonwealth’s 
brief, I use the PDF form of the document in class so that students can see the appearance of 
the brief as it was filed with the court. 
162. Harris II, No. 2320-06-2, 2008 WL 301334, at *5–6 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 
2008), rev’d, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008); Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 9 
(describing the driving as unusual). 
163. Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 15. 
164. Id. at 7–8.  The Virginia Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court’s 
denial of Mr. Harris’s motion to suppress, specifically distinguished the facts of the case from 
those present in either Jackson or J.L. on the grounds that the police officer, by observing Mr. 
Harris’s driving before pulling him over, had “corroborated the criminal component” of the 
tipster’s information.  See Harris II, 2008 WL 301334, at *5–6. 
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the tip alone was sufficient to justify the stop—allows the writer to advance a 
compelling theme and use highly relevant cases like Boyea, it appears to be 
the leading argument.  Some students question whether the brief’s first legal 
argument should be grounds upon which the Commonwealth previously won 
the case.165  This is a debatable issue, and we usually have a good discussion 
about the order of presenting these two arguments. 
When we discuss how best to structure the single argument that the 
tip provided sufficient information to justify the stop, students suggest that 
the argument begin with a detailed discussion of Jackson and its approval of 
the Boyea holding in the drunk driving context.166  The students also suggest 
that the argument should discuss in detail any favorable state court cases, 
particularly Boyea.  Students also recognize that other favorable cases may 
have been decided in the years following Boyea and suggest that the brief use 
any positive precedent decided after Boyea. 
When we discuss how to best use the case authority, the class agrees 
that the majority opinion in Boyea should be highlighted as a closely 
analogous case.  We compare the quality of the information of the tip in the 
Boyea case to the tip provided in Harris III, to argue that the tipster in Harris 
III provided even more reliable information than the tipster in Boyea (partial 
license plate, name of the driver, and what the driver was wearing).167  In 
addition, we discuss how the majority opinion in Boyea provides other 
means to distinguish the J.L. decision based on the public safety theme and 
the firearms exception.168 
We end our class meeting with a firm—if somewhat basic—outline 
of the structure of the Commonwealth’s brief to be filed before the Supreme 
Court of Virginia in the Harris III case.  After class, I provide the students 
with a copy of our class outline, the actual brief in the Harris III case, and a 
form that asks them to record their impressions of persuasiveness of the 
brief. 
In our second class meeting, we review the students’ reaction to the 
Commonwealth’s brief filed in the Harris III case.  Students highlight 
several reasons why the brief failed to persuade.  They can identify the 
absence of the key elements of persuasive writing:  Theme, organization of 
legal arguments, and persuasive use of case authority.  They understand that 
the cumulative effect of the brief’s defects with regard to these elements 
makes the document unpersuasive.  In addition, the students are disappointed 
                                                            
165. See Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 9. 
166. See State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 875 (Vt. 2000); Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 
603; Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 9–11, 13. 
167. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863 (describing the tipster’s information); Brief for the 
Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 7, 9–10. 
168. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000); Boyea, 765 A.2d at 866–67. 
139
: Nova Law Review 38, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
2014] LRW’S THE REAL WORLD 301 
that the brief failed to live up to the expectations they had developed when 
we outlined the brief in our earlier class.  Indeed, their disappointment is 
heightened by the fact that the students had certain expectations about the 
document before they read it. 
The Commonwealth’s brief in Harris III lacks a theme.  The first 
argument, which asserts that the stop was constitutional based on the tip and 
the officer’s personal observations together, has no theme at all.169  It also is 
the longer of the two arguments identified in the brief, taking ten pages of the 
sixteen pages of the Argument section.170  The second argument only half-
heartedly asserts the obvious public safety theme.171  The heading for this 
second argument, “Stop Supported [b]y Danger [f]rom Intoxicated Driver,” 
is an incomplete sentence that is not written persuasively.172  The phrase 
“threat to public safety” appears only twice in the brief; it appears once in-
text on page fifteen of the twenty-one page brief and once in a parenthetical 
following a case citation.173  The quote from the Jackson decision regarding 
the “‘greater urgency for prompt action’” needed when police receive a 
report of a drunk driver does not appear until page sixteen of the brief.174  
The image set forth in the concurring opinion in Boyea—that of the “drunk 
driver maneuvering a thousand pounds of steel, glass and chrome down a 
public road”—is not in the brief at all.175 
The brief also is poorly organized.  Again, the two main arguments 
in support of the constitutionality of the stop are (1) that the tipster’s 
information, standing alone, was sufficiently reliable to justify the stop; or 
(2) that the police officer personally observed enough suspicious driving to 
justify the stop.176  The Harris III brief is weak because it begins with the 
second argument.177  This argument relies on more generic Fourth 
Amendment principles to analyze whether a police officer’s observations in a 
variety of circumstances can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
                                                            
169. See Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 7–14.  The lack of a 
theme is evident even from a brief review of the Table of Contents.  See id. at i.  The relevant 
point headings in the Argument Section are “The Officer Properly Conducted An 
Investigatory Stop” and “Sufficient Independent Corroboration.”  Id.  Neither heading 
provides a hint of a theme that might support the constitutionality of the stop.  See id. 
170. Id. at 4–14. 
171. See Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 15–21. 
172. See id. at 15. 
173. Id. at 15, 16 (quoting State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 336, 343 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1999)). 
174. Id. at 16 (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 603 (Va. 
2004)). 
175. State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 875 (Vt. 2000); Brief for the 
Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 1–21. 
176. Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 7–21. 
177. See id. at 5–6. 
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activity.178  Because the argument does not feature factually relevant drunk 
driving cases, the writer cannot either advance a compelling theme using the 
precedent or make robust analogies to cases involving substantially similar 
facts. 
The brief itself amply demonstrates this weakness.  The first 
paragraph of the argument consists of three sentences; each sentence 
extensively quotes a different case, and each quotation sets forth only a 
general principle of Fourth Amendment law.179  This structure is not 
persuasive for two reasons.  First, the boring recitation of legal principles 
does not persuade the reader that the position being advanced is the correct 
result under the law.180  Second, the absence of a strong discussion of 
factually relevant cases gives the reader the impression that no such 
compelling precedent exists. 
Moreover, after a few pages, the police officer observation argument 
begins to morph into an argument that the tipster’s information alone was 
sufficient to justify the stop.181  At this point, the brief begins to cite some of 
the relevant case law, particularly the J.L. decision, on the issue of the 
reliability of anonymous tips.182  However, the brief lacks a cohesive 
presentation of the cases that addressed anonymous tips about drunk 
driving.183  To the contrary, the brief makes only passing references to the 
relevant cases by name, as if the cases previously had been discussed for the 
                                                            
178. See id. at 5–7. 
179. Id. at 5–6.  The first paragraph of the argument section reads: 
It is elementary that “the fourth amendment does not proscribe all 
searches and seizures, only those that are ‘unreasonable.’”  Stanley v. 
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 873, 875, 433 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1993) (quoting Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).  “Whether a search is unreasonable is determined by 
balancing the individual’s right to be free from arbitrary government intrusions 
against society’s countervailing interest in preventing or detecting crime and in 
protecting its law enforcement officers.”  Harrell v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 
398, 403, 517 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1999).  “In deciding whether to make a stop or 
effect a pat-down search, an officer is entitled to rely upon the totality of the 
circumstances—the whole picture.”  Peguese v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 349, 
351, 451 S.E.2d 412, 413 (1994)(en banc). 
Id. 
180. One such example is the legal proposition that “‘[a] trained law 
enforcement officer may be able to identify criminal behavior which would appear innocent to 
an untrained observer.’”  Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 6 (quoting Alston v. 
Commonwealth, 581 S.E.2d 245, 251 (Va. Ct. App. 2003)).  That legal proposition seems to 
have no bearing on the case given the Commonwealth’s argument that the defendant’s driving 
was unusual or erratic.  Id. at 9. 
181. See id. at 10. 
182. See id. at 9–10 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2000)). 
183. See id. at 11–12. 
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reader.184  The brief thus demonstrates how the failure to present arguments 
in the correct order can lead to a scattershot presentation of the law. 
Finally, the brief makes poor use of the case authority.  The brief 
does cite Boyea and several decisions of other state courts in which the 
courts found a Terry stop based on the anonymous tip of a drunk driver to be 
constitutional.185  However, the brief contains no detailed discussion of any 
drunk driving case.  Thus, the brief makes no argument analogizing the facts 
of Harris III to any prior drunk driving case.  Boyea and other favorable 
cases are cited in a long string citation of state court cases or in two separate, 
page-long block quotations from a single California case, the facts of which 
are not explained to the reader.186  In this regard, the brief amply 
demonstrates how case citations and block quotations do not convince the 
reader that the precedent is well-reasoned and should be followed. 
Not only does the brief omit any robust analogies to favorable cases, 
the brief also does not distinguish J.L. from the facts in the case.  The only 
attempt to distinguish J.L. is an extensive block quote from the Court of 
Appeals decision in Harris III.187  Given that the Supreme Court of Virginia 
in Jackson strictly followed J.L. in a case involving a crime of firearms 
possession, the failure to distinguish J.L., or otherwise argue that drunk 
driving differs from the crime of firearms possession, cripples the brief’s 
ability to persuade the reader.188 
F. Assessing the Consequences of Poor Advocacy 
Our second class meeting discusses all of the defects of the Harris 
brief.  The students, having acquired competence in recognizing and 
assessing strong persuasive legal writing, drive this discussion in class.  
Moreover, they are quite animated in their assessment of the brief and its 
                                                            
184. Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 10–11.  When the brief 
first refers to the J.L. decision in-text, it does so as if the reader already knows all of the 
relevant information about the case.  Id. at 10 (“The open nature of the conduct here, unlike 
that of possession of a concealed weapon, as in J.L., reduces the concern about the basis for 
the informant’s knowledge about the activity.”).  When the brief first mentions the Jackson 
decision in-text, it does so in a single sentence that divides two lengthy block quotations from 
the Harris Appellate Opinion.  Id. at 11–12. 
185. See id. at 13, 16–17. 
186. Id. at 11 (block quotation of the appellate court’s opinion), 12 (second 
block quotation of the appellate court’s opinion), 17 (block quotation of People v. Wells, 136 
P.3d 810, 815–16 (Cal. 2006)), 18 (block quotation of Wells, 136 P.3d at 816).  Viewing the 
brief in PDF form best demonstrates why page-long block quotations bore the reader.  See 
Brief for the Commonwealth, supra note 36, at 11–18. 
187. Id. at 11–12. 
188. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 600–01 (Va. 2004) 
(citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000)). 
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disappointing qualities.  Because of the work they have done to learn the law 
and assess the arguments, the students are invested in the quality of the 
Commonwealth’s brief, and they are disappointed that the real product did 
not live up to their expectations. 
We conclude this exercise by briefly reviewing the potential 
consequences of the brief’s lack of persuasion.  First, the students read the 
Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Harris III, in which the court held 
that the Terry stop had violated the Fourth Amendment.189  We discuss 
whether poor briefing by the Commonwealth led to an adverse result in the 
case.  Next, the students read an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts of 
the Supreme Court of the United States in which Chief Justice Roberts 
dissented from the Court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s petition for a writ 
of certiorari in the Harris IV case.190  This well-written opinion brings the 
lesson full circle. 
1. The Supreme Court of Virginia’s Decision in Harris IV 
The Harris IV case was narrowly decided by a 4-3 majority of the 
Supreme Court of Virginia.191  There are a number of indications in the 
opinion that poor briefing could have played a part in the court’s decision.  
First, in determining that the stop was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia reversed the rulings of both of the lower state courts.192  A criminal 
defendant who has lost at both the trial and appellate court levels faces a high 
obstacle to win in the court of last resort.193  The fact that the Commonwealth 
lost before the Supreme Court of Virginia after having won twice in the 
lower courts is itself significant when assessing the strength of the 
Commonwealth’s arguments before the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
Second, the majority in Harris III barely acknowledges that the case 
involves drunk driving or the threat to public safety that drunk driving 
poses.194  The majority never cites the court’s own prior statement in Jackson 
about the “greater urgency for prompt action” that may be required when 
police receive a tip about a suspected drunk driver.195  Nor does it mention 
any of the decisions of other state courts, like Boyea, in which Terry stops 
                                                            
189. Harris III, 668 S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008). 
190. Virginia v. Harris (Harris IV), 558 U.S. 978, 978–81 (2009) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting), denying cert. to 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008). 
191. Id. at 978. 
192. Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 147. 
193. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 11.7(g), at 616 (5th ed. 2012) (noting obstacles to a defendant’s successful 
appeal of an adverse ruling on a Fourth Amendment issue). 
194. Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 150 (Kinser, J., dissenting). 
195. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 603 (Va. 2004)). 
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based on anonymous tips of drunk driving were found to be constitutional.196  
In fact, the majority in Harris III never uses the word drunk, a strong 
indication that the majority did not view the case as one involving the danger 
to public safety posed by drunk drivers on the road.197 
Finally, the nature of the court’s ruling indicates that poor briefing 
may have resulted in a poorly-crafted legal rule on this Fourth Amendment 
issue.  Relying heavily on White, J.L., and Jackson, the majority held that the 
anonymous tip did not contain sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the 
stop.198  It went far beyond the facts of the particular case, however, to hold 
that an investigatory stop of a suspected drunk driver is never justified 
“unless the suspected driver operates his or her vehicle in some fashion 
objectively indicating that the driver is intoxicated.”199  The Supreme Court 
of Virginia thus created a blanket rule that, in all cases involving an 
anonymous tip of a drunk driver, the person behind the wheel actually must 
drive drunk before police may stop the car. 
The three dissenting justices in Harris III severely criticized the 
majority for failing to address the obvious public safety concerns posed by a 
drunk driver, stating that “the majority fails to understand” the contours of 
the legal issue before it.200  The dissent highlights the Supreme Court of 
Virginia’s prior statement in Jackson, that a drunk driver presents a public 
safety danger that requires a “greater urgency for prompt action.”201  The 
dissent also quotes the majority opinion in Boyea characterizing the drunk 
driver as akin to a mobile bomb.202  Finally, the dissent chides the majority 
for ignoring substantial precedent like Boyea, stating: 
On brief, the Commonwealth discusses at length the decisions 
from other jurisdictions holding that anonymous tips about 
incidents of drunk driving require less corroboration than tips 
                                                            
196. Compare id., with State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 868 (Vt. 2000). 
197. In contrast, the majority opinion in Boyea uses the word drunk nine times.  
See Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863–67.  This repeated use of the word drunk bolsters the public 
safety theme.*  In contrast, the majority in Harris III only uses the word intoxicated, and 
mainly uses the word only to describe either information from the tip or the crime with which 
the defendant was charged.  See Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 143–44, 146 (defendant “was 
charged with feloniously operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated;” officer received a 
report from dispatch about an intoxicated driver; the tip included the information that the 
driver was intoxicated). 
198. Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 145–46 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 
(2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328–31 (1990); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594 
S.E.2d 595, 599–600 (Va. 2004)). 
199. Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 146. 
200. Id. at 147 (Kinser, J., dissenting). 
201. Id. at 150 (quoting Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 603). 
202. Id. (quoting Jackson, 594 S.E.2d at 603). 
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concerning matters presenting less imminent danger to the public, 
and decisions holding that anonymous tips concerning drunk 
driving may be sufficiently reliable to justify an investigatory stop 
without independent corroboration.  In light of its decision, the 
majority, in my view, should address the Commonwealth’s 
argument.203 
Having read the brief itself, students understand that the dissenting justices 
are being charitable when they state that the Commonwealth’s brief 
discusses relevant drunk driving cases from other jurisdictions at length.  
Indeed, it does not appear that the majority in Harris III ignored a well-
reasoned argument that was made at length in the Commonwealth’s brief.  
Rather, it seems that the majority virtually ignored the argument because the 
brief did not place the argument squarely before the court, let alone articulate 
the argument coherently or persuasively. 
2. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissenting Opinion 
In October 2009, the Supreme Court of the United States denied a 
writ of certiorari that the Commonwealth of Virginia had filed in the Harris 
IV case.204  Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justice Scalia, dissented.205  
The dissenting opinion is the final reading of the exercise. 
The Roberts dissent strongly articulates the public safety theme that 
was so absent in the Commonwealth’s brief.  The first sentence of the dissent 
tells the reader that “[e]very year, close to [thirteen thousand] people die in 
alcohol-related car crashes––roughly one death every [forty] minutes.”206  
The dissent then casts the Harris III decision as one that threatens public 
safety, stating that the Supreme Court of Virginia has created a legal rule that 
will “undermine . . . efforts to get drunk drivers off the road.”207  The dissent 
characterizes the legal rule created as one that “commands that police 
officers following a driver reported to be drunk do nothing until they see the 
driver actually do something unsafe on the road.”208  These strong statements 
dramatically convey the risk posed by the Harris III ruling––that police 
                                                            
203. Harris III, 668 S.E.2d at 150 n.3 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
204. Harris IV, 558 U.S. 978, 978 (2009) (Roberts, J., dissenting), denying 
cert. to 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008). 
205. Id.  Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion earned him a “Green Bag 
Award” for exemplary legal writing from the Green Bag Journal.  Exemplary Legal Writing, 
GREEN BAG ALMANAC & READER, http://www.greenbag.org/green_bag_press/almanacs/
almanacs.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
206. Harris IV, 558 U.S. at 978 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
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officers must watch helplessly from the side of the road while drunk drivers 
careen into oncoming traffic. 
The dissent also organizes the discussion of the case law to best 
effect.  While stating that the federal and state courts are split209 on the issue 
of whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits investigative stops of suspected 
drunk driving based on anonymous tips, the dissent characterizes the cases 
finding in favor of constitutionality as the majority viewpoint.210  Cases in 
which such stops have been held to be unconstitutional, including Harris III, 
are characterized as the minority viewpoint.211  The dissent concludes by 
arguing that, given the clear conflict and the high stakes in terms of the 
potentially devastating effects of drunk driving, the Court should have heard 
the case.212 
By reading Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion, students 
complete the exercise with a well-written example of advocacy.  In addition, 
by reading the Supreme Court of Virginia’s opinion in Harris III together 
with the Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion, students see the real-
world consequences of poor persuasive writing.  They experience the 
frustration expressed by the dissenting justices of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia in Harris III, namely that the majority did not thoughtfully consider 
relevant persuasive authority on this very important issue of the proper 
balance between Fourth Amendment protections and the dangers of drunk 
driving. 
III. BENEFITS OF THE EXERCISE 
This exercise, with its focus on essential elements of persuasive 
writing in the context of real cases, provides several important benefits to 
students.  First, the exercise succeeds in teaching students the most 
challenging elements of persuasive writing.  Second, the exercise teaches 
students that, as in the documents they have read, they must critically 
examine their own work for the presence or absence of these persuasive 
writing techniques.  The exercise thus encourages students to take a more 
robust view of the writing process, particularly the time and attention needed 
to review and revise their work.  Third, the exercise energizes and empowers 
students by giving them confidence that they can competently assess and 
improve their own work.  Finally, students see that these persuasive writing 
                                                            
209. A split among lower federal courts and state courts on a constitutional 
issue is a common reason for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a case.  See, e.g., Florida 
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000). 
210. Harris IV, 558 U.S. at 980. 
211. See id. at 981. 
212. Id. 
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techniques are not esoteric or unimportant concepts, but important tools that 
can affect the development of the law in the real world. 
A. Teaching the Critical Elements of Persuasive Writing 
With its focus on particular elements of theme, organization, and 
good use of case authority, the exercise is a powerful tool to teach students 
essential persuasive writing techniques.  The exercise accomplishes this goal 
on several different levels.  Students first learn to identify the presence or 
absence of persuasive writing techniques through critical reading and 
assessment.  Because students know the substantive law, they are better able 
to identify and analyze the presence or absence of persuasive writing 
techniques when they read the various documents in which the law is 
applied.213  In addition to reading pieces of advocacy, students also step into 
the writer’s role and test their emerging understanding of persuasive writing 
techniques by applying the law to the facts of the Harris III case.  Students 
form judgments about the ordering of precedent or policy arguments and the 
juxtaposition of positive precedent with negative precedent.  They examine 
how best to use relevant cases to make persuasive analogies or distinctions.  
This multi-step approach, where students first read arguments and then create 
their own arguments, deepens the students’ understanding of the particular 
elements of persuasive writing that are the focus of the exercise. 
Students’ ability to understand the need for these key elements of 
persuasive writing is enhanced by the fact that several documents assert 
opposing positions on the same legal issue.  In my view, this method is 
superior to one where students read excerpts of documents addressing a 
variety of legal issues, each of which might illustrate a particular persuasive 
writing technique.  In this exercise, students are better able to focus on the 
persuasive writing techniques because the law does not change materially 
from document to document, only the manner in which the writer uses the 
law.  The ability to see the differences in writing while the law stays the 
same is a highly effective teaching tool. 
Finally, students become more aware of specific elements of 
persuasive writing because they analyze a document that, as to the critical 
persuasive writing elements, disappoints them as readers.  This example of 
deficient advocacy enables the students to understand what qualities must be 
                                                            
213. See Judith B. Tracy, “I See and I Remember; I Do and I Understand” 
Teaching Fundamental Structure in Legal Writing Through the Use of Samples, 21 TOURO L. 
REV. 297, 316 (2005) (noting that students have a different learning experience when students 
are familiar with the law contained in the document they read). 
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present in order for a document to persuade the reader.214  Indeed, students 
become quite animated when we critique the Harris brief in class.  They 
make specific suggestions about how the brief might be improved.  This 
level of class participation plainly demonstrates that students are actively 
engaged in assessing the lack of quality of the poorly written brief.215  The 
depth of their analysis of the Harris brief demonstrates that they have indeed 
engaged in higher order thinking that is characteristic of active learning.216 
B. A Robust View of the Drafting and Revision Processes 
In addition to teaching essential elements of persuasive writing, the 
exercise teaches students to take a robust view of the writing process.  At the 
initial drafting stage, the structure of the exercise also reduces, if not 
eliminates, the concern that the students will use the well-written pieces of 
advocacy as templates or fill-in-the-blank forms.  First, because the examples 
of well-written advocacy are judicial opinions, not briefs, students may be 
less likely to use the documents as templates.  In addition, students may have 
difficulty selecting just one of the many examples of well-written advocacy 
to be the template.  A third reason may be that the exercise involves a careful 
examination of a legal issue that does not relate to the students’ writing 
assignment.217  Students, therefore, are able to focus on assessing the 
materials without the corresponding desire to replicate portions of the 
documents in their own writing assignment. 
By reducing the tendency to use a document as a template, the 
exercise also encourages students to take a more robust view of the writing 
process, particularly the process of revising a working draft.  Students often 
initially view revision or editing as nothing more than a quick, final review 
of a document to eliminate any spelling or punctuation errors.218  Because the 
                                                            
214. See id. at 318 (describing the use of deficient samples of objective 
analyses to demonstrate to students why an analysis may not provide complete information to 
the reader). 
215. Hemingway, supra note 23, at 426–27 (describing how students came 
alive when analyzing poorly written work of actual lawyers). 
216. See id. at 422–23. 
217. Anna Hemingway sets forth several good reasons why students should 
read practitioners’ briefs that involve a legal issue and authorities that students must use in 
their own writing assignment.  Id.  Those reasons include the students’ heightened interest in 
the material and linking the students’ academic assignment to the real world of lawyering.  Id.  
I am concerned, however, that overworked and anxious law students will succumb to the 
tendency to use the documents as templates.  I prefer that my students focus solely on a robust 
assessment of the exercise materials without any eye towards adapting or using those 
materials as part of their own writing assignment. 
218. See Cunningham & Streicher, supra note 9, at 196–97 (stating that 
students tend to edit at the micro level only); Patricia Grande Montana, Better Revision:  
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Harris brief does not contain distracting grammar or punctuation errors, 
students’ suggestions to improve the brief’s persuasive qualities focus 
exclusively on substantive deficiencies.  Students thus learn that they should 
evaluate their own work using the same measures by which they evaluate the 
Harris brief, which refines their understanding of the revising and editing 
process.  As one student noted:  “When reading my own work I sometimes 
don’t fully complete my thoughts or [I] use conclusory statements because I 
can easily understand the logic and reasoning.  However, in reading this 
poorly-constructed [brief], I couldn’t follow all of the logic or arguments 
created so it ‘drove home’ some comments I’ve received from professors on 
exams and memos.”219 
C. Boosting Students’ Confidence 
The exercise also has a benefit for students that I did not expect.  My 
students find the exercise to be a confidence boost.220  One student 
commented that the exercise allowed him to see how much he has learned, in 
that he can identify mistakes and poor structure of the brief.221  Another 
student stated, “reading the Harris brief gave me confidence that I do possess 
some admirable writing techniques and skills.”222  Overall, students find it 
refreshing to be exposed to something other than five-star writing, which 
some see as an unattainable goal.223 
D. A Connection to the Real World 
Finally, because the exercise uses real world materials, students 
quickly learn that these persuasive writing techniques are essential tools for 
the practicing lawyer.  Indeed, the exercise has a great impact on the students 
because the materials are from a real case.  Students are interested to see how 
a poor brief can influence the outcome of a case.224  They invariably ask 
many questions about the case, including whether the decision in Harris was 
                                                                                                                                            
Encouraging Student Writers to See Through the Eyes of the Reader, 14 LEGAL WRITING:  J. 
LEGAL WRITING INST. 291, 293 (2008) (noting that students often view the editing process as 
polishing the document to add topic sentences, change words, or fix grammar or citation 
form). 
219. Student comments were submitted in writing and are on file with the 
author. 
220. See supra Part II.E–F. 
221. See supra Part II.E–F. 
222. See supra Part II.E–F. 
223. McArdle, supra note 20, at 519 (reading practitioner work of uneven 
quality can help a discouraged novice writer). 
224. See supra Part II.E–F. 
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followed by other state courts, whether Mr. Harris committed another drunk 
driving offense, and whether the Supreme Court of the United States has 
taken another similar case or clarified the issue of anonymous tips in cases of 
suspected drunk driving.  Students worry about the dismissal of a case 
involving a habitual drunk driver.  They see the real world implications of 
the Harris decision as potentially affecting the development of the case law 
on this legal issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This real world focus of the exercise demonstrates to students that 
these persuasive writing techniques are not simply professor-created metrics 
to assess and grade their work, but important tools both for the practitioner 
and the development of the law.  Once they perceive that the material being 
taught actually matters in The Real World,225 they are anxious to master the 
techniques. 
I highly recommend this exercise to those legal writing professors 
looking for a way to highlight the essential yet subtle aspects of persuasive 
writing for students.  The materials effectively teach the material, and 
students enjoy the process. 
                                                            
225. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
150
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/1
312 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
APPENDIX A—STATE V. BOYEA QUESTIONNAIRE 
You have read two opinions that advocate opposing positions even 
as they apply the same law to the same facts.  Use this questionnaire to 
record your impressions of the quality of the advocacy in each opinion with 
regard to three critical components of persuasive writing:  development of a 
theme, organization of legal arguments, and use of case authority. 
 
The Majority Opinion 
 
1. Does the majority opinion have an easily identifiable theme?  What 
is it?  Where does the majority first assert its theme? 
 
2. Review the majority opinion and identify at least three instances 
where the majority makes a thematic statement. 
 
3. Are these thematic statements standing alone, or do they appear as 
part of a discussion of case precedent? 
 
4. Look carefully at the order in which the majority opinion discusses 
federal and state court cases addressing the constitutionality of Terry 
stops. 
a. What case does it discuss first?  What cases are 
discussed next? 
 
b. Where does the majority discuss the Supreme Court 
cases? 
 
c. Do you find this ordering of the discussion to be 
persuasive?  Why or why not? 
 
5. Consider the manner in which the majority discusses specific cases.  
For example, what is significant about the majority’s discussion of 
the McChesney case in terms of persuasive writing?  Does the 
holding of the case support the majority’s opinion in favor of 
constitutionality?  How does the majority use the case? 
 
6. Consider how the majority’s use of the J.L. decision.  How does the 
majority distinguish J.L.?  Does it distinguish the case on its facts 
and, if so, how? 
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a. Other than a fact-to-fact comparison, how does the 
majority distinguish J.L.? 
 
7. What is the main policy argument made by the majority?  Where 
does it appear in the opinion?  Is it segregated to a particular 
discussion? 
 
8. If you were writing a brief in support of the constitutionality of a 
stop of a drunk driver based on an anonymous tip, what 3–5 quotes 
from the majority opinion in Boyea would you use in your brief? 
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The Dissenting Opinion 
 
1. Does the dissenting opinion have an easily identifiable theme?  What 
is it?  When does the theme first appear in the dissenting opinion? 
 
2. Review the dissenting opinion and identify at least three instances 
where the dissent makes a thematic statement. 
 
3. Look carefully at the order in which the dissenting opinion discusses 
federal and state court cases.  How does this order of presenting the 
law differ from the majority? 
 
a. Do you find this ordering of the discussion to be 
persuasive?  Why is it persuasive? 
 
4. Consider how the dissenting opinion discusses a single case.  
Specifically, how does the dissenting opinion use J.L. to argue that 
the stop was unconstitutional?  Does it distinguish the case on its 
facts and, if so, how? 
 
a. Does it go beyond a fact-to-fact comparison?  How 
so? 
 
5. Consider how the dissenting opinion deals with the state court cases 
that were discussed in the majority opinion?  How would you 
characterize the dissenting opinion’s treatment of those cases? 
 
a. Do you find this treatment of the state court cases to 
be persuasive in terms of advancing the dissenting 
opinion’s argument?  Why or why not? 
 
6. If you were writing a brief arguing that the stop of a drunk driver 
based on an anonymous tip was unconstitutional, what 3–5 quotes 
from the dissenting opinion in Boyea would you use in your brief? 
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APPENDIX B––BRIEF REVIEW FORM 
Overall Appearance Yes No 
The brief has a neat and professional appearance.   
Comments:   
The Table of Authorities is neat and correctly organized 
(cases, constitutions, statutes, rules or regulations, 
secondary sources). 
  
Comments:   
The Table of Contents contains point headings that use 
persuasive language to “tell the story” and/or highlight 
legal positions.  Point headings are complete sentences. 
  
Comments:   
The brief does not contain distracting use of bold face 
type, underlining or italics.  The font and typeface are 
appropriate. 
  
Comments:   
The brief contains no spelling or editing errors.   
Comments:   
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Introduction Yes No 
The introduction contains a central theme or message to 
support the party’s position. 
  
Comments:   
The client is introduced in a sympathetic and/or positive 
light. 
  
Comments:   
The opposing party is introduced in a less than flattering 
light using appropriate language (no personal attacks). 
  
Comments:   
The introduction previews the legal arguments, but with a 
focus on asserting theme (that the ruling sought is the just 
result). 
  
Comments:   
The introduction clearly states the relief sought.   
Comments:   
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Statement of the Case (Appellate Brief) Yes No 
Provides a complete procedural history by identifying 
relevant filings in the lower court with dates provided 
(showing thoroughness). 
  
Comments:   
Uses procedural history to best advantage by emphasizing 
favorable rulings or casting doubt on unfavorable rulings 
(ex:  “although noting X, the lower court nonetheless 
ruled Y.” Or, “in a well-reasoned opinion, the lower court 
correctly ruled Y”). 
  
Comments:   
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Statement of Facts Yes No 
The Statement of Facts begins by introducing the parties 
and their relationship to one another (relative to the legal 
dispute).  The client is described favorably and opposing 
party is cast in an unflattering/unfavorable light given the 
case and its issues (a legally unfavorable light, not a 
personal attack). 
  
Comments:   
The Statement of Facts uses good tone, diction, context 
and juxtaposition to present facts in the light most 
favorable to the party while still disclosing all relevant 
facts (gives most airtime to the best facts). 
  
Comments:   
The Statement of Facts includes emotional facts necessary 
to bolster the client’s position or characterization of the 
facts. 
  
Comments:   
The Statement of Facts does not discuss irrelevant facts.   
Comments:   
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Statement of Facts (Cont’d) Yes No 
The Statement of Facts does contain legal arguments or 
legal conclusions. 
Comments:   
The Statement of Facts is organized either 
chronologically or topically to present the facts clearly for 
the reader, choosing the organization structure that best 
benefits the client. 
Comments:   
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Summary of Argument Yes No 
Uses the theme or central message to introduce the reader 
to the summary of the legal arguments. 
  
Comments:   
Provides the correct level of detail (just enough, not too 
much) on the legal arguments to allow the reader to 
understand the client’s position. 
  
Comments:   
Uses persuasive writing style at the word and sentence 
level to portray the client’s position as the just result in 
the case. 
  
Comments:   
Focuses on positive arguments only.  Saves discussion of 
negative arguments for the Argument section. 
  
Comments:   
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Argument Section Yes No 
Ordering of Arguments 
 Has a clear structure of arguments that presents the 
arguments in a logical order and to best effect for the 
client. 
 Starts with “positive” arguments. 
 When making policy arguments, uses precedent to 
bolster policy arguments; weaves policy points into 
case discussions. 
 Transitions well to “negative” arguments. 
  
Comments:   
Use of Legal Authority: 
 Uses a synthesized Rule (if appropriate) that is not a 
collection of general, boring principles of law. 
 Fully describes favorable precedent without excessive 
use of case quotations.  Case illustrations of favorable 
precedent give the reader all of the necessary 
information needed to demonstrate the applicability of 
the case to the issue and the impact of its ruling on the 
current case. 
 Fully distinguishes unfavorable precedent.  Gives the 
reader all of the necessary information about the case 
to demonstrate why the precedent is distinguishable or 
otherwise should not be followed in the current case. 
  
Comments:   
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Argument Section (Cont’d) Yes No 
Application to Facts: 
 Contains a complete application of the facts to the 
law by (a) restating the relevant facts; (b) 
characterizing those facts to show their relevance; 
and (c) linking the characterized facts to the Rule by 
using the language of the legal Rule. 
 Makes complete analogies to favorable precedent 
that, if appropriate, go beyond a fact-to-fact 
comparison to include policy arguments from the 
precedent case. 
 Makes relevant factual distinctions vis-a-vis 
unfavorable precedent. 
 “Ties up” policy positions to the facts and desired 
ruling. 
Comments:   
Persuasive Writing Style: 
 Continues to reiterate and reinforce the theme of the 
brief. 
 Uses persuasive writing style at the word and 
sentence level such that the Argument reads as a 
piece of persuasive writing without being “over the 
top” in tone. 
 Is not so dry in tone that it fails to persuade. 
Comments:   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, in the landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia,1 the Supreme 
Court of the United States held, in a 6-3 majority, that the execution of a 
defendant with mental retardation was considered to be a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.2  The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual 
punishment, which led to the Court’s ruling that the execution of a defendant 
with an intellectual disability was unconstitutional.3  In order to make this 
decision, the Court had to determine how to differentiate between a 
defendant with normal intellectual functioning and one with a significant 
intellectual disability.4  The Court utilized a few psychological resources, 
including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM” 
or “Manual”) IV-TR, to determine what criterion was necessary to qualify a 
person as having mental retardation.5  By citing the definition of mental 
retardation from the DSM in their decision, the Court acknowledged that the 
Manual has an important legal use;6 this would later influence many states to 
use it in the creation of their own legislation.7 
In May of 2013, a fifth edition of the DSM was released.8  In this 
new edition, several revisions were made to mental retardation that are 
different from the information provided in the DSM-IV-TR, which was the 
current edition during the Atkins decision.9  The changes made include a 
name change from mental retardation to intellectual disability, as well as a 
change in the criterion used to make a clinical diagnosis.10  The diagnostic 
                                            
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
2. Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing 
Atkins v. Virginia:  How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and 
Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 812 
(2007); Joanna Hall, Comment, Atkins v. Virginia:  National Consensus or Six-Person 
Opinion?, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 361, 362 (2004). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Hall, supra note 2, at 362. 
4. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308–09. 
5. See id. at 308 n.3; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR:  
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxix, 41 (4th ed., text rev. 
2000) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR]. 
6. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. 
7. Benjamin J. Clark, Comment, America’s Evolving Stance on Mental 
Retardation and the Death Penalty, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 121, 137 (2003). 
8. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5:  DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5]; 
Timeline, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/about/pages/timeline.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
9. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra 
note 8, at 33; Intellectual Disability, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/
Documents/Intellectual%20Disability%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
10. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33. 
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criteria in the new edition moves away from the prior focus on the 
Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”) score—an objective standard—to a 
concentration on a measure of the person’s adaptive functioning, which is a 
more subjective measure.11  These changes, which create a greater overall 
subjective standard for a diagnosis of intellectual disability, differ from those 
in place when the Atkins decision was made.12 
With the newly released DSM-5 starting to be used by mental health 
professionals, the definition in operation for intellectual disability will now 
be different from that in place when the Atkins case was decided;13 this 
change will inevitably have an impact in the legal field for criminal cases 
with defendants that have intellectual disabilities.14  This article will first 
discuss the facts of the Atkins case, as well as background information about 
mental retardation and the death penalty, the DSM, and the specific 
diagnostic standards for mental retardation that were current at the time of 
the Atkins decision.15  This section will provide the history and details of the 
Atkins case, as well as an explanation of the final holding of the Court.16  The 
third section will note the relevant revisions made in the DSM-5 with the 
shift from mental retardation to intellectual disability.17  The final section 
will analyze the differences between the DSM-IV-TR and the DSM-5.18  
This discussion will be an attempt to predict the inevitable impact that the 
changes in the new edition of DSM will have on the legal system when 
courts are presented with mentally retarded defendants that face capital 
punishment; the diagnostic criteria used by professionals to assess the patient 
and determine a diagnosis will no longer match up with the law in most 
states.19  Additionally, the final section will hypothesize solutions to the 
problems that may be created by the revisions.20 
                                            
11. Id.; Intellectual Disability, supra note 9. 
12. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308–09; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra 
note 8, at 33. 
13. See infra Part III. 
14. See infra Part IV. 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See infra Part II. 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See infra Part IV. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part IV.A. 
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II. MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
The history of mental retardation and the death penalty is a relatively 
simple and straightforward one.21  Evidence of the relationship between the 
two can be seen dating back as early as the late 1700s when a person that 
was deemed by the court to be an idiot “was not subject to criminal 
liability.”22  By today’s standards, an idiot would be a person with severe or 
profound mental retardation.23  More recently, the Supreme Court of the 
United States heard the case of Godfrey v. Georgia24 in 1980.25  In this case, 
the Court “discussed the necessity of finding that a defendant has [a] higher 
moral culpability than an average criminal in order for the death penalty to 
be imposed.”26  The holding of this case will prove to be particularly 
important for future defendants with mental impairments when capital 
punishment is under consideration; their level of culpability is a factor that 
will be assessed by the courts as a determination of whether this punishment 
is appropriate.27 
Nine years later, the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari and heard the case of Penry v. Lynaugh28 in 1989; this was the first 
time the Court would address the issue of execution of a mentally retarded 
defendant.29  In this case, Johnny Paul Penry was sentenced to death after he 
confessed to the rape and murder of Pamela Carpenter.30  In state court, a 
clinical psychologist testified that Penry had mild to moderate mental 
retardation and an IQ score between fifty and sixty-three.31  Despite this, the 
jury found Penry competent to stand trial.32  The result of the trial was that 
“[t]he jury rejected Penry’s insanity defense and found him guilty of capital 
murder.”33 
                                            
21. See James W. Ellis, Disability Advocacy and the Death Penalty:  The 
Road from Penry to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 173, 173 (2003). 
22. Lyn Entzeroth, Constitutional Prohibition on the Execution of the 
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant, 38 TULSA L. REV. 299, 307 (2002). 
23. Id. at 308. 
24. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
25. Id. at 420. 
26. Änna M. Hagstrom, Atkins v. Virginia:  An Empty Holding Devoid of 
Justice for the Mentally Retarded, 27 LAW & INEQ. 241, 248 (2009). 
27. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 43233; Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 248. 
28. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
29. Ellis, supra note 21, at 174. 
30. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307. 
31. Id. at 307–08. 
32. Id. at 308. 
33. Id. at 310. 
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In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States 
specifically addressed the question of whether “it [is] cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment to execute a mentally retarded 
person.”34  The result of this case was that the Court failed to find an Eighth 
Amendment violation and stated that mental retardation should be viewed 
only as a mitigating factor when considering sentencing.35  The Court also 
stated that “[w]hile a national consensus against [the] execution of the 
mentally retarded may someday emerge . . . there is insufficient evidence of 
such a consensus today.”36  Despite the holding, after the Penry decision, 
eighteen states enacted legislation granting categorical exemption to any 
mentally retarded defendant from the death penalty.37 
A. A Brief History of the Death Penalty 
Prior to Penry, in 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States 
heard the case of Furman v. Georgia38 and held that in its current use, the 
death penalty—also referred to as capital punishment—violated the Eighth 
Amendment.39  In this case, three black men had each been accused of the 
rape or murder of a woman and for this, they faced the death penalty.40  The 
Eighth Amendment “bans the use of cruel and unusual punishment.”41  
Specifically, the Eighth Amendment reads, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”42  In writing this amendment, the Framers of the Constitution were 
aiming to prevent methods of punishment that would be equivalent to 
torture.43  In their decision, the Supreme Court Justices had different 
opinions and reasoning behind their choice of whether or not the death 
penalty was unconstitutional per se, but did agree on the final holding that 
the death penalty in its current form was cruel and unusual punishment.44 
However, in 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States heard the 
case that established the death penalty could be reinstated and was not 
                                            
34. Id. at 313. 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Penry, 492 U.S. at 340. 
36. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340 (emphasis added). 
37. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 812. 
38. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
39. Id. at 239–40; Amanda M. Raines, Note, Prohibiting the Execution of the 
Mentally Retarded, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 171, 177–78 (2002). 
40. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239, 252–53 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
41. Raines, supra note 39, at 177. 
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
43. Raines, supra note 39, at 177. 
44. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40; Raines, supra note 39, at 178. 
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entirely unconstitutional.45  Gregg v. Georgia46 presented a case in which the 
defendant committed armed robbery and murder; he sought to challenge the 
constitutionality of his death sentence.47  The Court held that, as a penalty for 
murder, the death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment.48  “[T]he 
goals of retribution and deterrence of capital crimes may be permissible” as 
factors to be considered when making the determination of “‘whether the 
death penalty should [or should not] be imposed.’”49  Simply put, to satisfy 
the goal of retribution, the Court must determine if the crime committed is 
serious enough to deserve the punishment.50  To make this determination, it 
is important to note, “the punishment of death is sufficiently related to an 
individual’s personal culpability.”51  Essentially, the levels of culpability of 
the offender and severity of the punishment must match.52  The theory of 
deterrence is based upon the idea that punishment would inhibit a criminal 
from engaging in that particular behavior; capital punishment can only be 
considered a deterrent if the murder is premeditated and deliberate.53  The 
reason behind that is the cause and effect relationship between the crime and 
the punishment.54  In making its decision, the Court noted that the 
punishment of death could not be said to be disproportionate to the crime of 
murder, in which another life is intentionally taken.55  Despite this holding, 
opponents to the death penalty still believe that it should be abolished 
completely for all offenders.56 
                                            
45. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); Kelly Christine Elmore, 
Note, Atkins v. Virginia:  Death Penalty for the Mentally Retarded—Cruel and Unusual—the 
Crime, Not the Punishment, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1295 (2004). 
46. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
47. Id. at 158, 162. 
48. Id. at 207; Elmore, supra note 45, at 1295. 
49. Holly T. Sharp, Determining Mental Retardation in Capital Defendants:  
Using a Strict IQ Cut-Off Number Will Allow the Execution of Many That Atkins Intended to 
Spare, 12 JONES L. REV. 227, 229–30 (2008); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. 
50. J. Amy Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion:  How to Achieve the 
Categorical Exemption of Mentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 
961, 970 (2011). 
51. Hall, supra note 2, at 376. 
52. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 247. 
53. Hall, supra note 2, at 377. 
54. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 247. 
55. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). 
56. Sharp, supra note 49, at 232. 
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B. The Atkins Case 
In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in 
the case of Atkins v. Virginia, a criminal case of murder from 1996.57  In this 
case, the defendant, Daryl Renard Atkins, was convicted of abducting Eric 
Nesbitt, robbing him of the money that he had with him, as well as forcing 
him to make a cash withdrawal from an automated teller machine.58  That 
evening, William Jones was also present and participated in the abduction 
and robbery.59  Later on, Atkins and Jones, who had both been armed with 
semiautomatic handguns the entire time, took Nesbitt to a remote location to 
shoot him eight times, which resulted in his death.60 
“Initially, both Jones and Atkins were indicted [under a] capital 
murder” charge for what happened to Nesbitt.61  However, Jones made a deal 
to plead guilty to first-degree murder in return for a full testimony against 
Atkins; this gave him the sentence of life imprisonment and made it no 
longer possible for him to receive the death penalty.62  During Atkins’ trial, 
his and Jones’ stories matched up substantially with the exception as to who 
actually took the shots resulting in Nesbitt’s death.63  As Jones did not have 
any sort of mental deficiency, his testimony was clearer and seemingly more 
credible to the jury than that of Atkins; Jones’ clear testimony provided the 
jury with sufficient evidence of Atkins’ guilt.64 
In the penalty phase of the trial, Dr. Evan Nelson, a forensic 
psychologist, testified for the defense about his pre-trial evaluation of 
Atkins.65  Taking into consideration “interviews with people who knew 
Atkins, a review of school and court records, and the administration of a 
standard intelligence test which indicated that Atkins had a full scale IQ of 
[fifty-nine],” Dr. Nelson stated that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded and 
had been consistently throughout his life.66  Despite this finding provided by 
Dr. Nelson, the jury sentenced Atkins to death.67  After a second sentencing 
hearing due to a misleading verdict form, the jury rendered the same 
verdict.68  With influence from the dramatic shift made in state legislation in 
                                            
57. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 307 n.1. 
62. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307 n.1. 
63. Id. at 307. 
64. See id. 
65. Id. at 308. 
66. Id. at 308–09. 
67. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309. 
68. Id. 
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favor of protecting mentally retarded defendants that had occurred since the 
Penry decision, as well as the severe opinion of the dissenters, the Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari as that someday mentioned in 
the Penry decision had finally arrived, and it was time to review the 
relationship between mentally retarded criminal offenders and the death 
penalty.69 
C. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
While reviewing the facts of the case in order to reach a decision, the 
Court used two similar psychological definitions to clearly understand Dr. 
Nelson’s diagnosis that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded.70  While 
multiple sources for a definition exist, the Court chose to use the DSM-IV-
TR and the similar definition of the American Association of Mental 
Retardation (“AAMR”).71  These definitions may differ in language, but 
offer the same conceptual information as to how to reach a diagnosis.72  
Specifically, the DSM is a diagnostic manual created by the American 
Psychiatric Association that classifies each type of mental disorder and 
provides diagnostic criteria to be used for a diagnosis.73  The DSM is 
particularly important, as it is the manual used by mental health professionals 
to make a diagnosis for a patient.74  Psychologists and psychiatrists—and 
their work—are important in the legal arena, as they serve as expert 
witnesses in cases where the defendant’s mental health is called into 
question.75 
In the United States, the DSM is the primary tool used for mental 
health professionals to make their diagnoses.76  The DSM uses a multiaxial 
system, which assesses an individual on five different axes.77  These axes 
each refer to a different area of information about that person, which helps 
the clinician in creating a comprehensive evaluation of the person.78  This 
system also contributes to a convenient format that allows the universal 
                                            
69. Id. at 307; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated by 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
70. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 & n.3. 
71. Id. at 308 n.3. 
72. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 819. 
73. John A. Zervopoulos, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM):  An Overview, in 2 EXPERT WITNESS MANUAL 1, 3 (1999); AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxiii. 
74. Zervopoulos, supra note 73, at 3. 
75. See id. at 2. 
76. Id. at 3. 
77. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 27. 
78. Id. 
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understanding of the diagnosis.79  In addition to diagnosis, the DSM also 
serves as a tool to develop treatment plans and anticipate treatment 
outcomes.80  DSM is so widely accepted that it is also used by the insurance 
industry to determine appropriate reimbursements for psychological 
treatments.81 
As noted, psychologists and psychiatrists use the DSM in their 
clinical practices to make diagnoses and can serve as expert witnesses in 
death penalty cases involving potentially mentally retarded defendants.82  
The expert must assess the defendant as they would if the defendant 
individually sought their help in a private practice.83  Diagnosis is 
particularly important for a mental health professional serving as an expert in 
a capital case as their diagnosis will be determinative of the defendant’s fate; 
it is a life or death determination.84  While it may not be a perfect forensic 
tool and was not specifically designed for legal use,85 due to its importance 
and overwhelming use in the mental health field, the Court chose to refer to 
the DSM for information about the psychiatric diagnosis of mental 
retardation.86  It has continued to be heavily relied upon for legal 
determinations that involve some sort of mental impairment or dysfunction.87 
DSM-IV-TR, the edition reviewed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Atkins, does include a section in the introduction that 
cautions about forensic usage of the Manual.88  It states “dangers arise 
because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the 
law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis.”89  It could be 
argued that this warning is suggesting that mental health professionals should 
limit their conduct to their own field of expertise as the DSM is intended for 
                                            
79. Id. 
80. Zervopoulos, supra note 73, at 4. 
81. Id. 
82. John Matthew Fabian et al., Life, Death, and IQ:  It’s Much More than 
Just a Score:  Understanding and Utilizing Forensic Psychological and Neuropsychological 
Evaluations in Atkins Intellectual Disability/Mental Retardation Cases, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
399, 403 (2011). 
83. See id. 
84. Id. 
85. See Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 265. 
86. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002). 
87. Douglas A. Hass, Could the American Psychiatric Association Cause You 
Headaches?  The Dangerous Interaction Between the DSM-5 and Employment Law, 44 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 683, 692 (2013). 
88. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra 
note 5, at xxxii–xxxiii. 
89. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxiii. 
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use of diagnosis in the mental health field and not for legal determinations.90  
The addition of legal information into the DSM would prove to be more 
problematic than helpful, which is why forensic additions have not been 
included in new editions of the Manual.91  However, it is noted in the DSM 
that with proper awareness of the risks and limitations, the DSM should 
properly assist legal decision-makers in reaching their final conclusion.92 
Despite the brief textual warning in the introduction that the DSM 
should not be used for forensic purposes, as information may be 
misrepresented, it is frequently used when law and psychology or psychiatry 
intersect.93  “Courts, legislators, and government[al] agencies have relied on 
the DSM[] as a persuasive” tool when making decisions in cases that involve 
mental illness.94  For example, some state and federal statutes make use of 
DSM definitions of mental illness or diagnostic criteria.95  Some states make 
specific mention of the DSM while others just use the language found in it.96  
The DSM is cited over 5500 times in court opinions, including other death 
penalty cases.97  Courts have also referred to the DSM with the use of highly 
respectful terms in several decisions.98  It is clear that the DSM has played an 
important role in the legal world—through the development of legislation 
and decisions made in the courtroom—and it will continue to do so.99 
1. Mental Retardation 
As stated, the edition of the DSM that was current and in use during 
Atkins was the DSM-IV-TR, which is a textual revision of the fourth 
edition.100  According to the DSM-IV-TR, mental retardation “is 
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning—an IQ of 
approximately [seventy] or below—with onset before age [eighteen] years 
                                            
90. Id.; Daniel W. Shuman, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders in the Courts, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 25, 26 (1989). 
91. See Shuman, supra note 90, at 26–27; Ralph Slovenko, Editorial, The 
DSM in Litigation and Legislation, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 6, 6 (2011). 
92. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxiii. 
93. Slovenko, supra note 91, at 6. 
94. Hass, supra note 87, at 692. 
95. Cia Bearden, Comment, The Reality of the DSM in the Legal Arena:  A 
Proposition for Curtailing Undesired Consequences of an Imperfect Tool, 13 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79, 80 (2012). 
96. Id. at 97–98. 
97. Slovenko, supra note 91, at 6, 8. 
98. Hass, supra note 87, at 692. 
99. See Slovenko, supra note 91, at 11. 
100. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002); AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxix. 
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and concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning.”101  At the 
time of publication, the prevalence rate of mental retardation was estimated 
to be one percent of the population.102  The estimated number of incarcerated 
offenders is two percent to twenty-five percent.103  Between four percent and 
twenty percent of the offenders currently on death row are estimated to be 
mentally retarded; of the three thousand five hundred, this comes out to 
about one hundred forty to seven hundred people.104  This is a significant 
number of people, which stresses why diagnosis is so important and will 
impact the implementation of the Atkins holding; it could result in pardons 
from the death penalty.105 
The DSM-IV-TR defines the diagnostic features of mental 
retardation as including three necessary criterions.106 
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is 
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in 
at least two of the following skill areas:  [C]ommunication, self-
care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community 
resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, 
health, and safety (Criterion B).  The onset must occur before age 
[eighteen] years (Criterion C).107 
Each of the three diagnostic criterions is equally as important; all are 
necessary for a person to receive a diagnosis of mental retardation and one 
cannot be omitted.108  For example, even if an individual has an IQ score 
lower than seventy, a diagnosis cannot be made if there is no impairment in 
adaptive functioning.109  Per Criterion B, adaptive functioning is defined as 
“how effectively individuals cope with common life demands and how well 
they meet the standards of personal independence expected of someone in 
their particular age group, sociocultural background, and community 
setting.”110  This serves as a protection to ensure that the person is not just a 
                                            
101. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 39. 
102. Id. at 46. 
103. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath:  Identifying Mentally Retarded 
Offenders and Excluding Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 86 (2003–2004). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 85–86. 
106. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41. 
107. Id. 
108. See id. at 41–42, 47. 
109. Id. at 42. 
110. Id. 
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bad test-taker.111  Adaptive functioning includes “self-direction, functioning 
academic skills, work, leisure, health, safety, personal hygiene, self-control, 
and aspects of unmanageable behavior” which are each taken into account 
when a determination for adaptive functioning is made.112  Any third-party 
contacts need to be carefully and thoroughly questioned about the individual 
in order for an accurate evaluation of adaptive functioning to be made.113  
Assessments do exist, but this type of determination is not one that is easily 
assessed by a standardized test.114 
The third and final prong, that is equally as important for diagnosis, 
is that mental retardation exists and will present itself in childhood.115  
Criterion C sets the specification that the person must show signs of 
cognitive impairment before the age of eighteen.116  What this means is that a 
person with seemingly normal cognitive function cannot unexpectedly 
become mentally retarded as an adult.117  This criterion is also in place to 
help clinicians with differential diagnosis; this allows them to distinguish 
between mental retardation and other intellectual deficits that can be 
acquired later in life due to a dramatic change such as brain trauma or 
disease.118  Additionally, while a mentally retarded person can be taught 
certain skills that can help them function in society in a more normal way, 
they can never be fully cured with therapy; this is a chronic condition.119  
When Criterion C is evaluated along with the first two criterions, if a 
diagnosis of mental retardation is made, it can be sure that it is one that 
would reflect the person as a whole including their psychosocial and 
cognitive functioning.120 
A diagnosis of mental retardation is further divided into four varying 
degrees of severity:  Mild, moderate, severe, and profound.121  The degree of 
severity that is most questioned in a legal setting, particularly in Atkins cases, 
is the lowest level—mild mental retardation—which is defined as having an 
                                            
111. JAMES R. EISENBERG, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND DEATH PENALTY 
LITIGATION 113 (2004). 
112. Id. at 113–14. 
113. Id. at 113. 
114. See id.; Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 846–47. 
115. Raines, supra note 39, at 176. 
116. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41. 
117. Raines, supra note 39, at 176. 
118. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 854. 
119. Raines, supra note 39, at 176. 
120. EISENBERG, supra note 111, at 114; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-
TR, supra note 5, at 41. 
121. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 39. 
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“IQ level [fifty to fifty-five] to approximately [seventy].”122  Why is that?  It 
is because this group is the closest or borderline to the level of normal 
cognitive functioning.123  This group, mild mental retardation, is the largest 
group consisting of approximately eighty-five percent of those who have 
mental retardation.124  They are described as having the “social and 
vocational skills adequate for minimum self-support.”125  Those with this low 
degree of severity should live successfully in a community setting either on 
their own or under supervision.126 
2. Intelligence Quotient 
For Criterion A of a mental retardation diagnosis, general intellectual 
functioning is measured and classified by an IQ score.127  In order to assess 
subaverage intellectual functioning, it is necessary to implement an 
intelligence test.128  Several IQ tests exist and are used in psychometric 
testing, so a single individual may have multiple true IQ scores based upon 
their performance on each test they have taken.129  The standard and most 
frequently used tests are the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test, 3rd edition 
(“WAIS-III”) and the Standford-Binet.130  These assessments are designed to 
measure a person’s general intelligence score by assessing a broad range of 
skills that produce a final numerical score that correlates to his or her level of 
mental functioning.131 
This score, as it is assessed through the psychometric measures, is an 
objective measure of a person’s cognitive performance.132  The person’s raw 
                                            
122. Id. at 42; see Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 825; Frank M. 
Gresham, Interpretation of Intelligence Test Scores in Atkins Cases:  Conceptual and 
Psychometric Issues, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 91, 92 (2009). 
123. See Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 88. 
124. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 43. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 41. 
128. David L. Rumley, Comment, A License to Kill:  The Categorical 
Exemption of the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1299, 1315–
17 (1993); Sharp, supra note 49, at 231. 
129. Gresham, supra note 122, at 93. 
130. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 826; Alexis Krulish Dowling, 
Comment, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court’s Ban on Executing the 
Mentally Retarded, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 773, 798 (2003); Penny J. White, Symposium, 
Treated Differently in Life But Not in Death:  The Execution of the Intellectually Disabled 
After Atkins v. Virginia, 76 TENN. L. REV. 685, 692 (2009). 
131. Dowling, supra note 130, at 798; see also White, supra note 130, at 692–
93. 
132. See Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 95. 
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score is compared to a norm that is predetermined to reach his or her result 
IQ score.133  It is important for the courts to be vigilant as to which test was 
administered to the defendant and how that particular test is to be interpreted, 
as norms for each assessment differ.134  The result—the IQ score—and the 
person’s performance on these tests are interpreted to determine if a 
defendant has a mental deficiency and, if so, what degree of mental 
retardation.135  In general, an IQ score of seventy or below must be obtained 
in order to receive a diagnosis of mental retardation; the score serves as an 
essential component in the defendant’s diagnosis.136  This score of seventy is 
“two standard deviations below the mean” score of one hundred.137  
However, it should be noted that in IQ assessment, “there is a measurement 
error of approximately [five] points” depending on the testing instrument 
used; due to this, mental retardation can also be found in individuals with IQ 
scores from seventy to seventy-five that show the appropriate level of 
adaptive behavior.138 
a. Potential Issues with IQ Scores 
The IQ test, while it appears to be a convenient and relatively simple 
tool, is deceiving, as it has been found to have flaws.139  In fact, it is often 
referred to as an imperfect tool.140  There can be a discrepancy between what 
the court believes an intelligence test measures and what it actually does 
measure; the court and legal professionals are not trained in the 
comprehension of psychometric measures.141  While these potential issues 
are important to consider, reliance on the IQ score remains high, as it 
remains heavily used and relied upon.142 
One believed flaw of IQ tests is the Flynn Effect—the general 
upward trend of IQ scores—which causes a need for the test norms to be 
updated and recalculated so that the score can continue to provide an 
accurate reflection of the actual IQ.143  James Flynn states that the mean IQ 
                                            
133. Dowling, supra note 130, at 798–99; Fabian et al., supra note 82, at 414; 
see also Gresham, supra note 122, at 93. 
134. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 825. 
135. See Gresham, supra note 122, at 92. 
136. Clark, supra note 7, at 137; Rumley, supra note 128, at 1317. 
137. Sharp, supra note 49 at 231. 
138. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41–42. 
139. Rumley, supra note 128, at 1329. 
140. Id. at 1333–34. 
141. See Gresham, supra note 122, at 96. 
142. Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 95. 
143. Gresham, supra note 122, at 93. 
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of Americans increases three points per decade and 0.3 points per year.144  
Flynn also believes that intelligence of a single individual does not change, 
but the norm changes over time; it could be said that the Flynn Effect has no 
impact on death penalty cases as it only concerns norms.145  However, the 
problem arises when the IQ assessment used produces scores that rely 
entirely on comparison to the norms for their meaning.146  It has also been 
found that individuals may score differently on an intelligence test depending 
on which point in the norming cycle the person took the assessment.147  For 
example, a person’s performance may result in a score in the mentally 
retarded range in the beginning of the cycle of a certain assessment and in a 
more borderline range at the end of the cycle of that same assessment.148 
The other important discrepancy with IQ assessment scores is 
practice effects, which is the theory that those with cognitive dysfunction are 
often administered multiple tests throughout their lifetime and that causes 
inflated IQ scores.149  Due to this, it is known that practice effects occur, and 
scores can increase due to the repeated administration of the measures; a 
useful rule of thumb is to only use each assessment once a year with an 
individual to reduce this effect.150  It is important to note that the smaller the 
time interval between administrations of the test, the larger the practice effect 
can be.151  The specific outcome of practice effects can also vary; factors that 
can alter the performance include “the person’s age, their learning ability and 
the time interval between testing.”152  This effect becomes problematic when 
a person shows an overall increase in their IQ score, but continues to display 
the same deficits in their adaptive functioning.153 
Additionally, race and socioeconomic background have also been 
found to alter an individual’s IQ score.154  Another possible influence on IQ 
score is that a defendant may be able to fake their mental retardation by 
purposely doing poorly on an IQ test; the faking of a mental illness is known 
as malingering.155  However, even if attempted, the faking of a low IQ score 
is difficult to do, and the IQ score is not the only consideration in a 
                                            
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 94. 
146. Id. 
147. EISENBERG, supra note 111, at 113. 
148. Id. 
149. Gresham, supra note 122, at 94–95. 
150. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 839; Gresham, supra note 122, at 
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151. Gresham, supra note 122, at 95. 
152. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 839. 
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diagnosis.156  Despite the possibility that there may be some flaws in the IQ 
testing system, the IQ score has remained an important factor in determining 
the intellectual functioning of a person under the diagnostic criteria DSM-IV 
as it is a more objective measure used by the mental health professional to 
assess a person’s overall cognitive functioning; it has been continually used 
in courts as well.157  Between adaptive functioning and IQ level, the 
cognitive IQ tends to be the more stable of the two.158  However, some 
believe the IQ score should not be the sole measure used to determine mental 
retardation, and thus may not be suited for a legal use.159 
3. Adaptive Functioning 
Criterion B describes a more subjective way of assessing the 
intellectual functioning of an individual by means of their adaptive 
functioning.160  This element, also referred to as adaptive behavior, includes 
the mental health professional’s assessment of how much service or support 
that a mentally retarded person needs.161  These limitations would affect the 
individual’s daily life as well as any stressors in his or her daily life or 
immediate environment.162  This measure is looking to “assess deficits in the 
performance of adaptive behavioral skills, even more than in the acquisition 
of such skills.”163  The reason that this measure is so subjective is that mental 
health professionals must rely upon interviews and other information 
collected from third parties to make their assessment.164  Other records, such 
as those from school, medical professionals, employment, etc., are also 
consulted, but those are also the result of a third party’s opinion or 
interpretation.165  In addition, over two hundred instruments are available to 
be used as a standardized assessment of adaptive behavior, but these 
assessments face the same level of scrutiny as IQ assessments; the large 
number of available tests shows the level of uncertainty as to what exactly is 
to be tested to make the determination.166  Overall, this assessment is 
                                            
156. Id. at 246–47. 
157. See Gresham, supra note 122, at 93. 
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particularly important for individuals with mild mental retardation, as it may 
be the determining factor in diagnosis when the IQ score is close to 
borderline range.167 
D. The Atkins Decision 
The Court, by making use of a clinical definition of mental 
retardation, “put professional standards of measurement, assessment, and 
diagnosis in the center of Atkins adjudications.”168  The decision in Atkins 
creates law that is highly dependent on psychological determinations.169  
With the use of the clinical definition of mental retardation and psychometric 
measure of IQ score, the Court concluded that the death penalty is not an 
appropriate punishment for a criminal defendant that is mentally retarded.170  
The Court reasoned that the mentally retarded defendant was “categorically 
less culpable than the average criminal.”171  The public consensus from the 
consistency in direction of change shown by the states was also a 
contributing factor to the decision.172  The Court noted that it was “not so 
much the number of these states that is significant, but the consistency of the 
direction of change.”173  While looking at this, the Court found that mentally 
retarded defendants should be punished in some way, but the death sentence 
is not appropriate due to their lower level of personal culpability.174 
The Court also held that execution of a mentally retarded person 
failed to meet either of the two goals of capital punishment, retribution or 
deterrence.175  These societal functions that the death penalty is supposed to 
accomplish are not obtained with mentally retarded defendants.176  The goal 
of retribution cannot be met with those that have mental impairments as they 
are held to have a lower level of culpability.177  Therefore, in order “to ensure 
that only the most deserving of execution are put to death, an exclusion for 
the mentally retarded is appropriate.”178  Deterrence is not met either due to 
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the fact that the Court has held that a defendant with mental impairment 
cannot make the appropriate connection between his or her impulsive 
conduct—i.e. murder of another person—with the future punishment of 
death due to the imposition of the death penalty.179  The inability to further 
these two goals of the death penalty contributed to the Court’s decision to 
provide a categorical exemption.180 
A final consideration made by the Court was that mentally retarded 
defendants face a higher possibility of wrongful execution.181  By nature of 
their condition, mentally retarded defendants are at a disadvantage when it 
comes to their defense.182  Mentally retarded defendants serve as poor 
witnesses, do not serve as much help to their defense counsel, can get 
confused easily, can appear to feel no remorse, and suffer other seemingly 
negative results of their diminished capacity.183  In addition, mentally 
retarded defendants have a much larger risk of making a false confession 
than defendants with standard intellectual functioning.184  All of these factors 
were considered and contributed to the Court’s decision that mentally 
retarded defendants should belong to a categorical exemption and should not 
face the death penalty.185 
This decision is a unique one, as it expresses a constitutional rule 
that is entirely dependent on a definition and diagnostic criteria from clinical 
psychology.186  In this case, the Court established “a per se rule exempting 
all persons with mental retardation from the death penalty based on diagnosis 
alone.”187  The exemption includes all people with the diagnosis regardless of 
what level of severity they are found to have.188  This makes the important 
question to be answered in these types of cases to be whether or not the 
defendant is mentally retarded; this is something that the Court disagreed on 
how to determine and left this decision to the states.189  The class that will 
prove to be the most difficult to protect and have the most controversy is the 
mildly mentally retarded as they come closest to the normal border range.190  
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However, even with this decision, which essentially overrules Penry, the 
death penalty remains an appropriate punishment “for a smaller, more 
culpable class of defendants.”191 
Justice Scalia makes an additional point about the purpose of the 
death penalty in his dissent.192  An additional purpose of the death penalty is 
to eliminate dangerous offenders; by doing this, the future crimes that they 
may commit are effectively prevented.193  It is quite clear that this goal is 
reached by the death penalty, as these offenders would no longer commit any 
crimes.194  This, however, is a purpose that would be properly served 
regardless of how high or low the offender’s IQ score is.195 
1. Determinations Left to the States 
In making its decision, the Court neglected to implement a procedure 
or designate a specific definition to be applied to determine if a defendant is 
mentally retarded.196  By doing this, the Court left state lawmakers and 
officials, and in a way, forensic psychologists or psychiatrists, the task of 
determining how exactly to enact and properly implement their decision.197  
The Court established some guidance by providing two similar definitions in 
the cases that implement the same three main criteria for a diagnosis.198  It 
could also be argued that the Court intended for the states to adopt one, or a 
hybrid form of the two definitions cited in the decision, due to their 
similarities.199  Its main determination was to justify the exemption of 
mentally retarded defendants from the death penalty; the exact way to 
enforce the exemption was not determined.200  Instead, the Court left this task 
up to the states, as it had done in Ford v. Wainwright201 for the determination 
of competency, and it became the task of the states to develop the 
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appropriate means of enforcement.202  Many states have chosen to use the 
DSM-IV-TR as their guidelines for making the determination of whether or 
not a defendant is mentally retarded.203  If a state were to fail to exclude the 
mentally retarded from facing the death penalty, that state would be in direct 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.204  Despite this, after the decision was 
made, state courts that did not agree with the decision could potentially use 
this freedom from the Court and lack of a uniform standard as a way to evade 
the Atkins decision.205 
The possibility of other complications arose for all states that 
complied; for example, the differences and discrepancies between the states 
allow for the possibility that one individual “could be found [to be] mentally 
retarded in one state, but not . . . another.”206 It depends on the exact 
language that was chosen by the state to be enacted in its legislation to 
determine what constitutes mental retardation.207  Even without giving a 
direct definition for mental retardation, some argue that the Court should 
have advised that the states not place as much weight on IQ test scores as 
they do.208  However, many states seem to agree that the IQ score cutoff is a 
particularly important factor to include in their legislation.209  There are 
significant differences amongst the states; some are strict on the IQ score 
requirement, while others are more vague by only demanding subaverage 
intellectual functioning.210 
In addition to a definition, the Court also left it up to the states to 
determine the specifics of the procedure, including determining who would 
be the fact finder, at which stage the mental functioning of the defendant 
should be assessed, and what the suitable burden of proof would be.211  For 
example, a majority of states with judicial procedures in place have chosen to 
make this determination prior to the start of trial.212  Some states give the 
task of determining mental retardation to a jury, while others give it to a trial 
judge.213  By neglecting to designate a specific definition and procedure to 
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follow, the Court allows for considerable differences to exist from state to 
state.214  These inconsistencies and differences in procedure and definition 
could cause contradictory rulings on whether or not a defendant has mental 
retardation.215 
2. Other Issues in Applying the Decision 
Several other points of ambiguity and perplexity came to light with 
the Atkins decision, such as the fact that the Court created a categorical 
exemption in the Atkins case.216  The use of this general categorization of 
exemption for those with mental retardation eliminates the entire idea of 
individual sentencing in our legal system as far as this specific group of 
individuals is concerned; it separates those with mental retardation from 
everyone else.217  Beyond the separation between those with normal 
cognitive functioning and those with impairments, the categorization treats 
all those with mental retardation the same without any sort of distinction 
made for the varying degrees of mental retardation.218  This creates a level of 
equality amongst those with the disorder while diagnosis makes a 
differentiation.219 
In neglecting to provide a uniform standard for mental retardation, 
there is also an issue with IQ assessment.220  Multiple assessment tools exist 
to make an assessment, but each has their own set of norms.221  The lack of 
uniform testing requirements may be highly problematic.222  Without a set 
rule as to which test to use, psychologists must be ethical in their 
determination of which test to administer; they must administer a current 
edition of an assessment that they have the appropriate level of proficiency to 
administer.223  The presence of a uniform rule as to which test to use would 
eliminate some of the possible errors and ethical violations that can 
potentially occur.224  The uniform rule would have to be updated frequently 
as these tests are often revised and the courts would have to use a current 
test.225  However, on the other side, the benefits of uniformity could be 
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outweighed by other disadvantages such as individualized selection for the 
defendant and that the clinician should administer the test they feel most 
competent using.226 
Another important point is potential ethical dilemmas that will be 
faced by the mental health professionals who will be assessing the specific 
defendant.227  One of the main issues that will be faced by any forensic 
psychologist is that they have the potential to do harm to their client; 
psychologists, under their ethics code, are not to do any harm to their 
clients.228  Additionally, these psychologists must be sure to go into their 
assessment of the defendant without any sort of preconceived thoughts about 
the crime on trial or what the outcome should be.229  Psychologists have to be 
mindful of any possible factor that may cause an unfair or incorrect result on 
the IQ assessment and properly account for these potential issues in their 
determination and assessment.230  The psychologists in these cases are faced 
with several potential ethical issues that they must avoid while trying to 
generate the most honest and truthful assessment that they can.231 
3. Cases Since Atkins 
In the time since the Atkins decision, many courts have encountered 
cases with mentally retarded defendants.232  However, the floodgates did not 
open for this type of litigation as was feared in the dissent by Justice Scalia; 
there has not been a complete overflow of claims by criminal offenders 
claiming to have mental retardation.233  Research shows that of the claims 
made that have lost, most failed to prove either subaverage intellectual 
functioning or significant limitations in adaptive functioning.234  Data also 
shows that the Atkins decision has not been applied to the states in a uniform 
way as could be expected from the differing legislation created by each 
state.235 
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http://archive.is/ToBPv. 
183
: Nova Law Review 38, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
2014] EFFECT OF THE DSM-5 ON POST-ATKINS 345 
In regard to intellectual functioning, or analysis of the IQ score, prior 
clinical research suggests that this should be only “a gateway to a rigorous 
assessment of adaptive functioning.”236  This is because it is believed that the 
employment of a strict cut-off of a score of seventy may wrongly exclude 
those who deserve protection under Atkins.237  In an analysis of multiple 
jurisdictions with various IQ cutoff points, it was found that over sixty 
percent of those who successfully prove intellectual impairment had no 
reported IQ scores over the score of seventy; it is also noted that fifteen 
percent of defendants that have been successful with their Atkins claim have 
had IQ scores that exceed seventy.238  A small number of successful Atkins 
claims involve defendants that have never scored below a seventy on any 
intellectual assessment.239  However, there have also been cases with less 
success that focus on IQ score; one example is a case in Texas, where a 
defendant met the requirement of having an IQ below seventy, but was not 
exempted from capital punishment.240 
There have been almost one hundred cases since the ruling in Atkins 
in which defendants with death penalty sentences have been reduced when 
the courts found that they met the necessary requirements to prove they were 
mentally retarded.241  This is an impressive statistic considering that between 
1976 and 2002, prior to Atkins, there were at least forty-one defendants 
executed who would have been found to be mentally retarded and could have 
been exempted.242  However, it seems less impressive when it is stated that 
only a quarter of the inmates that have claimed to be mentally retarded have 
received a stay of execution since the Atkins holding.243  Data shows that 
there have been varying levels of success for proving adaptive deficits; 
depending on which skill set was chosen as the definition for mental 
retardation, which includes several.244  There have also been very few cases 
that lose solely on the third prong, which requires onset before the age of 
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eighteen.245  Together, these results show the inconsistency of the 
implementation of Atkins.246 
III. THE DSM-5 
The latest edition of the Manual was released in late May of 2013.247  
This edition has been a work in progress for fourteen years as its 
development began immediately following the release of DSM-IV.248  DSM-
5 was developed in hope of addressing concerns that had existed with the 
prior editions.249  It was also created in order to match up more closely with 
the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and their International 
Classification of Diseases (“ICD”) as well as other important leading health 
organizations; this will provide for more uniform diagnoses in the health 
system.250  The newest edition of the Manual features several differences 
compared to prior editions, such as a different organizational layout and a 
removal of the prior multi-axial system.251  In this edition, all mental 
disorders are considered to be on a single axis and are therefore, given equal 
weight; prior editions had five axes of unequal weight.252  It is also the first 
edition not to make use of traditional Roman Numerals because this edition 
is intended to be a living document.253  The believed explanation for this 
change to Arabic Numeration is that when new evidence surfaces or changes 
occur, the Manual can be changed online which will produce constant 
revisions, which will produce more editions labeled with a decimal.254  That 
is the hypothesis as to why the decision was made to use the regular 
numerical display for this edition.255  Each change and revision was made 
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carefully to improve the Manual and provide more effective treatment and 
services.256 
A. Intellectual Disability (Intellectual Developmental Disorder) 
The American Psychiatric Association states that “[t]he significant 
changes [to intellectual disability] address what the disorder is called, its 
impact on a person’s functioning, and criteria improvements to encourage 
more comprehensive patient assessment.”257  In DSM-5, the first and most 
noticeable difference to mental retardation is the name change; mental 
retardation is now referred to as intellectual disability (intellectual 
developmental disorder).258  “[T]he parenthetical name . . . is included in the 
text to reflect deficits in cognitive capacity beginning in the developmental 
period.”259  This change occurred for reasons including “policy, 
administrative, and legislative purposes.”260  The new terms were carefully 
selected to be widely used and understood261 as of when this name was 
determined.262  The phrase intellectual disability is one that is commonly 
used in the medical, educational, and other professional fields.263  This name 
change will allow for a more universal understanding of what exactly the 
disability is.264 
In addition to the name change, the fifth edition emphasizes adaptive 
functioning of the individual as opposed to the more heavy reliance on the IQ 
score that is seen in DSM-IV-TR.265 
DSM-5 emphasizes the need to use both clinical assessment and 
standardized testing of intelligence when diagnosing intellectual 
disability, with the severity of impairment based on adaptive 
functioning rather than IQ test scores alone.  By removing IQ test 
scores from the diagnostic criteria, but still including them in the 
text description of intellectual disability, DSM-5 ensures that they 
are not overemphasized as the defining factor of a person’s overall 
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ability, without adequately considering functioning levels.  This is 
especially important in forensic cases.266 
Furthermore, the specification that the disability must be present 
prior to the age of eighteen is removed and replaced with a more generalized 
categorization of beginning in the developmental stage.267  This edition does 
have some consistency with the prior edition as it states that the prevalence 
rate of intellectual disability remains at one percent of the population268 and 
still makes use of the four specifications for the degrees of intellectual 
disability:  Mild, moderate, severe, and profound.269  However, these degrees 
of severity are now “defined on the basis of adaptive function[], and not IQ 
scores” as it is the level of adaptive functioning that determines the level of 
support that will be required for each level of severity.270 
1. Diagnostic Features 
DSM-5 defines intellectual disability as “a disorder with onset 
during the developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive 
functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains.”271  In order 
to receive this diagnosis, there are three criteria that must be met by the 
individual, which was also true in the prior edition.272  In this edition, the 
diagnostic features of intellectual disability are: 
The essential features of intellectual disability 
(intellectual developmental disorder) are deficits in general mental 
abilities (Criterion A) and impairment in everyday adaptive 
functioning, in comparison to an individual’s age-, gender-, and 
socioculturally matched peers (Criterion B).  Onset is during the 
developmental period (Criterion C).  The diagnosis of intellectual 
disability is based on both clinical assessment and standardized 
testing of intellectual and adaptive functions.273 
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In regard to Criterion A, this refers to intellectual functioning.274  To 
meet this, there must be “[d]eficits in intellectual functions . . . confirmed 
both by clinical assessment and individualized, standardized intelligence 
testing.”275  This includes things such as abstract thinking, practical 
understanding, planning, and problem solving.276  IQ scores are used to 
determine part of this and are only approximations of the individual’s 
intellectual functioning.277  Clinical judgment should always be used when 
interpreting the results of an IQ assessment to determine the level of 
intellectual function.278 
Criterion B assesses “[d]eficits in adaptive functioning that result in 
[the] failure to meet developmental and sociocultural standards for personal 
independence and social responsibility.”279  Adaptive functioning is assessed 
in two ways; it is done with both clinical evaluations as well as with the use 
of individualized psychometric measures.280  “Without ongoing support, the 
adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more activities of daily life . . . 
.”281  There are three domains that are assessed by this criterion:  Conceptual, 
social, and practical.282 
The conceptual—academic—domain involves competence in 
memory, language, reading, writing, math reasoning, acquisition 
of practical knowledge, problem solving, and judgment in novel 
situations, among others.  The social domain involves awareness 
of others’ thoughts, feelings, and experiences; empathy; 
interpersonal communication skills; friendship abilities; and social 
judgment, among others.  The practical domain involves learning 
and self-management across life settings, including personal care, 
job responsibilities, money management, recreation, self-
management of behavior, and school and work task organization, 
among others.283 
This criterion is met when at least one of the domains of adaptive functioning 
is sufficiently impaired.284  Sufficient impairment is when the person needs 
continual support in order to perform that function adequately in at least one 
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life setting.285  Additionally, these adaptive functioning deficits must be 
directly related to the intellectual deficit assessed for Criterion A.286 
The final necessity, Criterion C, is that “[o]nset of intellectual and 
adaptive deficits [is] during the developmental period.”287  Specifically, the 
phrase developmental period refers to either childhood or adolescence; there 
is no specific numerical age assigned to this period of time.288  The removal 
of the cut-off age of eighteen is a significant change as this new term allows 
for more subjective discretion.289  The DSM-5 states that the time of onset 
may vary from person to person as it is dependent upon the specific and 
individualized level of brain dysfunction.290  In order to make a proper 
diagnosis, Criterion C, as well as both Criterion A and B, must be met by the 
individual either within their specific history or past presentations or their 
current presentation; in other words, all three must be met in order for an 
individual to receive this diagnosis.291  The intended purpose of all of these 
revisions was to “help clinicians develop a fuller, more accurate picture of 
patients, a critical step in providing them with” treatment personally tailored 
to each specific individual which will make it as effective as possible.292 
B. Cautionary Statement for Forensic Use 
In its first few pages, the DSM-5 offers a cautionary statement 
towards its use in forensic settings;293 this warning receives much more 
emphasis compared to prior editions as it receives its own full page and 
separate heading.294  It warns that it has been designed to assist mental health 
clinicians in their work such as with assessments, diagnosis of patients, and 
treatment plans.295  The warning stresses that the definition in this edition 
was not developed to meet the needs of legal professionals.296  However, the 
statement also states that if used appropriately, the DSM-5 can serve as a 
useful tool to assist those in the legal profession to make necessary decisions 
by providing the necessary information for a legal decision maker to 
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understand the specific characteristics of a certain mental disorder.297  An 
important point, particularly when assessing mental retardation, is that the 
DSM-5 provides “diagnostic information about the longitudinal course 
[which] may improve decision making when the legal issue concerns [the] 
individual’s mental functioning at a past or future point in time.”298 
However, as with prior editions, this edition does stress that the 
information within its pages poses a risk for misuse or misunderstanding.299  
It is noted that there is an imperfect fit between the DSM-5 information for a 
clinical diagnosis and “the questions of ultimate concern to the law.”300  It 
also stresses the importance of only trained, mental health professionals 
using the Manual for the diagnosis of mental disorders.301  Finally, the 
warning concludes that while the DSM-5 could be a helpful tool in the legal 
field when used appropriately, it is important to note that the meeting of all 
criteria for a certain disorder does not demonstrate the person’s behavior in 
the particular moment in question.302 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CHANGES 
As the DSM-5 has just been released, the direct result of the changes 
remains to be seen, but it is inevitable that there will be ramifications 
regarding the nation’s categorical ban of defendants with intellectual 
disability from the death penalty.303  The now outdated DSM-IV-TR was 
used as a guideline for many states when they created their legislation 
regarding capital punishment for offenders with intellectual disability.304  As 
mental retardation was revised to intellectual disability and the diagnostic 
criteria has been revised, discrepancies and issues are likely to surface over 
time in regard to the exact definition of intellectual disability for diagnosis.305  
It will be important to deal with any issues quickly as this determination 
could mean the difference between life and death for criminal defendants.306  
The issues that will arise will be the direct result of the varying procedures 
and definitions implemented by the each state’s legislation at the result of the 
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Atkins case and definition and diagnostic criteria for the psychological field 
in the DSM-5.307  The importance and use of the DSM in fields outside of 
psychology is often overlooked, as are the implications of revisions made to 
the Manual.308 
The IQ score is highly emphasized in many state definitions, but has 
been removed from the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5.309  It can easily be 
understood why it is hypothesized that this will cause confusion; a defendant 
may meet the criterion for intellectual disability by an expert witness, but 
may not meet the legislative standards for that state.310  The removal of the 
focus on the objective assessment of an IQ score will inevitably cause 
trouble in the courtroom as it “has traditionally been at the core of 
diagnosing” intellectual disability.311  The focus for judges, attorneys, and 
psychologists tends to remain on the IQ score.312  Even with the possible 
negative effects, such as the Flynn Effect, the IQ score earned an important 
spot in many state definitions.313  Variation did exist in the exact cut-off IQ 
score used by states.314  For example, several states require an IQ below 
sixty-five while others chose the traditional cut-off of seventy; however, 
there are also states that chose not to identify a minimum IQ score in their 
legislation.315  While it has been established that there are discrepancies 
amongst the states as to how they define and implement their post-Atkins 
procedures, regardless of their current system, problems are likely to arise.316  
Most states modeled their current laws off of the clinical definition in the 
DSM-IV-TR, that was current at the time of the Atkins decision, and made a 
focus on the IQ score.317  With the revisions made to DSM-5, it is inevitable 
that there are now differences between the state’s legal and new clinical 
definition of intellectual disability.318  This will become problematic when 
discrepancies exist between a diagnosis made by a testifying clinical forensic 
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psychologist who focuses on adaptive behavior, but the state court is looking 
for an IQ score to make their determination.319 
The focus now, according to DSM-5, is more on adaptive 
functioning.320  According to DSM-5, this is a positive change as the IQ 
scores became less valid on the lower end of the range where mild 
intellectual disability is located.321  A focus on IQ has also been found to lead 
to problematic outcomes in forensic settings.322  “IQ scores are too unreliable 
and too sensitive to external factors for courts to rely on when a person’s life 
is at stake.”323  Additionally, the new edition of the Manual states that IQ 
scores are only approximations of a person’s intellectual functioning and 
may not be sufficient enough to assess their functioning in real life 
situations.324  However, as mentioned, most states put emphasis on the IQ 
score in their legislation—which is no longer relevant for diagnosis—and 
less concentration on adaptive behavior.325 
Another problematic function of this shift is that adaptive 
functioning is almost entirely based on third party accounts; while 
assessments do exist, that is not the type of behavior that is easily assessed 
with standardized testing.326  When it comes to adaptive behavior, there is 
more difficulty in measurement and presentation of conclusive evidence to 
the fact finder in court.327  Therefore, even as the need for clinical judgment 
in the diagnosis has always been significant, the role of the psychologists 
will become even more important.328  Their clinical judgment will be relied 
upon even further for the subjective assessment of adaptive behavior.329 
Even though it may seem minor, the change of the onset from age 
eighteen to during the developmental period is also a cause for concern.330  
This diagnostic factor was in place to help clinicians rule out other possible 
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diagnoses—such as brain injury—that can occur later in life.331  In the 
alternative, it could provide protection for younger defendants who never 
took an intellectual assessment when they were below the age of eighteen.332  
While before the age of eighteen and during the developmental period are 
intended to refer to the same time frame, the lack of a solid age cut-off may 
allow more room for malingering.333  The age-of-onset criterion served as a 
safeguard to keep a defendant from being able to feign an intellectual 
disability, but with a less restrictive terminology now in place, this safeguard 
may not be as strong.334 
So, why is this important?  Changes and complications are in store 
for the legislation that requires use of the DSM, particularly Atkins cases.335  
The exact result will be dependent on the state in which the trial is 
occurring.336  The reasons for that are the varying definitions and procedures 
in place in each state for dealing with capital punishment and intellectually 
disabled criminal offenders.337  However, despite these differences, a strong 
fear has developed among defense attorneys, as their hypothesis is that this 
new edition will allow for more executions of those that Atkins sought to 
protect.338 
Death penalty lawyers fear that this revision will allow courts to 
execute offenders with IQ scores below seventy more easily.339  Arguably, 
this shift in focus can give states more room to subvert the decision made in 
Atkins and allow the execution of a mentally retarded defendant in the mild 
range.340  The determination of adaptive functioning is exceptionally more 
subjective than an IQ score, which will undoubtedly allow for each side to 
have an expert witness arguing the alternative opinions on the diagnosis.341  
By replacing a diagnosis that requires one objective part and one subjective 
part with a fully subjective assessment, it gives courts more room to avoid 
following the Atkins decision if they so choose.342  Research has found that 
jurors have stereotypes of how they believe intellectual disability should 
manifest.343  If a jury is the fact finder, it is more likely for a person with 
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mild mental retardation to be executed, as they are unlikely to meet the 
standards of the stereotype; the jury may not accept the subjective 
assessment by a psychological expert witness because they will realize there 
is room for interpretation in the diagnosis.344  If the decision is for a judge to 
make and the defendant falls into a gray area for diagnosis based on their 
level of adaptive behavior, the judge has room to interpret the facts and use 
his or her own discretion to make a decision;345 this is a cause for concern as 
judges are not trained in this field.346  Defendants with IQ scores lower than 
seventy have been executed in the past several years despite the Atkins 
decision, and the DSM revision is highly likely to make this worse with the 
change to more subjective diagnostic criterion.347 
With a focus on adaptive function, this could lead to more 
executions of those the Atkins holding was intended to protect.348  It is 
believed that the removal of adaptive behavior from the requirements could 
actually bar more executions than required by the Atkins decision.349  A focus 
on this requirement of adaptive functioning allows for more erroneous 
findings of intellectual disability.350  With adaptive function, the focus is 
always on the weaknesses and never the strengths.351  If the focus were to 
return to the IQ score, the reach of Atkins exemption could arguably be 
expanded.352 
The DSM work group defends their decision and states that they do 
not agree with the fear of the defense attorneys.353  The American Psychiatric 
Association is a large organization that represents thousands of psychiatric 
professionals; its goal is for them to all work together and create the best 
mental heath care possible.354  Additionally, the prior focus on IQ scores is 
more likely to result in a mentally retarded defendant facing the death 
penalty due to its inherent limitations.355  A single IQ point could be the 
difference between life and death for an offender if additional clinical 
interpretation and analysis is not considered.356  For example, in a stricter 
                                            
344. Id. at 339, 342–43. 
345. Fabian et al., supra note 82, at 421. 
346. See id. at 401. 
347. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 37–38; Dilts, supra 
note 235. 
348. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 824. 
349. Id.; see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319, 320–21 (2002). 
350. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 824. 
351. Fabian et al., supra note 82, at 421. 
352. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 824. 
353. See Dilts, supra note 235. 
354. Cheung, supra note 314, at 321. 
355. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 264–65; Rumley, supra note 128, at 1338–39. 
356. Dilts, supra note 235. 
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cut-off state, such as Kentucky, a defendant must have an IQ score of 
seventy or lower in order to be considered to have an intellectual 
disability.357  An IQ score does not allow a legal fact finder to see the whole 
picture of who the defendant is and why they did what they did, but it does 
give them a numerical value as a comparison to assess their intellectual 
function, which makes their execution more likely.358  The DSM work group 
believes that their revision should be helpful to the courts by shifting the 
attention to adaptive behavior; this way, the courts can analyze the defendant 
more thoroughly and make more accurate decisions about the defendant’s 
mental abilities.359 
If the DSM does have a negative impact and results in the death of 
more mentally retarded defendants, this is a violation of the protection 
ensured to mentally retarded offenders by the Atkins decision.360  That 
holding was intended to protect them from cruel and unusual punishment.361  
In the Atkins holding, the Supreme Court of the United States intended to 
provide a categorical protection to those with intellectual disability by 
providing exemption from the death penalty that is now challenged by the 
changing diagnostic criteria of intellectual disability.362  With this new 
update to the diagnostic criteria of intellectual disability and the already 
existing discrepancies amongst the states, confusion is inevitable and the 
need for a uniform definition is even clearer.363 
A. Possible Solutions 
In cases where the court is unclear as to whether or not a defendant 
has an intellectual disability, the court should revisit the deciding factors in 
the Atkins holding.364  The court should consider the goals of capital 
punishment—deterrence and retribution—and whether they will in fact be 
furthered by the death of the defendant.365  In the end, “the court[] must 
conclude both that the defendant was more morally culpable than the average 
criminal and that the rationale behind the death penalty applies” 
appropriately to justify the most severe punishment in the country.366  In 
                                            
357. Cheung, supra note 314, at 327. 
358. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 264–65. 
359. See Dilts, supra note 235. 
360. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
361. Id. 
362. Cheung, supra note 314, at 337; Dilts, supra note 235; see Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 321. 
363. See Cheung, supra note 314, at 337. 
364. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 274; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21. 
365. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 274–75; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
366. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 275. 
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addition, the states may just want to consider revising their legislation to 
include the updated diagnostic criteria.367  Each state still has the ability to 
determine the definition used to make their legislation to categorically 
exempt intellectually disabled defendants.368  By making a revision, the court 
can be assured that they will properly determine if the death penalty is 
appropriate when faced with an Atkins case.369  Going back to the original 
decision may help courts make a more appropriate decision.370 
Another seemingly simple solution, however, would be to implement 
a uniform national standard.371  A countrywide standard would eliminate the 
state-to-state discrepancies.372  The new standard should be made in 
accordance with the current psychological definition and diagnostic criteria 
in the DSM-5 as well as the Atkins decision.373  In addition to eliminating the 
confusion created by having multiple definitions, the standard should also 
include procedural information such as when this determination should be 
made, as well as whether the judge, jury, or both should make it.374  This 
would prevent the possibility of different holdings for the same person 
depending on which state their trial was held in.375  By embracing the new 
edition of the DSM and finally creating a uniform way to enforce the Atkins 
holding, those that the Atkins decision intended to protect are more likely to 
be spared from execution.376 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States made a 
groundbreaking decision in Atkins v. Virginia and their decision created a 
categorical exemption for mentally retarded offenders.377  However, their 
lack of a uniform standard or specific guidance for the states regarding a 
definition of mental retardation led the states to make their own decision 
regarding legislation.378  Many states relied upon the DSM-IV-TR definition 
                                            
367. Cheung, supra note 314, at 344–45; see also Hall, supra note 2, at 385. 
368. Dilts, supra note 235. 
369. See Cheung, supra note 314, at 344. 
370. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 274–75; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
371. Cheung, supra note 314, at 344. 
372. See id. 
373. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 
33. 
374. Cheung, supra note 314, at 348–49. 
375. See id. at 344, 348–49. 
376. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 
8, at 25. 
377. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304, 321. 
378. Id. at 317; Cheung, supra note 314, at 326. 
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that was cited in the Court’s decision, as it is not only present in the written 
decision, it is also an important and highly used book in the psychological 
field throughout the United States.379  The newly released fifth edition of 
DSM makes significant revisions to intellectual disability, previously known 
as mental retardation.380  In doing so, it is possible that the already 
complicated implementation of post-Atkins legislation will become even 
more convoluted.381  Defense lawyers fear that these changes will undermine 
Atkins by allowing the courts to more easily execute a mentally retarded 
defendant, but those behind the new edition of the DSM do not agree and do 
not believe their revisions will be problematic.382  As the edition was 
released so recently, these fears have yet to become reality.383  However, it is 
an important point to be aware of, as it will inevitably have an effect on 
criminal defense lawyers and courts that hear capital punishment cases with 
mentally retarded offenders.384  These revisions and their implications are 
something that the courts should be vigilant of and the states may want to 
take in consideration.385 
                                            
379. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 963 So. 2d 150, 154 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); 
see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 39. 
380. Compare AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33, with AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41–42. 
381. Dilts, supra note 235; see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, 
at 33. 
382. Dilts, supra note 235; see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33. 
383. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33; Dilts, supra 
note 235. 
384. See Dilts, supra note 235. 
385. Dilts, supra note 235; see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, 
at 33. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With mass murders on the rise, the public demanded legislative 
action to ameliorate the issue.  Thus far, the legislature’s response has been 
primarily comprised of gun reform proposals.1  Congress has been flooded 
with bills and acts that call for stricter licensing practices, more in-depth 
background checks, or bans on assault weapons and high capacity 
magazines.2  However, the solution to the mass murder problem does not 
likely lie within gun control, but rather, within prescription drug control.3  
Antidepressant and antipsychotic medications are known to increase suicidal, 
homicidal, and violent tendencies in some users.4  Individuals such as James 
E. Holmes, Seung-Hui Cho, and Eric Harris were prescribed antidepressant 
or antipsychotic medications.5  Afterward, these same individuals committed 
the mass murders at Aurora Century movie theater, Virginia Polytechnic 
                                                 
* Marissa Duquette will graduate from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard 
Broad Law Center, in May 2015.  Duquette would like to thank the board members and her 
colleagues at the Nova Law Review for persistently working to improve and refine this article.  
She would also like to thank Professors Rex Ford and Michael Richmond for their guidance 
and support, as well as her family—Scott, Marie, and Rosco—for all of their dedication and 
encouragement. 
1. See Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun 
Control Act, 45 CONN. L. REV. 813, 831 (2013). 
2. See id. at 832; JEFFREY A. ROTH & CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, IMPACTS OF THE 1994 ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN:  1994–96 1 (1999). 
3. Jerome R. Corsi, Psych Meds Linked to 90% of School Shootings, WND 
(Dec. 18, 2012, 10:16 PM), http://www.wnd.com/2012/12/psych-meds-linked-to-90-of-
school-shootings/; Bob Unruh, Are Meds to Blame for Cho’s Rampage?, WND (Apr. 23, 
2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.WND.com/2007/04/41218. 
4. Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3. 
5. Corsi, supra note 3; see McCreary, supra note 1, at 823, 824 n.54. 
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Institute and State University, and Columbine High School, respectively.6  A 
simple analogy illustrates the point. 
A drunk driver swerves off of the road and onto a crowded sidewalk, 
killing some and injuring others.  Nobody blames the vehicle.  Legislators do 
not call for sports car bans.  The Department of Motor Vehicles is not 
criticized for its failure to perform a more thorough background check before 
issuing the driver’s license.  Rather, society blames alcohol and its ability to 
impair normal human functions. 
Contrastingly, a drug-addled college student storms onto campus and 
proceeds to slaughter thirty-two students with two semiautomatic handguns:  
A Walther P22 .22 caliber and a Glock 19 9-mm.7  A sizeable number of 
people blame the firearms.8  Legislators call for assault weapon bans and 
high capacity magazine bans.9  The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms (“ATF”) is criticized for its inability to establish an effective 
federal background check system.10  Very few people blame the college 
student’s prescription medication and its ability to induce suicidal, 
homicidal, and violent behavior.11 
This article proposes that the gun—like the car—should not be the 
subject of further regulation.12  Antidepressant and antipsychotic medications 
should bear the blame for their capacity to induce violent behavior in users.13  
As such, the pharmaceutical industry—not the gun industry—should be the 
legislature’s focus if the mass murder problem is to be solved.14 
This article begins with an overview of American gun control to 
date.15  It then analyzes the legislature’s failure to curb mass shootings 
through stricter gun laws.16  In doing so, the article negates two common 
misconceptions:  First, that gun control reduces the number of firearms in 
criminal hands; and second, that a European-style ban on firearms would be 
a possible and effective solution to the mass shooting problem.17  While 
                                                 
6. McCreary, supra note 1, at 823–24; Corsi, supra note 3. 
7. McCreary, supra note 1, at 824, 829; see also Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, 
supra note 3. 
8. See Unruh, supra note 3. 
9. See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1. 
10. See Mark B. Melter, The Kids are Alright; It's the Grown-ups Who Scare 
Me:  A Comparative Look at Mass Shootings in the United States and Australia, 16 GONZAGA 
J. INT'L L. 33, 55–56 (2012). 
11. See Corsi, supra note 3. 
12. See infra Part IV. 
13. See infra Part IV. 
14. See infra Part IV. 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. See infra Part III. 
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invalidating those false impressions, the article displays how increased gun 
availability actually lowers mass shooting rates.18  The article then discusses 
the link between mass shootings and prescription drug use and details how 
such violence can actually be a treatment-induced problem.19  Finally, the 
article closes with a new way for legislators to respond to the mass murder 
problem.20  This involves a shift in responsibility from the gun industry to the 
pharmaceutical industry by putting liability on the latter, and requiring drug 
compatibility tests to be administered prior to prescribing a medication.21 
II. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN GUN LEGISLATION 
Modern gun control debates in the United States are typically 
preceded by a tragic event; most often it is a mass shooting.22  However, 
prior to the 1900s, gun control laws were enacted in response to slave 
uprisings and were primarily aimed at keeping slaves and freedmen from 
obtaining firearms.23  In 1911, New York enacted the Sullivan Law as a 
response to the widely publicized shooting of novelist David Graham 
Phillips.24  The Sullivan Law required that a permit be obtained before an 
individual was allowed to possess or carry a handgun.25  This was among the 
first major forms of gun control outside of the South.26 
Prohibition in 1919 spurred alcohol smugglers and distillers to 
engage in turf wars with one another, culminating in the St. Valentine’s Day 
Massacre ten years later.27  Such extreme gun violence prompted legislators 
to pass the National Firearms Act (“NFA”), which targeted the gangs’ 
weapons of choice:  Machine guns and short-barreled shotguns.28  This Act 
did not expressly prohibit the possession of such arms, but it did make 
ownership of them financially infeasible.29  For example, the Thompson 
M1928 (“Tommy Gun”)—a notoriously popular gun for smugglers and 
                                                 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part V. 
21. See infra Part V. 
22. McCreary, supra note 1, at 831; Corsi, supra note 3. 
23. David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century—
and Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527, 1529 (2012). 
24. Peter Duffy, 100 Years Ago, a Killing that Spurred a Gun Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at A.21; Author Phillips Shot Six Times; May Recover, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
24, 1911), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F20911F93C5517738DDD
AD0A94D9405B818DF1D3. 
25. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1529. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 1531. 
28. See id. at 1531, 1533. 
29. See id. 
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gangsters—typically sold for around two hundred dollars in that time 
period.30  The NFA placed a two hundred dollar flat tax for possessing that 
gun, as well as any other machine gun or short-barreled shotgun.31  Hence, 
owning a Tommy Gun after the ratification of the NFA would cost four 
hundred dollars.32  Taking inflation into consideration, that is the equivalent 
of $5,386.29 today, thus making possession of such a weapon practically 
unachievable.33 
Shortly after the NFA, Congress passed the Federal Firearms Act of 
1938 (“FFA”).34  Under this Act, firearms dealers had to keep a record of all 
gun sales and obtain a license before they could acquire or ship any weapon 
over state lines.35  Additionally, the Act made it “unlawful for any person 
who [was] convicted of a [violent crime] ‘to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which had been shipped’” over state lines; as such, firearms 
dealers were responsible for ascertaining that any prospective buyer had not 
been previously convicted of a violent crime.36 
In 1939, the NFA and the FFA were discussed in detail by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Miller.37  In that case, 
two defendants were charged with violating the NFA and the FFA when they 
transported a sawed-off, double-barreled shotgun over state lines.38  In 
response, the defendants argued that the Acts violated their Second 
Amendment rights.39  Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, found 
that the Second Amendment did not protect the individual right to possess a 
sawed-off double-barrel shotgun since it was not a common-use weapon and 
bore no relationship to the preservation of a well-regulated militia.40  
Although the Court tried to make it clear that the right to bear arms was an 
individual right rather than a collective or states’ right,41 the decision in 
                                                 
30. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI: A 
CENTENNIAL HISTORY, 19082008 16 (2008); see BILL YENNE, TOMMY GUN: HOW GENERAL 
THOMPSON’S SUBMACHINE GUN WROTE HISTORY 86 (2009). 
31. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533. 
32. See YENNE, supra note 30, at 86; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533. 
33. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
34. 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1938) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012)); 
Kopel, supra note 23, at 1533–34. 
35. 15 U.S.C. § 902(f); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534. 
36. 15 U.S.C. § 902; United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 1942), 
rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534. 
37. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
38. Id. at 175. 
39. Id. at 176. 
40. Id. at 175, 178. 
41. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–80, 592 (2008). 
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Miller resulted in nationwide misinterpretation of the Second Amendment.42  
One example comes from Commonwealth v. Davis,43 in which the state’s 
supreme court said: 
[T]he declared right to keep and bear arms is that of the people, the 
aggregate of citizens; the right is related to the common defense; 
and that in turn points to service in a broadly based, organized 
militia. 
. . . . 
[The Second Amendment] is not directed to guaranteeing the 
rights of individuals, but rather, as we have said, to assuring some 
freedom of State forces from national interference.44 
From 1939 to 2008, courts across the United States erroneously used Miller 
to justify otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on Second Amendment 
rights.45 
In 1967, New York City mandated long-gun registration.46  
Eventually, the registry information was used to confiscate those firearms 
after the city council erroneously decided that rifles and shotguns were 
assault weapons.47  When federal legislators attempted to adopt New York 
City’s gun registration methods, the House of Representatives amended 
statutes to explicitly forbid federal agencies from compiling any information 
that could be used for a national gun registry.48 
The Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) slightly altered the record-
keeping requirements set forth by the FFA.49  It required firearms dealers to 
record a buyer’s personal information and the gun’s identifying features such 
                                                 
42. Id. at 627 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 179); United States v. Warin, 530 
F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Stevens v. United States, 440 
F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 
261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev’d, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 174); 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass. 1976) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 177–
78); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1550. 
43. 343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976). 
44. Id. at 848–50. 
45. Warin, 530 F.2d at 106–07 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Stevens, 440 
F.2d at 149 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178); Tot, 131 F.2d at 266 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 
174); Davis, 343 N.E.2d at 850 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 177–78). 
46. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1541. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1565–66. 
49. Id. at 1534, 1545.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5) (2012), with 27 C.F.R. 
§ 478.11 (2014). 
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as its model and serial number on Form 4473 for each gun sale.50  Although 
Form 4473 is a federal form, the gun sale would be registered by the dealer 
and “would not be collected in a [national] registration list.”51  The pool of 
civilians who were legally allowed to purchase or possess a firearm from a 
licensed dealer was also the subject of GCA restrictions.52  Whereas the FFA 
only prohibited gun sales to individuals convicted of a violent crime, the 
GCA further prohibited gun and ammunition sales to illicit drug users and 
those who were mentally defective.53 
In the years following the enactment of the GCA, the phrase 
mentally defective was interpreted differently by courts across the United 
States.54  In 1973, the Eighth Circuit decided that a mental illness was not 
synonymous to a mental defect.55  Rather, the court determined that “[a] 
mental defective . . . is a person who has never possessed a normal degree of 
intellectual capacity, whereas . . . an insane person[’s] faculties which were 
originally normal have been impaired by [a] mental disease.”56  Therefore, in 
the Eighth Circuit, individuals with a subnormal level of intelligence were 
barred from owning guns, but individuals suffering from schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, or a personality disorder were entitled to full Second 
Amendment rights.57 
In Huddleston v. United States,58 the Supreme Court attempted to 
improve the lower courts’ ability to analyze the language of the GCA’s 
prohibited persons categories.59  The Court stated that the ultimate goal of 
the GCA was to keep “‘lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, drug 
addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles, and other persons whose 
possession of them is too high a price in danger to us all to allow.’”60  
Although this statement may have provided lower courts with the legislative 
                                                 
50. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1545; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5). 
51. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1545–46. 
52. McCreary, supra note 1, at 816. 
53. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 816.  Compare 
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012), with 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014). 
54. See United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 
1120, 1123–24 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d 787, 788 (W.D. Mich. 
2000). 
55. Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1124. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1125; McCreary, supra note 1, at 818 n.17, 844–45. 
58. 415 U.S. 814 (1974). 
59. Id. at 823, 825. 
60. Id. at 825. 
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intent behind the Act, it merely replaced the phrase mentally defective with 
mentally disordered, which did little to actually clarify the definition.61 
The ATF eventually revised its definition of the mentally defective 
class of individuals who were not allowed to possess a firearm.62  To belong 
to this class, an individual needed: 
(a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or other 
lawful authority that a person, as a result of marked subnormal 
intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease: 
(1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or 
(2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own 
affairs. 
(b) The term shall include— 
(1) A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and 
(2) Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or found 
not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility . . . .63 
Correspondingly, there was no longer an issue as to whether mentally 
defective referred to mental illness or subnormal intelligence; the term 
encompassed both characteristics, and either one could disqualify an 
individual from firearm possession.64  However, courts faced a new problem:  
Whether commitment to a mental institution qualified as an adjudication of 
mental defectiveness.65 
In United States v. Giardina,66 the Fifth Circuit found that 
involuntary hospitalization would not disqualify an individual from the right 
to buy and possess a firearm under the statute.67  The court in United States 
v. Vertz68 went even further, finding that adjudication by a probate judge that 
a defendant required treatment because he was mentally ill was “not 
                                                 
61. McCreary, supra note 1, at 846 (noting that courts have been known to 
muddy the waters when it comes to interpreting the meaning of mentally defective).  Compare 
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012), with Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 825. 
62. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 47, 49 (1st Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Vertz, 102 F. 
Supp. 2d 787, 791 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
66. 861 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1988). 
67. Id. at 1337. 
68. 102 F. Supp. 2d 787 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
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sufficient to bring [the defendant] within the statute,” because “[t]he probate 
court made no finding that [the defendant] was a danger to himself.”69  
Finally, United States v. Rehlander70 established that full due process of law 
was required before any individual’s Second Amendment rights could be 
denied; as such, a voluntary commitment to a mental institution or a 
commitment for observation would not bar an individual from buying a 
firearm in the future.71  Although the ATF’s new definition was intended to 
clarify the Legislature’s intent in enacting the GCA—“keeping ‘[guns] out of 
the hands of . . . [those] whose possession of them is too high a price in 
danger’”—it seems as though it just shifted the courts’ focus further away 
from public safety concerns, and onto the Fifth Amendment rights of the 
mentally ill.72 
In 1986, Congress decided that “the rights of citizens to keep and 
bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution . . 
. require additional legislation to correct existing firearms statutes and 
enforcement policies.”73  Accordingly, the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act 
(“FOPA”) was made law that year.74  Originally, one of the major proposals 
of the Act would have banned most of the center-fire rifle ammunition in the 
United States, since Republican Mario Biaggi put forward a cop-killer bullet 
ban and over-broadly defined what that would include.75  Fortunately, the 
National Rifle Association made a compromise with Biaggi and modified the 
text of the Act to simply “ban[] a category of ammunition that was no longer 
being produced for the retail market.”76  In addition to banning certain types 
of ammunition, “FOPA . . . banned the sale of new machine guns . . . to the 
public,” placed restrictions on the ATF’s power, forbade federal gun 
registration, and required firearms dealers to report certain gun sales directly 
to the Attorney General.77  Specifically, FOPA required firearms dealers to 
provide a report to the Attorney General when any one purchaser bought two 
or more firearms within a five-day period.78 
Although the FFA, GCA, and FOPA all specified classes of the 
population that were ineligible to purchase a firearm, licensed firearms 
                                                 
69. Id. at 788. 
70. 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012). 
71. Id. at 48–49. 
72. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974). 
73. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1, 100 Stat. 449, 
449 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012)). 
74. Id. 
75. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1572. 
76. Id. at 1573. 
77. § 103, 100 Stat. at 455; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1574. 
78. § 103, 100 Stat. at 455. 
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dealers had no way of confirming a prospective buyer’s eligibility.79  
Purchasers simply had to certify in writing that they were not a member of a 
disqualified class—such as a convicted felon or adjudicated as mentally 
defective—and the licensed dealer had to trust that this information was 
true.80  Of course, ineligible individuals wishing to obtain a firearm were 
inclined to falsely certify their eligibility, so in 1993, Congress attempted to 
ameliorate this problem through the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act (“Brady Bill”).81 
The Brady Bill mandated a five-day waiting period before a licensed 
dealer could release a gun to a purchaser.82  In that five-day period, licensed 
dealers collaborated with the local chief law enforcement officers, who 
conducted a background check to verify the purchaser’s eligibility.83  Five 
years later, the waiting period requirement expired pursuant to the terms of 
the Brady Bill and was replaced with the National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (“NICS”).84  The NICS, maintained by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), cut out the chief local law 
enforcement middleman and allowed firearms dealers themselves to conduct 
background checks on potential buyers.85  To accommodate a prospective 
gun buyer’s right to privacy, the NICS background check would only reveal 
the buyer’s eligibility status, and not the reason behind it; i.e., the system 
would only display ineligible rather than adjudicated as mentally defective.86  
Unfortunately, even this system had its glitches.87  State agencies with 
information related to a person belonging to a class of prohibited purchasers 
were under very little pressure to report this information to the FBI.88  
Consequently, compliance with reporting procedures was infrequent and the 
NICS was rarely up to date, resulting in a prospective purchaser’s 
ineligibility failing to show up on the NICS for months.89  In addition, “only 
‘licensed’ importers, manufacturers, and dealers [were] federally mandated 
                                                 
79. United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 1942), rev’d, 319 U.S. 
463 (1943); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1534, 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 833. 
80. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1546; McCreary, supra note 1, at 833–34. 
81. McCreary, supra note 1, at 834–35. 
82. Id. at 835. 
83. Id. 
84. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1582–83; Melter, supra note 10, at 55. 
85. Melter, supra note 10, at 55. 
86. See McCreary, supra note 1, at 854. 
87. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, STATE LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDINANCES xiii–xv (31st ed. 2010–2011), available 
at https://www.atf.gov/files/publications/download/p/atf-p-5300-5-31st-editiion/2010-2011-
atf-book-final.pdf; McCreary, supra note 1, at 837–38; Melter, supra note 10, at 55. 
88. See McCreary, supra note 1, at 835–36. 
89. See id. at 838. 
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to perform background checks on weapons purchasers,” which meant that 
private firearms sales—including sales at gun shows—could be conducted 
legally without inquiry into a purchaser’s eligibility.90  Furthermore, 
concealed carry permits and similar firearms licenses qualified as alternatives 
to the background check requirements of the Brady Bill in nineteen states.91  
Although a background check is almost always required in order to obtain 
any sort of weapons permit, states had no federal obligation to keep permit 
record information on a readily accessible database for licensed firearms 
dealers to access.92 
The NICS Improvement Act recognized that there were problems 
with the Brady Bill’s background check requirement, but failed to correctly 
identify them.93  Rather than providing incentives for state agency reporting 
compliance, closing the gun show loophole, or eliminating the license 
alternative to a background check, it merely required federal agencies with 
any information regarding an individual’s ineligibility to “report that 
information to the Attorney General . . . quarterly.”94 
In 1994, the Clinton Crime Bill was enacted as a response to Patrick 
Purdy’s mass murder in Stockton, California, and the intensifying turf and 
drug wars conducted by gangs.95  It included one of the most irrational and 
functionally inconsequential assault weapon bans in the history of American 
gun control, ironically titled the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use 
Protection Act.96  The ban outlawed a mere nineteen guns by name, some of 
which had already been banned since 1989.97  Of the nineteen explicitly-
banned guns in the Act, there were at least twelve legal substitutes already on 
the market.98  The Act also banned roughly two hundred more guns based on 
“appearances [and] . . . accessories such as bayonet lugs and adjustable 
stocks,” under what was called the Features Test.99 
(30) The term “semiautomatic assault weapon” means— 
. . . . 
                                                 
90. Melter, supra note 10, at 55–56. 
91. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, supra note 87, 
at xiv–xv. 
92. See id.; McCreary, supra note 1, at 835. 
93. See McCreary, supra note 1, at 837–38. 
94. See id. at 837. 
95. ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585. 
96. See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 1; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585–86. 
97. ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 2–3; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585. 
98. ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 3. 
99. ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 4; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585–86. 
207
: Nova Law Review 38, #2
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
2014] THE RX AND THE AR 369 
(B) a semiautomatic rifle that has an ability to accept a 
detachable magazine and has at least [two] of— 
(i) a folding or telescoping stock; 
(ii) a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously 
beneath the action of the weapon; 
(iii) a bayonet mount; 
(iv) a flash suppressor or threaded barrel 
designed to accommodate a flash suppressor; and 
(v) a grenade launcher . . . .100 
The Features Tests for semiautomatic pistols and shotguns were similarly 
focused on aesthetics.101  The overbroad and generic nature of the Features 
Test allowed firearms manufacturers to disconnect the frills, rename the 
weapons, and ultimately sell guns that were “operationally the same as the 
banned guns.”102  Moreover, roughly six hundred firearms, such as the Ruger 
Mini-14, were explicitly exempted from the ban because of their large 
ownership base even though they were “functionally identical to banned 
guns like the AR-15.”103 
The Act also banned the sale of high capacity magazines—defined 
as “ammunition-feeding devices designed to hold more than [ten] rounds”—
but did not outlaw possession or use of them.104  As such, this ban was futile 
as well because “when one considers many of the older model guns . . . such 
as the AR-15 (in production since the 1960s) . . . the world-wide inventory of 
ammunition magazines holding more than [ten] rounds was probably in the 
tens or even hundreds of millions.”105 
Paradoxically, the most notable effect of the assault weapons ban 
was the influx of so-called assault weapons into civilian hands.106  While the 
Act was being debated in Congress, the production of soon-to-be-banned 
guns such as the Colt AR-15, SWD M-10, and TEC-9 skyrocketed.107  In 
1994, 203,578 assault weapons were produced just before the ban became 
                                                 
100. Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, H.R. 4296, 
103d Cong. § 2(b)(30)(B) (1994). 
101. See id. § 2(b)(30)(C)–(D). 
102. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586; see ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 4. 
103. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1585–86. 
104. ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 2; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586. 
105. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1586. 
106. See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 4. 
107. Id. at 3–5. 
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law later that year.108  This is in stark contrast to the annual average 
production of 91,137 assault weapons from 1989 to 1993.109  Since the 
market became flooded with assault weapons and high capacity magazines 
just before the ban was enacted, the price of these commodities dropped 
significantly the next year.110  Prior to the ban, an AR-15-type rifle sold for 
anywhere between $825 and $1325; by the very next June, the price of the 
same rifle had fallen to about $660.111  Although the transfer of an assault 
weapon was prohibited after 1994, individuals who paid a high pre-ban price 
and then “watched as their investment depreciated after the ban took effect” 
were prone to sell the weapon at a discount price to an ineligible purchaser, 
and then report the gun as stolen to an insurance company in order to collect 
on the policy.112  In essence, the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use 
Protection Act made assault weapons more available and less expensive to 
those who could not pass a NICS background check.113  Thankfully, the 
assault weapon ban expired in 2004.114 
The Supreme Court of the United States had a chance to discuss gun 
bans—albeit a little late—in the 2008 case, District of Columbia v. Heller.115  
The law at issue in the case “totally ban[ned] handgun possession in the 
home” and was struck down.116  In making its decision, the Court relied on 
the common use principle.117  The common use principle dictates that a 
“prohibition of an entire class of arms” is unconstitutional if that class of 
arms is “overwhelmingly chosen by American[s]” for a lawful use, such as 
self-defense or sporting.118  Justice Scalia poignantly stated: 
It is no answer to say . . . that it is permissible to ban the 
possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms 
(i.e., long guns) is allowed. . . . There are many reasons that a 
citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense:  It is easier to 
store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it 
cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is 
easier to use for those without the upper-body strength to lift and 
                                                 
108. Id. at 6. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 5. 
111. See ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 3, 5. 
112. Id. at 1, 45. 
113. See Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, H.R. 
4296, 103d Cong. § 2 (1994); ROTH & KOPER, supra note 2, at 5; Melter, supra note 10, at 55–
56. 
114. H.R. 4296 § 6(2); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1604. 
115. 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008). 
116. Id. at 628, 635. 
117. Id. at 627; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1608; Melter, supra note 10, at 46. 
118. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28. 
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aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar with one hand . . . .  
Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon 
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete 
prohibition of their use is invalid.119 
Under this common use interpretation, a future ban on semiautomatic AR-
15s and the like would arguably be unconstitutional as well, because they are 
some of the most popularly owned guns in America.120 
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH GUN LEGISLATION 
Unfortunately, the GCA and FOPA were not enough to stop Laurie 
Dann from obtaining a firearm and shooting seven children in 1988.121  The 
Acts were insufficient to keep Patrick Purdy from killing five children and 
wounding thirty others in Stockton, California with a Kalashnikov-style 
semi-automatic rifle in 1989.122  The Public Safety and Recreational 
Firearms Use Protection Act did not keep Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold 
from obtaining a Savage-Springfield 67H, Hi-Point 995, TEC-9, or Stevens 
311D, all of which were used in 1999 to kill thirteen and wound twenty-four 
others at Columbine High School.123  The NICS did not reveal that Seung-
Hui Cho had been involuntarily committed to a mental institution, and was 
thus ineligible to buy the Walther P22 and Glock 19 that he used to kill 
thirty-two people at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University.124  These instances alone should indicate that gun control is not 
effectively reducing mass shootings, but they are only some of the most 
notable.125  As of 1976 under the GCA, until FOPA was enacted, there were 
190 mass shootings and 880 victims in America.126  In the time span between 
the enactment of FOPA and the Brady Bill, there were 140 mass shooting 
                                                 
119. Id. at 629. 
120. EDWARD W. HILL, MAXINE GOODMAN LEVIN COLL. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, 
CLEVELAND STATE UNIV. HOW MANY GUNS ARE IN THE UNITED STATES?  AMERICANS OWN 
BETWEEN 262 MILLION AND 310 MILLION FIREARMS 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.urban.csuohio.edu/publications/hill/GunsInTheUS_Hill_032813.pdf; Kopel, supra 
note 23, at 1608. 
121. See Unruh, supra note 3. 
122. See Kopel, supra note 23, at 1578; Unruh, supra note 3. 
123. Janet L. Kaminski Leduc, OLR Research Report: Weapons Used in Mass 
Shootings, ST. CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013-
R-0057.htm; Unruh, supra note 3. 
124. McCreary, supra note 1, at 824, 829–30; Kaminski Leduc, supra note 
123; Unruh, supra note 3. 
125. See Melter, supra note 10, at 41; Unruh, supra note 3. 
126. Melter, supra note 10, at 60. 
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incidents and 620 individuals either wounded or killed.127  During the era of 
the Clinton Crime Bill, 193 mass shootings occurred, leaving 875 people 
either dead or injured.128  Since 2004, when the assault weapons ban ended, 
there have been 178 mass shootings and 969 victims.129 
Still, about twenty-four percent of the nation’s citizens believe that 
tighter gun restrictions would prevent mass shootings in America.130  This is 
despite the fact that countries with even more stringent gun laws than the 
United States have had their fair share of mass shootings.131  England—with 
a mere 6.2 guns per one hundred people—experienced a mass shooting in 
2010, which claimed the lives of twelve citizens.132  Germany had “three of 
the five worst school shootings worldwide over the past fifteen years,” 
despite the country’s incredibly strict gun laws.133  But two instances hardly 
prove the point:  It could be argued that Europeans have only seen about 
twelve mass public shootings and just over one hundred people killed by 
gunfire, during those shootings, since 2001, which is notably less than what 
Americans have experienced in the same time frame.134  It is worthy of note, 
however, that although the number of mass shooting incidents in Europe is 
less than that in America, the number of mass murders is roughly the same; 
perpetrators simply resort to bombs and arson instead of firearms.135 
Even supposing that the prevalence of guns in the United States is to 
blame for mass shootings, gun bans have proved ineffective in the past and 
government seizures of firearms would be just as unsuccessful in reducing 
gun availability.136  There are between 262 and 310 million firearms 
privately owned in America.137  Guns are not registered or tracked, so there 
is no reliable way for the government to hunt down and seize each one.138  
Furthermore, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, gun owners would need to 
                                                 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 60–61; MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, ANALYSIS OF RECENT 
MASS SHOOTINGS 6–23 (2013), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/
NEWS/A_U.S.%20news/US-news-PDFs/Analysis_of_Mass_Shootings.pdf. 
130. Melter, supra note 10, at 42; Amy Roberts, By the Numbers:  Guns in 
America, CNN (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/09/politics/btn-guns-
in-america. 
131. Melter, supra note 10, at 42–43. 
132. Id. at 43. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 43–44, 60–61 tbl.1. 
135. See “Assault Weapons,” GUNCITE, http://www.guncite.com/gun_control_
gcassaul.html (last updated Oct. 24, 2010); see also Melter, supra note 10, at 42, 44, 60–61 
tbl.1. 
136. See Melter, supra note 10, at 46–47, 49–51. 
137. HILL, supra note 120, at 2. 
138. Id. 
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be adequately compensated if the government chose to confiscate their 
property.139  This would require “hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars,” 
which is simply not in national or states’ budgets.140  Hence, it is highly 
unlikely that gun owners would receive even half of the fair market value of 
their firearms, let alone a single penny for their ammunition and add-ons.141  
Even if government agencies were able to confiscate fifty percent of the guns 
in the United States—with adequate compensation to the owners—over 100 
million guns would still remain.142  Against those numbers, it is difficult to 
imagine that a potential mass shooter would have any trouble gaining access 
to a firearm.143  As such, a government seizure of guns in America would be 
operationally impossible, financially impracticable, constitutionally 
impermissible, and ultimately ineffective.144 
Contrary to popular belief, research shows that the overwhelming 
presence of firearms actually has a deterrent effect on mass shooters.145  As 
one author noted, “mass shootings rarely take place within the hunting aisles 
of Wal-Mart or at the local shooting range.”146  In fact, “mass shooter[s] 
[almost] always pick a location in which” law-abiding citizens will not be 
armed, such as a school or a place of worship.147  Conversely, areas where 
citizens can lawfully carry a concealed handgun are sixty-seven percent less 
likely to experience a mass-shooting incident.148  This is primarily because 
armed civilians are not suitable prey—they possess the ability to neutralize 
the shooter—and mass shooters are looking for a target, not a duel.149  In 
light of this, Americans may want to think twice before they blame mass 
shootings on the prevalence of firearms.150 
IV. THE LINK TO ANTIDEPRESSANT AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC USE 
Mass shooters have more in common than the fact that they all—by 
definition—used a firearm to effectuate death and injury.151  This has led 
                                                 
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564. 
140. Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564. 
141. Id. at 1564–65. 
142. Melter, supra note 10, at 51. 
143. Id. 
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; HILL, supra note 120, at 2, 8 figs.4 & 5 
(noting the sheer number of households that contain a firearm); Kopel, supra note 23, at 1564; 
Melter, supra note 10, at 49–51. 
145. Melter, supra note 10, at 41–42. 
146. Id. at 53. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 42. 
149. See id. at 41. 
150. See Melter, supra note 10, at 41. 
151. See id. 
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authors and researchers to propose alternatives to gun control that could be 
used to arrive at an actual solution to the mass murder problem.152  For 
instance, most mass shooters have a documented history of mental illness.153  
Hence, numerous researchers have proposed that gun buyers should be 
required to provide firearms vendors with a certificate guaranteeing the 
buyer’s mental health.154 
While this seems like a viable solution to the mass shooter problem, 
it suffers from the exact same flaws as previous gun control legislation, but 
with more of a negative economic impact.155  Looking at the mental health 
certificate idea objectively, it is plain to see that it is just an additional form 
of permit or background check that gun purchasers would need to supply.156  
Firearms dealers would still have the burden of verifying the certificate’s 
authenticity, and states would still be under no obligation to keep records in a 
readily searchable database in order to facilitate verification; in fact, as seen 
with the NICS, states are sometimes reluctant to comply even when they are 
urged to supply records for a federal database.157  Prospective gun buyers 
without insurance might not be able to afford the doctor’s visit, and 
therefore, they would be denied their Second Amendment rights purely 
because of their economic status.158  If Medicare or Medicaid covered the 
cost of the doctor’s visit for those without adequate funds, then the already-
strained federal budget would be put under even more stress.159  
Furthermore, the mental health certificate may rely on the opinion of a single 
doctor, which may not always be accurate.160  Even if accurate, the practice 
of denying Second Amendment rights to those diagnosed as mentally ill 
would be constitutionally impermissible because those individuals would not 
have received due process of law before their rights were stripped.161  
Essentially, there are too many problems with the mental health certificate 
idea for it to be a viable solution.162 
                                                 
152. Id. at 56; McCreary, supra note 1, at 855. 
153. See Unruh, supra note 3. 
154. McCreary, supra note 1, at 855; Melter, supra note 10, at 56. 
155. See McCreary, supra note 1, at 855–57. 
156. Id. at 855. 
157. Id. at 838, 856. 
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. II; McCreary, supra note 1, at 838, 856. 
159. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
MEDICARE ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET 1 (2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/39xx/doc3982/11-14-longrangebrief6.pdf; McCreary, supra note 1, at 
857. 
160. See McCreary, supra note 1, at 827 (noting that Cho was released from a 
mental health facility after one doctor said that he was not a danger to himself or others). 
161. United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2012). 
162. E.g., McCreary, supra note 1, at 857. 
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Fortunately, the fact that many mass shooters had a documented 
mental illness means that they have yet another characteristic in common:  
Most of them sought—or were forced to undergo—treatment from a 
physician or psychiatrist.163  Similarly, the treatments offered to these mass 
shooters were comparable in the sense that they were all antidepressant or 
antipsychotic medications.164  For example:  Laurie Dann, on Anafranil and 
Lithium, opened fire on seven children in 1988, killing one;165 Patrick Purdy, 
prescribed Thorazine and Amitriptyline, killed five children and wounded 
thirty others with an AK-47 assault rifle in 1989;166 that same year, Joseph T. 
Wesbecker gunned down twenty of his coworkers just a month after he 
began taking Prozac;167 unnamed “‘prescription medications related to the 
treatment of psychological problems”’ were found in Seung-Hui Cho’s 
possession just after his shooting rampage at Virginia Tech left thirty-two 
dead;168 finally, James Eagan Holmes was prescribed sertraline—a generic 
form of Zoloft—and Clonazepam shortly before he began stockpiling 
firearms and ammunition for his 2012 massacre in Aurora, Colorado;169 and 
those are just to name a few.  Thus, this pattern is a factor that cannot be 
ignored when trying to solve the mass shooting problem in America.170 
The availability of antipsychotics and antidepressants has been 
steadily increasing since the 1950s, with more than twenty types being 
introduced to the market since then.171  The number of Americans on 
antidepressants has doubled every ten years since the 1970s, and today, 
roughly ten percent of Americans are prescribed at least one of these 
drugs.172  There are four popular types of antidepressants:  Tricyclics, 
                                                 
163. Id. at 825; Unruh, supra note 3; Jenny Deam, James Holmes’ Psychiatrist 
Warned He May Pose Threat, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/
04/nation/la-na-james-holmes-documents-20130405. 
164. See Corsi, supra note 3; Unruh, supra note 3. 
165. Unruh, supra note 3. 
166. Robert Reinhold, Killer Depicted as Loner Full of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
20, 1989, at A.8; Unruh, supra note 3. 
167. Ronald Smothers, Disturbed Past of Killer of 7 Is Unraveled, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 1989, at 1.10; Unruh, supra note 3. 
168. Corsi, supra note 3. 
169. McCreary, supra note 1, at 823; Deam, supra note 163. 
170. See Corsi, supra note 3.  Approximately “[ninety] percent of school 
shoot[ers]” were prescribed these drugs.  Id. 
171. Bruce L. Saltz et al., Recognizing and Managing Antipsychotic Drug 
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14, 14 (Supp. 2 2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC487007/
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monoamine oxidase inhibitors (“MAOIs”), selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (“SSRIs”), and serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors 
(“SNRIs”).173  Popular SSRI brand names include Prozac, Paxil, Celexa, and 
Zoloft, whereas popular SNRIs are marketed under names such as Effexor 
and Cymbalta.174  SSRIs and SNRIs are more popular than tricyclics and 
MAOIs because they are newer, and, in comparison, users may have a 
decreased risk of developing long-term involuntary movement disorders.175  
However, patients react to drugs differently and “no one-size-fits-all 
approach to medication exists.”176 
Doctors and patients have to conduct trial-and-error experiments 
with different psychoactive drugs and different dosages in order to 
“maximize relief while minimizing side effects.”177  This is because 
antipsychotics and the four most popular categories of antidepressants are 
metabolized in the human body by two enzymes:  Cytochromes P2D6 and 
P2C19 (“CYP2D6” and “CYP2C19”).178  The body’s production of these 
enzymes determines how an individual will react to psychoactive 
medications.179  Accordingly, if a patient’s body naturally produces high 
amounts of CYP2D6 or CYP2C19, then the patient will metabolize an 
antidepressant such as Prozac very quickly, the drug will only effect the 
patient minimally, and only for a short amount of time.180  Conversely, if a 
patient’s body does not produce enough of these enzymes, then a normal 
dose of the psychoactive drug will cause the active ingredient to build up in 
the patient’s system.181  Such an accumulation of the drug in the human body 
causes serious side effects.182 
                                                 
173. 117 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (2010). 
174. Id. 
175. Id.; Jack J. Chen, Drug-Induced Movement Disorders:  A Primer, U.S. 
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177. Id. 
178. What is CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 Testing for Psychiatric Drug Response?, 
CEPMED, https://cepmed.dnadirect.com/grc/patient-site/psychiatric-drug-response/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2014); see also Weir, supra note 172. 
179. See Sara Hoffman Jurand, Lawsuits Over Antidepressants Claim the Drug 
Is Worse than the Disease, TRIAL, Mar. 2003, at 14, 16–17; see also M.J. Kuhar & A.R. Joyce, 
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The side effects experienced by poor metabolizers can range 
anywhere from nausea and dizziness to aggression and violence.183  
Akathisia is a reported side effect of psychoactive drug use that is 
characterized by “a terrible inner sensation of agitation accompanied by a 
compulsion to move about.”184  Patients experiencing akathisia often 
“describe it as wanting to ‘jump out of their skin.’”185  This condition has 
been known to trigger violent behavior and drive patients to commit suicide 
and homicide.186 
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical manufacturers insist that akathisia is 
not a side effect at all:  “[P]atients taking [antidepressants and 
antipsychotics] suffer from clinical depression—and . . . depressed people 
can be suicidal.”187  However, doctors often prescribe these drugs for medical 
conditions other than depression, and with good reason.188  Zoloft alone has 
been approved by the FDA as suitable for treating panic disorder, pediatric 
OCD, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and social anxiety disorder, to name 
a few.189  Patients who received psychoactive drugs as a treatment for 
ailments such as these, and showed no homicidal or suicidal behaviors prior 
to taking the medication, suddenly committed violent acts up to and 
including homicide.190  For example, Vicky Jo Hartman received Zoloft from 
a family doctor despite the fact that “[s]he was not diagnosed with—or even 
evaluated for—clinical depression, anxiety attacks, or any other 
psychological disorder.”191  After a short period of taking the medication as 
directed, Vicky shot her husband and then committed suicide.192  
Furthermore, in spite of the confident facade that pharmaceutical companies 
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Psychopharmacology in the Treatment of Depression, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
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190. See Estates of Tobin v. SmithKline Beecham Pharm., 164 F. Supp. 2d 
1278, 1280, 1283–84 (D. Wyo. 2001); Jurand, supra note 179, at 14; Corsi, supra note 3. 
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put up—that the disease is to blame, not the drug—Solvay Pharmaceuticals 
settled with Columbine victims after it was alleged that Luvox caused Eric 
Harris’s high school rampage in 1999.193  In another case, the manufacturer 
of Paxil was found liable in a wrongful death suit in excess of six million 
dollars after expert testimony revealed that some individuals experience 
severe reactions to SSRIs such as Paxil and Prozac, that the shooter was one 
such individual, and that his ingestion of Paxil caused his homicidal and 
suicidal behavior.194  Instances such as these are evidence that homicidal and 
suicidal tendencies are not always a symptom of a pre-existing mental 
illness, but are sometimes a treatment-induced problem.195 
Despite the increasingly clear connection between psychoactive drug 
use and akathisia-related side effects, it was not until 2006 that the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) even considered requiring the warning labels 
to include these risks.196  Still, the failure to adequately warn about suicidal 
and homicidal tendencies has been the main source of litigation against 
pharmaceutical companies in recent years.197  Much of this litigation has 
proved to be unsuccessful for the plaintiffs for a few reasons.198 
According to Comment k in Section 402A of the Second 
Restatement of Torts, there are some products—such as antidepressants and 
antipsychotics—that are unavoidably unsafe.199  Unavoidably unsafe 
products are those that have the potential to pose a serious risk to users even 
if the product is used as directed.200  Manufacturers of products that fall 
under the meaning of Comment k are generally exempted from strict liability 
in suits for injuries related to the use of the product.201  Manufacturers are 
able to put unavoidably unsafe products—such as psychoactive 
medications—on the market as long as the medication is not unreasonably 
dangerous.202  A product is only unreasonably dangerous when its benefits 
                                                 
193. Taylor v. Solvay Pharm. Inc., 223 F.R.D. 544, 549 (D. Colo. 2004); 
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fail to outweigh its risks.203  Since the medical utility of an antipsychotic or 
antidepressant is so great, pharmaceutical manufacturers are rarely held 
liable for putting an unavoidably unsafe product on the market.204  As such, 
they can usually only be held liable for injury resulting from use of their 
product when they failed to provide an adequate warning.205 
In order to be sufficient, the warning label on psychoactive drug 
packaging “must:  (1) indicate the scope of the danger, (2) communicate the 
extent or seriousness of the potential danger, (3) alert a reasonably prudent 
practitioner to the danger, and (4) be conveyed in a satisfactory manner.”206  
The third adequate warning requirement brings up a problem known as the 
learned-intermediary doctrine (“LID”).207 
The LID functions as a major obstacle to plaintiffs asserting a failure 
to warn claim against pharmaceutical manufacturers.208  Under the LID, a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer has no duty to warn a patient of possible side 
effects.209  Rather, the manufacturer is only obligated to warn the medical 
practitioners who will be prescribing the drug.210  The LID applies to claims 
in strict liability and negligence, and it is used to break the chain of causation 
between the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the drug-induced violence of 
the patient.211  The rationale behind the LID is that the “physician is in the 
best position to evaluate the often complex information provided by the 
manufacturer concerning the risks and benefits of its drug . . . and to make an 
individualized medical judgment, based on the patient’s particular needs and 
susceptibilities, as to whether the patient should use the product.”212  In order 
to prove that a drug was not accompanied by a sufficient warning, a doctor, 
qualified as an expert, must testify that had a stronger warning been given, he 
would not have prescribed the drug to his patient.213  This requirement 
almost always sets the plaintiff up for failure, and the reason why is clear 
when one considers the abovementioned information about CYP2D6 and 
CYP2C19.214  Under the current scheme, doctors do not test a patient’s rate 
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214. See Trials, supra note 173, § 16; Jurand, supra note 179, at 16–18; Kuhar 
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of enzyme production prior to prescribing an antipsychotic or 
antidepressant.215  They operate under the assumption that every patient’s 
body has a normal level of CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 and will thus be capable 
of metabolizing the drugs properly.216  Since violent akathisia-related side 
effects do not occur when a drug is metabolized properly, doctors are 
justified in prescribing a medication—regardless of the known possible side 
effects—because a patient with normal CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 levels is 
statistically unlikely to suffer them.217  As such, physicians typically cannot 
testify that a stronger warning would have deterred them from prescribing a 
drug to a particular patient because it is not the content of the warning that 
has the most effect on their decision, but the probability that the warning’s 
content will occur.218 
If a doctor is capable of providing the necessary testimony in a 
failure to warn claim, the plaintiff’s next major obstacle is the 
pharmaceutical company’s federal preemption defense.219  Since the failure 
to warn is a state law cause of action, pharmaceutical companies are inclined 
to argue that “the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to leave no 
room for supplementary state regulation, or state law conflicts with federal 
law, making compliance with both either impossible or frustrating to the 
purpose of the federal law.”220  In cases such as these, the pharmaceutical 
companies insist that the FDA regulations create “both a floor and a ceiling 
for drug labeling” requirements.221  Under this theory, which was the 
common understanding of FDA regulations until 2008, pharmaceutical 
companies were discouraged from strengthening their warnings above what 
was required for FDA compliance.222  This was intended to reduce the risk of 
over-warning, because over-warning would “exaggerate [the drug’s] risk[] . . 
. to avoid liability,” which could “discourage [the] appropriate use of a 
beneficial drug” or “cause meaningful risk information to lose its 
significance.”223 
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However, some courts have noted that the federal regulations 
imposed by the FDA do not always preempt a state law cause of action 
against pharmaceutical manufacturers.224  One such case was Tucker v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp.,225 which involved a wrongful death claim 
against the manufacturer of the antidepressant Paxil.226  In that case, the court 
analyzed the language of the federal statutes that govern changes to a 
psychoactive drug’s warning label.227  The court noted that “the FDA 
regulations allow a manufacturer to modify pharmaceutical labels 
unilaterally and immediately, without prior FDA approval, when the 
manufacturer has reasonable evidence of a serious hazard.”228 
[T]he ongoing ability, authority, and responsibility to strengthen a 
label still rest squarely with the drug manufacturer. . . . [T]he 
FDA’s power to disapprove does not make the manufacturer’s 
voluntarily strengthened label a violation of federal law, which is 
what it would take to establish an actual conflict between state tort 
law and federal law.229 
Many cases after Tucker have followed a similar line of reasoning, finding 
that a pharmaceutical manufacturer has the duty to revise its warning label as 
soon as a possible risk is brought to light.230  Rather, the manufacturer’s duty 
to warn is dependent on the risks that it has reason to know about, and it is 
under a continuous obligation to notify prescribing physicians of any 
possible side effects that could possibly be related to the drug’s use.231  A 
causal relationship between the drug’s use and the purported risk does not 
need to be established in order for the duty to warn to apply.232 
Although a causal relationship need not be shown in order for the 
manufacturer to have the duty to warn, causation is a key element that 
plaintiffs need to prove at trial.233  The causation element is another large 
problem in failure to warn cases, because it requires the plaintiff to show that 
the suicide, homicide, or other event would not have occurred if the patient 
was not prescribed the medication.234  Since pharmaceutical manufacturers 
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are typically the only party with access to information about a drug’s ability 
to actually cause suicidal and homicidal behavior in patients, the plaintiff 
often has trouble establishing the required showing of causation.235 
V. THE SOLUTION 
In recent years, biomedical companies have been investing in 
pharmacogenetic studies, the results of which “offer[] the promise of 
‘personalized medicine.’”236  Pharmacogenetics is the study of differences in 
drug metabolism and response due to differing levels of enzyme 
production.237  Pharmacogeneticists recognize that some individuals are 
chemically incompatible with—or poor metabolizers of—certain prescription 
drugs.238  As a result, pharmacogeneticists have developed a simple test, 
which allows a physician to determine the CYP2D6 and CYP2C19 levels in 
a patient’s body.239  This compatibility test begins with a cheek swab, and 
after two days, a prescribing doctor is able to tell whether a patient will 
experience adverse side effects if prescribed a certain type of medication.240  
According to pharmacogenetic researchers, “[t]he solution . . . is to assess 
enzyme activity and then prescribe medication compatible with that . . . 
activity.”241  Accordingly, the compatibility test is intended to ensure that 
individuals suffering from psychosis, depression, anxiety, or other 
psychological disease will receive a medication that will work with their 
body chemistry.242  Administering the test to patients prior to prescribing an 
antipsychotic or antidepressant will reduce the likelihood that a patient will 
experience violent, homicidal, and suicidal side effects.243 
The proposal, then, is to require pharmaceutical companies to 
provide physicians and psychiatrists with the means necessary to conduct 
one of these tests for each patient who may need a psychoactive medication.  
If less people suffer from akathisia-related side effects, then there is a 
decreased likelihood that individuals will engage in mass shootings.244 
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The financial burden of providing the compatibility tests should not 
fall squarely on the doctors or medical facilities for a few reasons.  First, 
medical facilities such as hospitals, doctors’ offices, mental institutions, and 
psychiatrists’ offices are under a huge financial burden as it is.245  Their 
budgets should not be put under additional stress, especially because 
requiring them to foot the bill for the compatibility test could have a negative 
impact on patient treatment:  If the medical institution is required to foot the 
bill for the compatibility test, then doctors may be convinced to avoid 
prescribing psychoactive drugs in order to save the facility money.  This 
would be an undesired effect, as it may result in patients not receiving the 
treatment they need.  Putting the cost of providing the test on the prescribing 
physician or the medical facility could also cause doctors to continue 
prescribing psychoactive drugs, but simply not administer the test in an effort 
to save money.  If akathisia-related side effects in the patient occurred 
thereafter, then the doctor could lose his or her license and be held civilly 
liable to the patient.246  This would be yet another undesired effect.  Instead, 
putting the cost of the compatibility tests on the pharmaceutical 
manufacturers easily avoids these issues. 
Second, it is a standard principle of tort law that the duty to warn 
falls on the party with the most information available about the product, 
which is the manufacturer.247  The compatibility test is no more than a tool 
that establishes a personalized warning for each patient by providing the 
statistical likelihood of adverse side effects on the user.248  Therefore, the 
duty of providing the test or warning should fall on the manufacturer.249  
Third, this proposal complies with FDA regulations regarding manufacturer-
supplied warnings, because there is no federal law explicitly prohibiting 
pharmaceutical companies from providing the statistical likelihood that an 
individual patient will experience side effects.250 
Finally, this proposal serves as a way around the often-troubling 
LID:  If pharmaceutical companies were required to provide compatibility 
tests to medical practitioners in order to satisfy the adequate warning 
requirement and they failed to do so, then doctors could testify that they 
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would not have prescribed the drug if they knew that the patient was a poor 
metabolizer.  Currently, doctors, patients, and shooting victims bear the risk 
of loss for injury when akathisia-related side effects occur.251  This proposal 
places the risk of loss onto pharmaceutical manufacturers instead because 
they are in a better position to financially handle “the loss by distributing it 
as a cost of doing business.”252  Ultimately, this proposal opens the door for 
pharmaceutical company liability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Mass shootings in America are not going to be stopped by simple 
gun regulations.253  The failures of previous gun laws and the sheer number 
of mass shootings that occurred during America’s strictest gun control eras 
should testify to that point.254  Government-sponsored gun buy-backs, future 
gun bans, and mental health certificates are not viable solutions either 
because of their inherent unconstitutionality and impracticability.255  When it 
comes to mass shootings, gun restrictions are analogous to treating a 
symptom; it is never going to cure the disease because it does not target the 
root cause.256  Instead, if Americans wish to find a solution to the mass-
shooting problem, they need to focus on targeting the source of mass 
shooters’ suicidal and homicidal proclivities.257  One such source is akathisia 
as a result of psychoactive drug use.258  Accordingly, the best way to reduce 
the likelihood of mass shootings is to reduce the likelihood that patients will 
suffer from akathisia after taking a prescription medication.259  One way to 
help ensure that this side effect will not occur is by conducting a simple 
compatibility test to determine the patients’ ability to metabolize 
psychoactive drugs.260  The compatibility test requirement also makes the 
pharmaceutical companies vulnerable to civil suit.261 
The doors for pharmaceutical company liability need to be opened 
when it is discovered that a mass shooter was using that company’s drug, and 
rightly so.  If it is discovered that an antipsychotic or antidepressant was 
being used by a mass shooter at the time of the massacre in question, then 
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pharmaceutical companies should bear some risk of liability.  This will 
undoubtedly help the survivors and the families of the deceased.  Typically, 
these individuals cannot recover from the shooter because he is either dead—
shot by the police or committed suicide at the scene—or because he is not 
financially capable of adequately compensating his victims.  The victims 
cannot recover from gun manufacturers under the current regulatory scheme 
because they are immune from suit in these circumstances.262  Survivors and 
the families of the deceased cannot recover from the owner of the shooting’s 
location because they would have to prove that the owner knew or should 
have known that this venue would be the place of an attack and he failed to 
hire security accordingly, which oftentimes requires a previous, similar 
violent instance at that location.263  Opening liability on the pharmaceutical 
companies gives the victims a chance to recover damages, have their medical 
expenses covered, or have their loved ones’ funeral service paid for.  It will 
also help because it will encourage the pharmaceutical companies to 
independently—on their own time and dime—work toward reducing the 
likelihood of their product causing a violent event. 
Aside from lifting the burden off of the gun industry, saving money 
on ineffectual gun legislation attempts, helping to reduce the mass shooting 
problem, and assisting victims in their struggle to recover, this solution also 
secures the rights of those suffering from mental illness.  With the 
compatibility test administered, these individuals do not have to suffer 
through a trial-and-error method of treatment; it is likely that they will get 
the most effective medication for their ailment the very first try—the best 
possible treatment for their illness—thus securing their right to 
comprehensive mental health care.  Further, this solution will assist in 
securing the Second Amendment rights of all American citizens—regardless 
of their health—because it does not impose additional disqualifiers for 
firearm ownership, nor does it mandate additional certifications or checks. 
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